Abstract
This chapter challenges the widespread assumption that disagreement about the nature of racism is disagreement about a matter of fact. This assumption is surely false if conventionalism provides the correct picture of meaning and definition. On conventionalism, disagreement about the correct definition of “racism” is disagreement about a norm. That is, disputes about “what racism is” are part of an ongoing process of “metalinguistic negotiation.” The object of this negotiation is a norm, a representational practice. And the method of negotiation consists of pragmatic advocacy in support of a picture about what the term “racism” ought to mean. The author concludes by defending the contention that metalinguistic negotiations can be rational.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For a discussion of conceptual disagreement about racism from a social science perspective, see Etienne Balibar’s “Racism Revisited: Sources, Relevance, and Aporias of a Modern Concept” (2008).
- 2.
Garcia (1999, 13–14).
- 3.
Garcia (1997, 6).
- 4.
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 2).
- 5.
- 6.
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).
- 7.
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 14).
- 8.
This point is acknowledged by Plunkett and Sundell, for their account is meant to apply to many “context-sensitive expressions” (2013, 16).
- 9.
The term “metalinguistic statement” is sometimes used to signify a statement about language. For example, “The word ‘red’ is used to signify a color that is darker than pink.” I do not limit my use of “metalinguistic” to explicit statements about language. As Glock points out, grammatical propositions “expressing a linguistic rule need not be a metalinguistic statement about the employment of words, or contain expressions of generality. Rather, they depend on whether an expression has a normative function on a given occasion” (1996, 324). After all, “Red is darker than pink” and “The king moves one square at a time” are not explicitly about the words “red” and “king,” respectively, and yet they function as norms governing the use of these terms.
- 10.
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15).
- 11.
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 3).
- 12.
This felicitous phrase is Georg Henrik von Wright’s: “Philosophic reflexion on the grounds for calling a thing ‘x’ is challenged in situations when the grounds have not been fixed when there is no settled opinion as to what the grounds are. The concept still remains to be moulded and therewith its logical connexions with other concepts to be established. The words and expressions the use of which bewilder the philosopher are so to speak in search of a meaning” (1967, section 3).
- 13.
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15–16).
- 14.
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, 15).
- 15.
Rules must be followed intentionally, but intentionally following a rule does not imply a conscious decision to follow a rule; nor does it imply the presence of the rule in one’s mind as one follows it. “Although rule-following presupposes a regularity in behaviour, this does not distinguish it from natural regularities like the movement of the planets or human acts which happen to conform to a rule unintentionally. If an agent follows a rule in Фing, the rule must be part of his reason for Фing, and not just a cause. He must intend to follow the rule. However, this intentionality is only virtual. He does not have to think about or consult the rule formulation while Фing, it is only required that he would adduce it to justify or explain his Фing” (Glock 1996, 324–325).
- 16.
To commit oneself to grammatical rule is simultaneously to commit oneself to a technique of application. This technique determines the range of possible applications. It follows from this that although grammatical rules themselves may be arbitrary, their application is not. (See Lectures 1930–32, p. 58.) The stipulation of a rule always involves, implicitly or explicitly, the positing of an explanation of meaning (e.g., a rule-formulation) that determines the range of possible applications. It further follows from this view that, once a grammatical rule (an explanation of meaning) is established, what counts as the correct application of the rule is no longer a matter of individual or collective decision, for the normative force of the rule is given by the practice and not by the attitudes of individuals as such.
- 17.
- 18.
Glasgow (2009, 92).
- 19.
Blum (2002, 55–57).
- 20.
Blum (2002, 2).
- 21.
Blum (2002, 8).
- 22.
Blum (2004, 76).
- 23.
This is a crude summary of my argument in “What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do” (2018).
- 24.
Kekes (1977, 72).
- 25.
Kekes (1977, 75–76).
- 26.
Kekes (1977, 84–86).
- 27.
Kekes thinks that there are six necessary and sufficient conditions for essentially contested concepts: “I regard the following six [conditions required for a concept to be essentially contested] as necessary: first, the concept must signify a type of voluntary and goal-directed activity; second, the concept must be used appraisively and the debate stems from conflicting appraisals; third, the participants in the debate must share a need and a goal, and the aim of the debate is to find the best way of satisfying the need and of achieving the goal; hence, both the existence of the debate and its resolution are in the interest of the participants; fourth, the type of activity signified by the concept must be internally complex; fifth, the importance of the elements comprising the internally complex type of activity must be variously assessable; hence the use of the concept is modifiable; sixth, the debate about the correct use of the concept must be capable of rational resolution” (Kekes 1977, 86).
- 28.
The concept and term were originally introduced by Gallie (1956). Kekes presents his analysis as a modification of and improvement on Gallie’s account.
- 29.
“By this [“internal complexity”] I mean that the activity must comprise many elements, each of which plays a role in the performance. An element contributes to the internal complexity of the activity if without it the activity could not be what it is. So internal complexity is due to necessary, and not merely to accidental, elements involved in normal performance” (Kekes 1977, 79).
