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The Role of Election Management Bodies in Advancing Democracy in Ghana

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Abstract

At the core of democratic governance is an election which is managed by Election Management Bodies (EMBs). This chapter assesses the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) against the Democracy enhancing qualities of EMBs postulated by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), including transparency, independence, impartiality and professionalism. The chapter argues that although the EC has successfully conducted series of elections since 1992 its financing and appointment of Chairpersons tied to the executive casts doubts on the independence of the Commission. Selection of Chairpersons must also involve independent national and private institutions. The chapter further argues for collaborative effort among African EMBs to promote genuine intra-Africa learning through experience sharing, consolidating gains and innovation around common democratic challenges.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Alfred Amedeker, “An assessment of Ghana’s Democratic Consolidation Since 1992 and the Implications for International Relations” (MA dissertation, University of Ghana, 2013), 8–9.

  2. 2.

    Shaheen Mozaffar, “Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa’s emerging democracies,” International Political Science review 23 (2002): 85.

  3. 3.

    Mcebisi Ndletyana, Institutionalizing Democracy: The Story of the Electoral Commission of South Africa 19932014 (South Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2015), 14.

  4. 4.

    Howard Cincotta, What Is Democracy (1998), para. 1, http://www.ait.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/whatsdem/homepage.htm.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.

  6. 6.

    Cincotta, What Is Democracy (1998), para. 1.

  7. 7.

    Omar Mohammed, “The Six African Elections to Watch Out for in 2016” (2016), para. 5, http://qz.com/585357/the-six-africans-elections-to-watch-out-for-in-2016-and-why/.

  8. 8.

    Lawrence LeDuc Richard et al., Comparing Democracies 3: Election and Voting in the 21st Century (London: Sage, 2010), 42.

  9. 9.

    Financing EMBs are major problems in Africa. As an independent body serving the need of citizens, EMBs do not have programs of raising their own money and so are supported by governments. In as much as the government funds the EMBs doesn’t guarantee partiality toward them as this governmental duty are mostly constitutionally backed. Foreign donors also play prominent roles in financing EMBs.

  10. 10.

    Deluc et al., Comparing Democracies 3: Elections and voting in the 21st Century, 42.

  11. 11.

    Richard et al., Comparing Democracies 3: Election and Voting in the 21st Century, 44.

  12. 12.

    Pippa Norris, Why Elections Fail (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 143.

  13. 13.

    The fact that the government model is employed does not guarantee partiality toward the government as in many cases. A closer looks at countries that are mentioned above have little to no problems with regards to elections and electoral violence. It is rather some countries with the independent model that have shown uncertainties and mistrust in their systems.

  14. 14.

    International IDEA, “Electoral Management Design” (2014), 8.

  15. 15.

    IDEA, “Electoral Management Design,” 8.

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Stan ChuIlo, The Face of Africa: Looking Beyond the Shadows (UK: Author House, 2006), 110.

  18. 18.

    The structural independence emanates from the independent Model of EMBs where the EMB is supposed to be separate entity from other arm of government, especially the Executive whereas the fearless comes from the normative expectations of EMBs where they must do their work diligently without fear or favor.

  19. 19.

    IDEA, “Electoral Management Design,” 8.

  20. 20.

    This is evident in countries like Mexico, South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius and Zambia. This system works better with the independent Model than the other Models.

  21. 21.

    Some countries like Brazil, Zambia and Australia have proved that the use of Justices or Judges as heads or chairpersons of EMBs can be very good. Burkina Faso also appointed the leader of a civil society organization.

  22. 22.

    Charles Lasham, “Transparency and Impartiality of the Electoral Administration on Election Day: The Importance of the Management of the Elections and the Role of the Electoral Administrator” (2005), 3.

  23. 23.

    Carl W. Dundas, Electoral Essays and Discourses (UK: Author House, 2014), 233.

  24. 24.

    Commonwealth, Election Management: A Compendium of Commonwealth Good Practices (2016), 15.

  25. 25.

    Transparency also covers the EMBs finances. This could be enforced by electoral laws requiring EMBs to update the public on its financial activities as practiced in Indonesia. This could be through media briefings, releases and stakeholder consultations like the Liberian EMB for their 2011 elections.

  26. 26.

