Narratives About Victimhood: Evil Germans, Good Italian Occupiers and Evil Soviets?

Scianna, Bastian Matteo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-26524-3_9

Bastian Matteo Scianna³

Part of the book series: Italian and Italian American Studies ((IIAS))

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Abstract

Besides the question of combat performance and officers’ capabilities, three other fields need connecting: the question of German behaviour vis-à-vis their ally, the Italian occupation and the fate of prisoners in the Soviet Union. These issues were used in political quarrels after 1945 in order to create or to deride narratives about victimhood.

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Notes

1.
E.g. in Hamilton, Sacrifice. See also the remarks in Evan Mawdsley, “Sacrifice on the Steppe: The Italian Alpine Corps in the Stalingrad Campaign, 1942–1943. By Hope Hamilton,” War in History 20, no. 1 (2013): 133–35.
2.
Avagliano and Palmieri, Vincere, 211ff. Already before the December retreat, the Germans noted that the setback at El Alamein had resulted in “defeatist talk” and a generally depressed mood, BA-MA, RW 5/v.424, Defaitistische Propaganda in Italien, 27 Oct. 1942, fol.3.
3.
The Italian diplomatic service in France even withheld information on sabotage and partisan activities from their allies, ACS, T-821/354/IT 4513/676, Puti (Paris) to Barbuscio Rizzo (Rome), 14 June 1943.
4.
Giannuli, Le spie, 218–19.
5.
Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit, 141.
6.
Schreiber, “Italiens Teilnahme,” 283–84.
7.
According to an intelligence assessment of the ARMIR, Cavallero Diary, 27 Jan. 1943.
8.
Osti Guerrazzi and Schlemmer, “I soldati italiani,” 413.
9.
Mussolini had always attempted to proof Italy’s trustworthiness and reliability in order to counter prejudices about the Italian ‘treason’ in 1915 that were still virulent in Germany, see Woller, Mussolini , 175–76; König, Kooperation, 295ff.; Rusconi, Deutschland/Italien, 151ff.
10.
Cecini, I generali, 142–57. He became commander of the Second Army in 1938, but the campaign against Yugoslavia included little fighting and subsequent anti-partisan actions were different to e.g. leading an army against the British or Russians. On his time on the Balkans see Osti Guerrazzi, Italian Army, 31–50.
11.
This reenvirement was motivated by Cavallero’s desire to get rid of the so-called ‘Spanish group’ of generals Roatta, Gambara and Bastico; according to Cecini, I generali, 146.
12.
Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 162. He stressed this point again in two memoranda for Mussolini in late February and urged to reinforce the Balkans and the Mediterranean, see ibid., 166ff.
13.
Knox, “‘Totality’ and Disintegration,” 94.
14.
Cecini, I generali, 148ff. On his relations to Caviglia see Pier Paolo Cervone, Enrico Caviglia, l’anti Badoglio (Milan: Mursia, 1992), 214ff. On Badoglio, Pieri and Rochat, Badoglio , 767ff. Also other widely respected officers in retirement, such as General Francesco Saverio Grazioli, who was considered a Russia expert, wrote memoranda to Mussolini, which showed their sceptical view of the situation of the Axis and their urge to focus on the defence of the Italian peninsula, see TNA, GFM 36/217, Gen. Grazioli – La situazione della guerra ai primi di febbraio 1943, 10 Feb. 1943. Grazioli had suggested the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the USSR to Mussolini, see ibid., Gen. Grazioli – Pro-memoria per l’Eccellenza il Capo del Governo, 5 Dec. 1942. An idea that Mussolini raised with Göring and told Ciano to communicate it to Hitler as well, Ciano Diaries, 16 Dec. 1942. On Grazioli, see Cecini, I generali, 173–87; Giannuli, Le spie, 201.
15.
Mussolini resisted some of the appointments; see IWM, EDS AL 2763/4, Ambrosio Diary, 4 Feb. 1943.
16.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4573/698, Promemoria per l’Ecc. Vecchiarelli, 20 Mar. 1943.
17.
Many of these letters and lists of officers can be found in ACS, T-821/355/IT 4573.
18.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4573/696, Ambrosio to Gariboldi, 13 Mar. 1943.
19.
IWM, EDS AL 2763/4, Ambrosio Diary, 1 Apr. 1943. Gariboldi and Zanghieri, too, visited Ambrosio, see entries for 3 and 15 Apr. 1943.
20.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4552/466-467, Promemoria, 29 May 1943.
21.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4572/666-667, Promemoria, 23 Apr. 1943.
22.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4572/673-674, Promemoria, 11 May 1943.
23.
Ibid.
24.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4572/679-683, Promemoria, 1 June 1943.
25.
Deakin, Brutal Friendship, 205. The Germans had allegedly even tried to film fleeing Italian units, see ibid.
26.
See e.g. the memoranda by General Giuseppe Castellano in February 1943, ACS, T-821/128/IT 1154a. This was extended to demands to all service chiefs to send their strategic assessment, ACS, T-821/211/IT 1581/715, Ambrosio to Riccardi, Fougier and Rossi, 7 Feb. 1943.