- 30.
I am not suggesting that the concept winning in basketball is normally contested. It is not. My point is that the concept could be contested due to its internal complexity. Indeed, there are times when the concept is contested: e.g., when a referee makes a bad call which costs the “losing” team the game; or, when children play for fun, without keeping score, and the team with the highest number of points claims victory.
- 31.
A “ranking,” as I use the term, is one of several possible evaluative hierarchies of a concept’s internal elements. Consider Kekes’ fifth necessary condition: “The importance of the elements in an internally complex activity instantiating an ECC [essentially contested concept] must be variously assessible” (Kekes 1977, 80).
- 32.
“Modification is possible,” writes Kekes, “because various elements can be ranked in different hierarchies. Internal complexity and the various assessibility of the elements guarantee the openness of ECCs [Essentially Contested Concepts] and their openness makes the activities modifiable” (1977, 81).
- 33.
For as Kekes observes: “Of course, such generalities irresistibly call forth the Socratic questioner hiding in each philosopher. However, my point is not that these generalities should be left unquestioned, but that they define a domain upon which the questioning must be concentrated. The disputes and controversies have a common subject and it is that subject that ECCs signify” (Kekes 1977, 76).
- 34.
Kekes 1977, 87–88.
- 35.
I use the term “racial realist” here in connection with a particular school of critical race theory associated with the work of Derrick Bell (1992a; 1992b). According to Bell, racial realism is, among other things, the position that racism is a permanent feature of society. For discussion and defense of this thesis, see Tommy Curry (2009).
- 36.
Harris (1998, 228).
- 37.
- 38.
Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 1091).
- 39.
Burgess and Plunkett (2013a, 1096).
- 40.
Plunkett and Sundell (2011).
- 41.
The authors cite Peter Ludlow’s “The Dynamic Lexicon” (unpublished manuscript).
References
Balibar, Etienne. 2008. Racism Revisited: Sources, Relevance, and Aporias of a Modern Concept. PMLA 123 (5), Special Topic: Comparative Racialization (October), 1630–1639. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25501966
Barker, Chris. 2002. The Dynamics of Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 1–36.
Baker, Gordon P., and Peter M. S. Hacker. 2009. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volumes 1 and 2 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. 2nd ed. (Extensively revised). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Bell, Derrick. 1992a. Racial Realism. Connecticut Law Review 24 (2): 363–379.
———. 1992b. Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism. New York: Basic Books.
Blum, Lawrence. 2002. “I’m Not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
———. 2004. What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do? In Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki, 56–77. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Burgess, Alexis, and David Plunkett. 2013a. Conceptual Ethics I. Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1091–1101.
———. 2013b. Conceptual Ethics II. Philosophy Compass 8 (12): 1102–1110.
Curry, Tommy J. 2009. Will the Real CRT Please Stand Up? The Dangers of Philosophical Contributions to CRT. The Cut (Winter): 1–47.
Gallie, Walter B. 1956. Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56: 167–198.
Garcia, Jorge L.A. 1997. Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy. Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (2): 5–42.
———. 1999. Philosophical Analysis and the Moral Concept of Racism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (5): 1–32.
Glasgow, Joshua. 2009. Racism as Disrespect. Ethics 120: 64–93. https://doi.org/10.1086/648588.
Goldberg, David T. 1992. The Semantics of Race. Ethnic and Racial Studies 15: 543–569.
Glock, Hans-Johann. 1996. A Wittgenstein Dictionary. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Harris, Leonard. 1998. The Concept of Racism: An Essentially Contested Concept? The Centennial Review XLII (2): 217–232.
Kekes, John. 1977. Essentially contested concepts: A reconsideration. Philosophy & Rhetoric 10 (2, Spring): 71–89.
Kripke, Saul A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ludlow, Peter. The Dynamic Lexicon. unpublished manuscript.
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin. 2018. A View of Racism: 2016 and America’s Original Sin. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1). https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v13i1.253.
Plunkett, David, and Tim Sundell. 2013. Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosopher’s Imprint 13 (23): 1–37.
Sundell, Tim. 2011. Disagreements about taste. Philosophical Studies 155 (2): 267–288.
Urquidez, Alberto G. 2018. What Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do. Journal of Value Inquiry 52: 437.
———. Racism as an Essentially Contested Concept. unpublished manuscript.
von Wright, Georg Henrik. 1967. The Varieties of Goodness. The Gifford Lectures Series. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved online: https://www.giffordlectures.org/books/varieties-goodness
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. On Certainty, ed. Gertrude E.M. Anscombe and Georg H. von Wright and trans. Gertrude E.M. Anscombe and Denis Paul. Oxford: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Urquidez, A.G. (2020). Re-defining “Disagreement”: Rationality Without Final Solutions. In: (Re-)Defining Racism. African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27257-9_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-27256-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-27257-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)