    IDEA, “Electoral Management Design,” 258.

  27. 27.

    EMBs employ temporary people to support them during elections as a result of the work overload during elections.

  28. 28.

    IDEA, “Electoral Management Design,” 258.

  29. 29.

    International IDEA, Electoral Law Reforms in Africa: Insight into the Role of EMBs and Approaches to Engagement (Sweden: Bulls Graphic, 2014), 13.

  30. 30.

    IDEA, Electoral Law Reforms, 13.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., 16.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., 14.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Johnson Olaniyi, “Enhancing Democracy and Surmounting the Challenges of Election Management in Africa: Insights from Nigeria,” in Myths of Peace and Democracy? Towards Building Pillars of Hope, Unity and Transformation in Africa, ed. Munyaradzi Mawere and Ngonidzashe Marongwe (Cameroon: African Books Collective, 2016), 124.

  35. 35.

    Carl Dundas, The Lag of 21st Century Democratic Elections: In Africa Union Member States (USA: Author House, 2011), 158.

  36. 36.

    Dundas, The Lag of 21st Century Democracy, 158.

  37. 37.

    Dietar Nohlen et al., Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 427.

  38. 38.

    UN Economic Commission for Africa, “African Governance Report III: Elections and the Management of Diversity” (2013), 7.

  39. 39.

    Ravindra Das, Adopting Biometric Technology: Challenges and Solutions (USA: Author House, 2016), 47.

  40. 40.

    Regarding right to vote and be voted for, most instruments are general in nature as it does not mention men or women. However the patriarchal nature of our societies does not give women the same opportunities. The CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol are just few of the instruments that promote women’s rights.

  41. 41.

    Bright Joe Sefah and Kennedy Kariseb, “Women’s Political Participation in Decision Making Processes and Organs: Trends, Practices and Social Realities,” in Ghana @ 60: Governance and Human Rights in Twenty First Century Africa, ed. Michael Addaney and Michale Gyan Nyarko (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2017), 117.

  42. 42.

    Sefah and Kariseb, Women’s Political Participation, 117.

  43. 43.

    UNDP and UN Women, Inclusive Electoral Process: A Guide for Electoral Management Bodies on Promoting Gender Equality and Women’s Participation (UN: UNDP and UN Women, 2015), 2.

  44. 44.

    UNDP, Inclusive Electoral Process (2015), 2.

  45. 45.

    Dundas, Electoral Essays and Discourses, 241.

  46. 46.

    Dundas, Electoral Essays and Discourses, 241.

  47. 47.

    Dundas, Electoral Essays and Discourses, 242.

  48. 48.

    Arne Tostensen, “Elections Observation as an Informal Means of Enforcing Political Rights,” Nordsk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 22 (2004): 330.

  49. 49.

    Carl Dundas, The Lag of 21st Century Democratic Elections, 20.

  50. 50.

    Article 45 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  51. 51.

    Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, “Modeling Success: Governance and Institution-Building in Africa: The Case of Ghana’s Electoral Commission” (2007), 6.

  52. 52.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Modeling Success (2007), 6.

  53. 53.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Modeling Success (2007), 7.

  54. 54.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Modeling Success (2007), 7.

  55. 55.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Modeling Success (2007), 8.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Article 46 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  58. 58.

    The preparations and conducting elections is established for the EC of Ghana under articles 43–46 of the 1992 Constitution. The rest of the mandate it further detailed in the Electoral Commission Act of 1993.

  59. 59.

    Article 43 and 70 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  60. 60.

    The Constitution does not provide for term limits. Chairpersons serve until they are found in a position where they cannot serve any more or they retire. The president appoints a new commissioner to that effect.

  61. 61.

    Article 45 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  62. 62.

    Article 52 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  63. 63.

    Article 53 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  64. 64.

    EC, “Online Recruitment System” (2016), www.ec.gov.gh/…/115-recruitment-temporary-election-officials.html.

  65. 65.

    Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, “Ghana: Electoral Commission of Ghana” (2012), para. 7, accessed October 22, 2016, https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/gha3.htm.

  66. 66.

    The consolidated fund is one of the public funds of Ghana as provided for under article 175 and 176 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Funds in the Consolidated Fund include revenues and monies received on behalf of the government.

  67. 67.

