Abstract
This chapter examines the ways in which Said’s book on Conrad draws on existential phenomenology to reinvigorate and go beyond what I have shown to be an exhausted formalism. Through analyses of the writings of Georges Poulet, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, R.P. Blackmur, and Jean-Paul Sartre, I illustrate how Said builds on these thinkers to conceptualize literature as the embodiment of an authorial consciousness firmly embedded in the world. This method, which rehumanizes literature and locates agency with the individual, informs Said’s interpretation of human behavior in Conrad’s novellas as responses to reduce inner conflicts. The chapter reveals the critical ethics of responsibility informing Said’s practice and how, already in his first book, Said turned literary criticism into an interventionist activity programmatically committed to worldliness and change.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
In 1975, Joseph Hillis Miller announced his membership of a new group of critics centered at Yale University which also included his colleagues Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman and de Man (1975, 33). To this tetrarchy in New Haven, Hillis Miller counted Derrida, who was never a full-time scholar at Yale but heavily influenced the group from the margins. These ‘Yale Critics’—or sometimes dubbed ‘New Yale Critics’ so as to distinguish them from their New Critical predecessors Brooks, Wimsatt, Penn Warren and Wellek in the 1950s (Redfield 2016, 3–4)—significantly differed from each other and weren’t therefore seen so much as an actual group at the time (see Hartman 2004, viii), but more as a conceptual entity which became synonymous for ‘theory’ in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s (Redfield 2016, 2).
- 3.
Mark Currie’s The Invention of Deconstruction (2013) and Marc Redfield’s Theory at Yale: The Strange Case of Deconstruction in America (2016) provide recent accounts of the impact of ‘French Theory’ in U.S. academic culture. For a French perspective on the topic, see François Cusset’s French theory: Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze et cie et les mutations de la vie intellectuelle aux Etats-Unis (2003).
- 4.
The resemblance to the institutional situation of the New Criticism in the 1950s and its authoritative weight that caused the very term ‘New Criticism’ to be synonymous to ‘criticism’ itself is striking.
- 5.
Graff describes the institutional situation in a more vivid manner: “The senior ‘Renaissance man’ might fulminate privately about the obstreperous young ‘modernist’ in the office down the hall with his impertinent opinions about Milton and Shelley and his pretentious and incomprehensible cant about textures, structures, and objective correlatives. But his more tolerant department chairman had only to remind the old scholar that he personally need have nothing to do with the offensive young man, whose courses in any case were drawing so many students into the department that the dean might soon be ready to meet the department’s request for another medievalist. When the Renaissance man retired, his replacement was most likely somebody who had quietly assimilated the critical methods, with the offensive prejudices smoothed away” (1987, 194).
- 6.
Poulet remarks that the act of reading is marked by “the disappearance of the ‘object’” (1972, 57)—which is of course nonsensical and should be taken to mean figuratively, not literally (McLaughlin 2015, 43–44). In what follows, Poulet therefore backs away from asserting the actual disappearance of the book as a material object in favor of a phenomenological description of the experience of the act of reading. However, he does approach the experience of reading and the encounter of a reader with a text almost exclusively in mentalist terms by reiterating the assumption that “in order to exist as mental objects they must relinquish their existence as real objects” (Poulet 1972, 58). Thomas McLaughlin, on the other hand, has recently taken up a position that is closer to existential phenomenologists who revalue the role of the body. He stresses that reading is a highly physical act: “In the act of reading, there is no question—the book is not ‘nowhere’ it is right in front of my eyes. And it can only exist as a mental object if it exists as a material object, accessible to highly disciplined operations” (McLaughlin 2015, 44).
- 7.
