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How to Manage Such a Complex Program

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ITER: The Giant Fusion Reactor
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Abstract

Few will disagree that ITER is a huge multifaceted project management challenge, one that is technological, industrial, organizational, and logistical and concerns people. How can decentralized manufacturing be managed across 35 countries? How can any timetable be respected when industry itself generates many risks and unforeseen events because it is dealing with a unique and unprecedented program? How can budget increases be kept at least to a minimum if not completely avoided? How can such a complex endeavor that involves several thousand people all over the world be kept under control? How can staff be motivated when high pressure and heavy workload are part of daily life? Moreover, most important of all, how can a unique and unprecedented program that has no reference point be managed when it comes to its organization and management? This chapter explains the management and governance that have been put in place by the ITER Organization and the seven Domestic Agencies under the supervision of the ITER Council. Many changes were brought in after publication of a management assessment report in 2013 that was highly critical. Although the full report has never been made public, the summary was crystal clear: “There has been a lack of strong project management culture inside the ITER Organization. The ITER Organization’s culture appears to be more academic and research oriented, which has often led to protracted debates and impeded rapid progress. […] As a result, many of the best ideas were never heard nor expressed and key decisions lacked ownership.” ITER can be described as a political project in that it is managed by politicians. However, despite featuring what Robert Bell calls political technology (technology developed and showcased for political reasons) ITER is a driving force behind research and industry in fusion. ITER governance reflects the importance of the “technostructure.” As argued by John Kenneth Galbraith the stockholders are without real power and decisions are effectively taken by groups of experts. ITER also bears out the theses of French sociologist Jacques Ellul who came to the conclusion that humankind today can play only a secondary role in the development of technology.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The report has never officially been published, but the executive summary was put online by a journalist from The New Yorker, Raffi Katchadourian, who investigated ITER over several months and published one of the best articles (in my opinion) on the subject: Katchadourian [1]. The summary is available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1031934-2013-iter-management-assessment.html.

  2. 2.

    See, for example, Drucker [2].

  3. 3.

    Morin [3].

  4. 4.

    Gibney [4].

  5. 5.

    Bell [5].

  6. 6.

    The current ITER Director General Bernard Bigot (whose five-year contract has just been renewed), former head of the CEA, does indeed have a triple profile since he is a scientist, a manager of large technology programs, and has experience of international politics. He has a dark side in that he is used to managing staff in a ministry and likes to fire people with immediate effect. The ITER Organization has been condemned in several cases by the administrative tribunal of the International Labour Organization (ILO) based in Geneva.

  7. 7.

    See, in particular, Galbraith [6].

  8. 8.

    See, for example, Ellul [7].

  9. 9.

    French scholars of the time used the word technique in their analysis to refer to technology, although their meanings are not exactly equivalent.

  10. 10.

    Les Echos of January 12, 2006.

  11. 11.

    Sokal [8].

  12. 12.

    Feyerabend [9].

References

  1. Katchadourian R (2014) A star in a bottle. The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/03/a-star-in-a-bottle

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  4. Gibney E (2014) Five-year delay would spell end of ITER. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature.2014.15621

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  7. Ellul J (1980) The technological system. Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, Oregon

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  8. Sokal A (1996) Transgressing the boundaries: towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity. Soc Text (46/47):217–252

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Correspondence to Michel Claessens .

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Claessens, M. (2020). How to Manage Such a Complex Program. In: ITER: The Giant Fusion Reactor. Copernicus, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27581-5_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27581-5_9

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