    Shola Omotola, “The Electoral Commission of Ghana and the Administration of the 2012 Elections,” Journal of African Elections 2 (2014): 12, 37.

  68. 68.

    Omotola, “Electoral Commission of Ghana and the Administration of the 2012 Elections,” 36.

  69. 69.

    Ernest Adu-Gyamfi, “Assessment of Citizens Perception on the Independence of the Electoral Commission of Ghana,” in Public Policy and Administration Research 4 (2014): 67.

  70. 70.

    Article 46 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  71. 71.

    Articles 44, 46, 51, 53, 54 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  72. 72.

    The current chairperson’s diverse experiences such as proven civil servant who headed the NCCE, a company lawyer for Unibank Ghana LTD, lectured at the University of Ghana and advisory board member for the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection but her political affiliation is also questionable.

  73. 73.

    Government of Ghana, “Charlotte Osei Appointed New EC Chairperson,” June 2015, http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/1523-charlotte-osei-appointed-new-ec-chairperson.

  74. 74.

    Citifmonline, “NDC Appointed Charlotte Osei to Rig Elections-Martin Amidu,” August 2017, http://citifmonline.com/2017/08/07/ndc-appointed-charlotte-osei-to-rig-election-martin-amidu/.

  75. 75.

    Government of Ghana, “New EC Chairperson, Two Deputies and Executive Member Sworn into Office,” August 2018, http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/4900-new-ec-chairperson-two-deputies-and-executive-member-sworn-into-office.

  76. 76.

    Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Namibian Electoral Act 5, 2014; This was informed by cases such as Rally for Democracyand Progress andOthers v Electoral Commission of Namibiaand Others 2011 (12) SA NASC 21; Maletsky v The Electoral Commission of Namibia 2014 (326) NAHCMD 365.

  77. 77.

    Article 44 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  78. 78.

    Articles 51 and 53 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  79. 79.

    IPAC is a platform for dialogues between the registered political parties and the EC.

  80. 80.

    EC, “Voters Exhibition,” Electoral Commission of Ghana (2012), www.ec.gov.gh/register/check-your-registration.html.

  81. 81.

    African Union Commission, “Report of the African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 7 December 2012 General Election in the Republic of Ghana” (2012), 19.

  82. 82.

    African Union Commission, “Reports of the African Union Election Observation” (2012).

  83. 83.

    PPP, “Press Statement Issued by the Progressive Peoples Party at a Press Conference Organized to Address Matters Relating to the Alleged Disqualification of Dr. Papa Kwesi Nduom by the EC of Ghana,” accessed October 24, 2016, http://pppghana.org/index.php/2016/10/14/press-statement-issued-by-the-progressive-peoples-party-at-a-press-conference-organised-to-address-matters-relating-to-the-alleged-disqualification-of-dr-papa-kwesi-nduom-by-the-electoral/.

  84. 84.

    The fair and firmness with which the chairperson declared the 2000 and 2008 elections were unprecedented. At a time where there had never been constitutional change of government in the fourth Republic, it proved its impartiality and fairness in announcing results.

  85. 85.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Modeling Success (2007), 15.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    African Union, “Report of the AUEOM to the 7 December 2012 General Election in the Republic of Ghana” (2012), 19.

  88. 88.

    African Union, “Report of the AUEOM to the 7 December 2012 General Election in the Republic of Ghana” (2012), 11.

  89. 89.

    African Union, “Report of the African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 7 December 2012 General Election in the Republic of Ghana” (2012), 11.

  90. 90.

    African Union, “Report of the AUEOM to the 7 December 2012 General Election in the Republic of Ghana” (2012), 12.

  91. 91.

    Darsheenee Raumnauth and Roopanand Mahadew, “A Comparative Analysis of Multi-Party Politics in Ghana and Mauritius,” in Ghana @ 60: Governance and Human Rights in Twenty First Century Africa, ed. Michael Addaney and Michale Gyan Nyarko (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2017).

  92. 92.

    African Union, “Report of the AUEOM to the 7 December 2012 General Election in the Republic of Ghana” (2012), 12.

  93. 93.

    The 2013 election petition will forever stand out as the forum which brought out minor short falls of the commission’s work which is always observed as ‘generally free and fair’. The extent of generally free and fair always cover these shortfalls which could heavily and negatively taint the commission’s work.