I am indebted to Steven Knapp and Walter Ben Michaels for this example. In their seminal 1982 article “Against Theory” they come up with the now famous example in which the sea seemingly recreates stanzas from a well-known poem of Wordsworth on the sand in order to argue that as long as we take something to be meaningful, it must always be the product of an intentional, conscious agent (Knapp and Michaels 1982, 727–729). According to Knapp and Michaels, we would only consider these squiggles in the sand to be meaningful if we can ascribe them to some sort of intentional agent or consciousness, such as the living sea—after we have judged the sea to possess a consciousness and thus capable of being such an agent. However, if we judge otherwise and deem the sea to be incapable of intentional agency, we would consider the marks on the sand to be accidental, nonintentional effects of the mechanical operation of the waves. Because in this second case the marks are not the product of an intentional, conscious agent, we would also consider them meaningless (Knapp and Michaels 1982, 728).
- 8.
I would like to reiterate my remark that every literary theory implicitly foregrounds its preferred literary genre that suits its methodology. Where poetry is a proxy for literature in the New Criticism, a quick browse through some seminal phenomenological texts reveals that the kind of literature that phenomenologists are concerned with could now be classified as ‘traditional’ literature from the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century, written by ‘white’, ‘European’, and ‘male’ authors such as Baudelaire, Nerval, Proust, Flaubert, Henry James, Conrad, and Dickens. While some of these authors were non-canonical in their respective cultural and historical moments, their writings have now been firmly established in the canon of Western literature. Contrary to non-Western, experimental literature, or works predating modernity, these works easily allow the kind of immersive reading which phenomenology propagates and do not really complicate understanding beyond the horizon of these equally white, European, and male phenomenological literary critics. Unsurprisingly, not long after World War II Simone de Beauvoir stressed that phenomenology often takes for granted a normalized male subject (1949). Shortly thereafter, the Martiniquan psychiatrist Frantz Fanon added that in order for black people to get by in the world of phenomenology they must wear ‘white masks’ (1952).
- 9.
This especially holds true for Husserl’s early publications. In his unfinished book Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1954) and in the dozens of unpublished notes which were collected at the Husserl Archive at the University of Leuven and became known only after his death in 1937, Husserl expands on his ideas about the transcendental consciousness. Seemingly influenced by his student Martin Heidegger whose Sein und Zeit is built on the foundation that the very essence of human existence, what it means to be human, is precisely its being-in-the-world or what he called “das In-der-Welt-sein” (1967), the notions of environing world or existential lifeworld (Umwelt) come to occupy central positions in these posthumous works (Holub 1995, 292).
- 10.
Sartre uses this aphorism to argue that at the moment of our birth we are thrown into the world—“jeté dans le monde” (1946, 37)—and that, due to the lack of any a priori essence to our human existence, we have the total responsibility over our existence and painful freedom to fill in our subjectivity ourselves (1946, 24). This happens in an intentional process that takes place on a daily basis in our dynamic encounter with the world, through our intentional acts of improvising, responding, and adapting to the changing situations we encounter. To Sartre, it means that “l’homme existe d’abord, se rencontre, surgit dans le monde, et qu’il se définit après. L’homme, tel que le conçoit l’existentialiste, s’il n’est pas définissable, c’est qu’il n’est d’abord rien. Il ne sera qu’ensuite, et il sera tel qu’il se sera fait” (1946, 21–22).
- 11.
Hartman identifies the same anti-formalist tendency in the criticism of Poulet as we have seen in Said’s treatment of Conrad, in which Said does not draw any formal distinction between Conrad’s texts and argues that every individual imagination reveals the same authorial consciousness. Likewise, the criticism of Poulet ignores “all formal distinctions, as between part and whole, or preface, novel, journalistic comment, obiter dicta” (Hartman 1966, 550–551). Moreover, part of Poulet’s antiformalism is that he makes “no distinction between Coleridge’s primary and secondary imaginations. The I AM implicit in every act of consciousness is also the I AM revealed in art” (Hartman 1966, 553).
- 12.
We could image that Derrida, for one, must have done so. A year later he published La voix et le phénomène (1967), a work that refutes precisely this transparent idea of language and the concept of a Husserlian, transcendental consciousness. The work is regarded to be a foundational work for the method of deconstruction. It includes, amongst other things, a long discussion of Husserl’s theory of signs and a critique of Poulet’s notion that language is under the final authority of an individual subject (see Said 1975, 338).
