Abstract
In this chapter we will focus on the relation between psychology as a discipline and how it understands nonsense. We will present a broad Wittgensteinian perspective inspired by the approaches of Peter Winch and Rom Harré, and use Wolcott’s approach to the ‘language’ of schizophrenia, schizophrenese, as an object of analysis. Using a therapeutic understanding of Wittgenstein, we will claim that Wolcott’s approach resembles a substantial (Wittgensteinian) interpretation of schizophrenese, debarring an actual (‘resolute’) understanding of the nonsensical character of schizophrenese. In the end, we conclude that Winchian and Harréan approaches help develop our sensitivities towards the diversity and uniqueness of cultural practices, but that it can be misleading to assimilate severe mental disturbance to the concepts of culture and language. Doing so misunderstands and covers over such disturbance, in the very act of seeming/seeking to understand it.
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- 1.
We mostly bracket Wittgenstein here, because though Wolcott refers to Wittgenstein as inspiration, he does not discuss Wittgenstein’s argument in detail. Hence, our focus here is neither on the many existing interpretations of Wittgenstein’s idea of a private language, nor the validity of Wolcott’s interpretation (for a general overview, readers should consult Baker 1998). We assume, in a certain sense along with Wolcott, that schizophrenese can be understood (sic) as a private language, and our “therapy” revolves around whether his approach or strategy is viable.
However, it will be self-evident to an informed reader that our approach relies heavily on Wittgensteinian thinking, and the usefulness of Wittgenstein’s own thinking in relation to the matter we are describing will emerge into prominence as this paper unfolds.
- 2.
Some Wittgenstein interpreters distinguish between a resolute and therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein. Since this distinction has no bearing for our argument, we use resolute and therapeutic interchangeably.
- 3.
Wolcott also follows Reichenbach in distinguishing a cognitive and instrumental functioning of language, with the former being the use of language expressing true statements, while the latter is for the purpose of influencing another person. In addition, the instrumental can be divided into three sub-functionalities: communicative, suggestive and promotive. “Communication involves the transmission of meaningful messages to someone else with the aim of having him believe the information. Suggestion is the use of language with the intention of arousing emotions of another. The promotive use of language involves the intent of inducing another to perform certain actions.” (ibid., 126).
- 4.
Similar to Mulhall’s distinction between a substantial and therapeutic reading above, some Wittgenstein interpreters suggest a substantial break in Wittgenstein’s thinking between the early (Tractatus) and late works (Philosophical Investigations), while others emphasise the continuity in Wittgenstein’s use of the therapeutic approach. Conant and Diamond are on the continuity side, hence their interpretation of non-sense and solipsism in the Tractatus relates to the late work as well. The logic of their radical mode of interpretation extends to the logic of the anti-‘private-language’ considerations.
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Read, R., Christensen, B.A. (2019). Psychology and Non-sense: Schizophrenese as Example. In: Christensen, B. (eds) The Second Cognitive Revolution. Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26680-6_17
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