  94. 94.

    Article 55 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  95. 95.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Modeling Success (2007), 16.

  96. 96.

    T. Dowetin, “Ghana: The Role of EMB in Electoral Reform,” para. 4, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/lf/lfc/ghana-the-role-of-the-emb-in-electoral-reform.

  97. 97.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Modeling Success (2007), 16.

  98. 98.

    AU (n. 78 above) 12.

  99. 99.

    Electoral Commission of Ghana, “EC Implements 27 Reforms for Better Elections,” Electoral Commission of Ghana (2016), http://www.ec.gov.gh/medias/news/89-ec-implements-27-reforms-for-better-elections.html.

  100. 100.

    EC, “EC Implements 27 Reforms for Better Elections” (2016).

  101. 101.

    Article 42 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

  102. 102.

    Creating a new register is one of the key aspects that enhance the democratic elections. From the creation of a register to the following election, some people may have passed on, younger ones may have attained 18 and others, migration playing a part. The BVR machine in 2012 helped in this regard as it decreased such problems.

  103. 103.

    The necessities, details and processes of registration are further provided for in the Regulations and Registration of Voters Regulations of 1995.

  104. 104.

    African Union Commission, “AUEOM Report,” 13.

  105. 105.

    The NDP candidate Mrs. Rawlings was rejected on the grounds of breaching some of the provisions of the Political Parties Act 574 of 2000.

  106. 106.

    GBN, “EC Gives Reasons for Disqualifying Candidates for 2016 Elections,” Ghana Business News (2016), https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2016/10/11/ec-gives-reasons-for-disqualifying-candidates-for-2016-elections/.

  107. 107.

    GNA Politics, “Nduom Declares Assets Campaign Funds Deepens Frontiers of Transparency,” Ghana News Agency (2018), http://www.Ghananewsagency.org/politics/nduom-declares-assets-campaignfunds-deepens-frontiers-of-transparency-53401.

  108. 108.

    Ghana Statistical Service, “2010 Population and Housing Report” (2013), xi.

  109. 109.

    The 10% women representation in parliament is woeful. It falls far behind the expected MDG expectation of 30% minimum women representatives in Parliament.

  110. 110.

    Article 2 of the African Charter.

  111. 111.

    Article 9(1 and 2) of the Maputo Protocol.

  112. 112.

    Ratifying such instruments is a clear intent of upholding right and freedom enshrined in that instrument. However, ratifying is one thing whereas grounds implementation is another.

  113. 113.

    UNDP, “Consolidating Representation and Participation in Ghana: 2015–2016 Work Plan” (2015), 5.

  114. 114.

    The two women who were disqualified in the 2012 elections have again been disqualified in the 2016 elections and are currently seeking redress in court to contest.

  115. 115.

    EC, “Research and Monitoring the 2012 Elections” (2014).

  116. 116.

    Article 98(1)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010; section 35 of the Election Act 24.

  117. 117.

    Articles 98(1)(c) and (d) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

  118. 118.

    African Union Commission, “AUEOM to 2012 Elections, Ghana” (2012), 12.

  119. 119.

    Ibid.

  120. 120.

    Coffey is an NGO that collaborates with governments and governance institutions for the improvement of governance focused challenges.

  121. 121.

    CODEO is a platform for domestic election observers with the aim of enhancing electoral credibility, preventing electoral fraud and advancing free and fair elections.

  122. 122.

    CODEO, “CODEOs Pre-election Environment Observation Statement—September” (2016), para. 1.

  123. 123.

    All Africa, “West Africa: Obasanjo Leads ECOWAS Observer Mission for Ghana’s Elections” (2016), http://allafrica.com/stories/201211300632.html.

  124. 124.

    EU, Handbook for European Union Election Observation (Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union, 2016), 16.

  125. 125.

    UNDP, “Governance and Peace Polls in Ghana” (2014), www.gh.undp.org/…/UNDP_GH_GAP%20Poll%20Findings-Final%20R.

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Sefah, B. (2020). The Role of Election Management Bodies in Advancing Democracy in Ghana. In: Addaney, M., Nyarko, M.G., Boshoff, E. (eds) Governance, Human Rights, and Political Transformation in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27049-0_11

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