- 13.
The authorial consciousness at the same time acts as the center or structural and organizing principle of the literary work and as the work’s genetic origin (Hartman 1966, 551). As such, phenomenological literary criticism not wholly unproblematically equates the spatial notion of ‘center’ and the temporal notion of ‘source’ and fails to account for the fact that these notions are not identical and a very productive tension may indeed develop between them (de Man 1971c, 82).
- 14.
Hillis Miller had joined Poulet at Johns Hopkins in 1953, where he found himself immensely inspired by the Belgian critic of consciousness. The two became close collaborators and friends. In 1959, under close supervision of Poulet, Hillis Miller published Charles Dickens: the World of his Novels (1959), a reworked version of his Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard that was already quite inimical in scope to the New Criticism but now became even more so. The reworked version was also the first explicit criticism of consciousness written by an American and made Hillis Miller one of the most influential avant-gardist phenomenological critics in the United States of the 1960s, before he gradually dropped phenomenology in the 1970s in favor of the deconstructive criticism of his colleagues at Yale (Eagleton 2008, 51; Leitch 2010, 134; Lentricchia 1980, 64). Attesting to Hillis Miller’s status as the leading phenomenologist in the United States is the inclusion of a chapter on his work in Sarah Lawall’s Critics of Consciousness (1968), the first monograph to introduce Anglophone critics to the phenomenology of an otherwise exclusively European and French-speaking group of critics such as Marcel Raymond, Albert Béguin, Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre Richard, Jean Starobinski, Jean Rousset, and Maurice Blanchot.
- 15.
I am not implicitly arguing that the phenomenological method in literary criticism proposed by such critics as Gadamer is better. A flaw of this method is that it fails to account for ideology and existing power relations and does not take into account that the hermeneutic dialogue is not always conducted between equal partners, but is as often as not a monologue by the powerful to the powerless (Eagleton 2008, 64). While Poulet’s model does not account for this either, it is actually a more realistic depiction of such unequal power relations.
- 16.
In the words of Sartre: “Ce que j’appelle le vécu, c’est précisément l’ensemble du processus dialectique de la vie psychique, un processus qui reste nécessairement opaque à lui-même car il est une constante totalisation, et une totalisation qui ne peut être conscient de ce qu’elle est. On peut être conscient, en effet, d’une totalisation extérieure, mais non d’une totalisation qui totalise également la conscience. En ce sens, le vécu est toujours susceptible de compréhension, jamais de connaissance” (1972, 111; my emphasis).
- 17.
For a more thorough examination of the role of Schopenhauerian philosophy in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, see Abdirahman Hussein’s Edward Said: Criticism and Society (2002, 32–48). For more on the ‘subjective correlative’, see R. Raj Singh’s Schopenhauer: A Guide for the Perplexed (2010, 16–19). Schopenhauer’s ‘subjective correlative’ may not without good reason remind us of T.S. Eliot’s ‘objective correlative’. For a recent study of the Schopenhauerian genealogy of Eliot’s objective correlative, see the work of Aakanksha Virkar-Yates (2015).
- 18.
Criticism of consciousness at times collapses not only the traditional distinction between literary and non-literary texts but, as a result of the duplication of the author’s language by the critic, the distinction between literature and criticism too. As Poulet poetically writes, criticism of consciousness is the purest form of criticism: “Il n’est pas de plus pure. Il n’en est pas de plus littéraire. Littérature de la littérature, conscience de la conscience. Elle correspond exactement dans le domaine de la critique à ce que Mallarmé a réalisé dans un plus haut domaine, celui de la poésie” (1954, 9).
- 19.
In September 1966, a month before he addressed the audience in Baltimore, Poulet attended a conference on contemporary French literary criticism at Cérisy-la-Salle in Normandy. In a discussion following a talk by Gérard Genette, Poulet admitted that his biggest literary critical concern was to “sauver à tout prix la subjectivité de la littérature” (Poulet cited by Genette 1967, 251).
- 20.
At the eve of World War II, Husserl’s unfinished works and unpublished notes were smuggled outside of Germany, where they were in danger of destruction by the Nazis because Husserl was born in a Jewish family, and brought for safekeeping to the University of Leuven. In 1939, Merleau-Ponty was one of the first to travel to the Husserl Archive in Leuven to study these notes. He found himself deeply impressed by Husserl’s unedited writings on the Umwelt or ‘environing world’ (Holub 1995, 292–293), which he considered to be Husserl’s most important contributions to philosophy and on which he consequently built his seminal work Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). For a sweeping account of the transfer of Husserl’s writings from Freiburg to Leuven, see Sarah Bakewell’s At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being and Apricot Cocktails (2016, 125–130).
- 21.
Compare with Sartre’s argument that “nous entendons par existentialisme une doctrine qui rend la vie humaine possible et qui, par ailleurs, déclare que toute vérité et toute action impliquent un milieu et une subjectivité humaine” (1946, 12).
- 22.
Merleau-Ponty borrows the term from Husserl’s unedited notes that are stored at the archives in Leuven, where this existential lifeworld is more aptly called the Umwelt (Beyer 2016; Said 1967, 63). The German prefix um- is used to denote a circular motion, ‘around’ or ‘about’, and in combination with the noun Welt comes to denote a ‘surrounding world’ or literally an ‘around-world’.
- 23.
This is the so-called existentialist ‘paradox of freedom’, according to which human freedom is what it is on account of its limits, not despite them. Or, in the words of Sartre, “il n’y a de liberté qu’en situation et il n’y a de situation que par la liberté. La réalité-humaine rencontre partout des résistances et des obstacles qu’elles n’a pas créés; mais ces résistances et ces obstacles n’ont de sens que dans et par le libre choix que la réalité-humaine est” (Sartre 1943, 469–470).
- 24.
In L’Être et le néant Sartre argues that even when the possibility of physical interaction with the world seems inexistent, individuals always have the freedom of intentionality which is a psychological form of action: “Ainsi ne dirons-nous pas qu’un captif est toujours libre de sortir de prison, ce qui serait absurde, ni non plus qu’il est toujours libre de souhaiter l’élargissement, ce qui serait un lapalissade sans portée, mais qu’il est toujours libre de chercher à s’évader (ou à se faire libérer) – c’est-à-dire que quelle que soit sa condition, il peut pro-jeter son évasion et s’apprendre à lui-même la valeur de son projet par un début d’action” (1943, 564). Sartre’s model of agency collapses the distinction between intention and action.
- 25.
We have already encountered the lines following this citation during my discussion of the affective fallacy in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography and Said’s stance on the ‘imperialism of criticism’ related to it. The particular Sartrean intertext of this passage offers a more precise reading of Said’s remarks that “the critical act is first of all an act of comprehension: a particular comprehension of the written work, and not of its origins in a general theory of the unconscious” (1966, 7; my emphasis). As Said indicates in the work’s preface, the goal of his reading of Conrad that is set on comprehending consciousness is precisely to “balance the current view of him as a writer of ‘mythic’ or ‘unconscious’ fiction” (1966, ix).
- 26.
The clearest example of this concern can be found in “Traveling Theory” (1983), where in a discussion of the intellect or subject in the works of Georg Lukács, Said writes that “he shows the increasing retreat of the subject into passive, privatized contemplation, gradually more and more divorced from the overwhelmingly fragmented realities of modern industrial life, Lukacs [sic] then depicts modern bourgeois thought as being at an impasse, transfixed and paralyzed into terminal passivity” (1983, 231).
- 27.
The first passage I cite is from Walter Kaufmann’s translation in The Portable Nietzsche, which only contains an abridged version of Nietzsche’s essay (1966). I cite this version of the passage because it is the version cited by Said. For an unabridged and slightly different translation, see Ronald Speirs’s version “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” (1999). This is also the version of Nietzsche’s essay I cite in the remainder of this book.
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Vandeviver, N. (2019). Beyond Formalism. In: Edward Said and the Authority of Literary Criticism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27351-4_3
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