27.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4528, Principali questioni che potrebbero essere trattate con la parte Germanica, Fronte Russo – 8^ Armata, 21 Mar. 1943, fs.17–20.
28.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4528, Principali questioni che potrebbero essere trattate con la parte Germanica, Il ripiegamento del C.A. Alpino, 21 Mar. 1943, f.23.
29.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4528, Principali questioni che potrebbero essere trattate con la parte Germanica, Il ripiegamento del II e XXXV C.A., 21 Mar. 1943, fs.21–22.
30.
Pelagalli, Marras , 209.
31.
BA-MA, RH 2/1672, fol.545.
32.
Burgwyn, Mussolini , 221.
33.
Giusti, La campagna, 118–20.
34.
ACS, T-821/146/IT 2228/105.
35.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4575/735-736, Promemoria, 22 Apr. 1943.
36.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4575/737-747, Gen. Granati – Relazione sulla visita compiuta ad ufficiali reduci dal fronte russo [hereafter ‘Relazione’], 16 Apr. 1943.
37.
Ibid., f.741.
38.
Ibid., fs.742, 746. Major Serano (Part of the Torino ’s 52nd Artillery Regiment) defended harsh German actions against Italian formations that had “ceased fighting and whose officers were – due to exhaustion – not up to their duties any more”, ibid.
39.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4575/737-747, Gen. Granati – Relazione, f.746.
40.
Ibid., f.738.
41.
ACS, T-821/354/IT 4511/647-661, Lt. Col. Manaresi – Rapporto sull’invio del 9^o treno A.P.E. in Russia (febbraio–marzo 1943), 24 Mar. 1943, fs.655, 659.
42.
Ibid., f.660.
43.
Pelagalli, Marras , 218.
44.
Cavallo, Italiani in guerra, 184.
45.
ACS, T-821/355/IT 4575/737-747, Granati – Relazione, f.747.
46.
Wiskemann, Rome-Berlin, 291; Avagliano and Palmieri, Vincere, 247ff.
47.
Tolloy, Con l’Armata, 207.
48.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/16, Report, 19 Dec. 1942, fol.75.
49.
As for example in Dnepropetrovsk, which fuelled partisan activity, BA-MA, RH 31-IX/12, Telegram, 7 Sept. 1942, fol.36.
50.
BA-MA, RH 2/2894, Head of Liaison Staffs Berlin to Military Attaché Rome, 8 Mar. 1943, fol.4.
51.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/12, Malaguti to Tippelskirch, 30 Sept. 1942, fol.37.
52.
Burgwyn, Mussolini , 205.
53.
Tolloy, Con l’Armata, 177.
54.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/9, Eighth Army to German liaison officers, 13 Nov. 1942, fol.88.
55.
BA-MA, MSg 2/4388, Distler – Verbindungsoffizier, fol.89. If this was a case of the Wehrmacht blaming the Waffen-SS for wrongdoings could not be assessed, but it should not be excluded.
56.
Corni, “Briefe von der Ostfront.”
57.
Massignani, Alpini e tedeschi, 135. See also Hamilton, Sacrifice, 84, 87; Schreiber, “Italiens Teilnahme,” 283–85.
58.
His report is printed in Schlemmer, Italiener, 146–52; also Buttar, Knife’s Edge, 244–45.
59.
Ben H. Shepherd, War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 175.
60.
BA-MA, RH 2/2894, Wochenbericht Italien, 17 May 1943, fol.23.
61.
Wimpffen, “Zweite Ungarische,” 346ff.
62.
See again Focardi, Il cattivo tedesco.
63.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato; Giusti, La campagna. Stramaccioni only briefly referred to Russia and criticised the Italian treatment of prisoners, without providing new evidence, Stramaccioni, Crimini di guerra, 47–49.
64.
Botti and Ilari, Il pensiero, 436ff.
65.
Osti Guerrazzi, Noi non sappiamo odiare, 297–304.
66.
Knox, “‘Totality’ and Disintegration,” 81.
67.
Ibid., 101ff.; Ceva, “Fascismo,” 385.
68.
Knox, “‘Totality’ and Disintegration,” 90.
69.
TNA, GFM 36/170, Farinacci to Mussolini, 13 Sept. 1939.
70.
BA-MA, RH 2/2936, Rintelen to Tippelskirch, 1 Dec. 1939, fol.2.
71.
BA-MA, RH 2/2936, Rintelen to Gen. Matzky, 6 June 1941, fos.218–19.
72.
Giannuli, Le spie, 92–94.
73.
Osti Guerrazzi and Schlemmer, “I soldati italiani,” 399–403.
74.
Karel C. Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda During World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 196; on the other nations see ibid., 194ff.
75.
Quinto Antonelli, “Fronte russo. Le forme della propaganda,” in Battaglie in Russia. Il Don e Stalingrado 75 anni dopo, ed. Olga Dubrovina (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 2018), 167–82. Scotoni has argued that the corps was even meant to be called Corpo Anticomunista italiano (CAI)—but could not provide evidence for this claim, Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 137.
76.
Olga Dubrovina, “Immagine del nemico. Meccanismo della costruzione,” in Battaglie in Russia. Il Don e Stalingrado 75 anni dopo, ed. Olga Dubrovina (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 2018), 159–65.
77.
Maria Teresa Giusti, “‘Restare vivo è molto difficile…’. Gli italiani sul fronte orientale e l’immagine del nemico,” in Battaglie in Russia. Il Don e Stalingrado 75 anni dopo, ed. Olga Dubrovina (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 2018), 81–109, here 103–4.
78.
Virtue, “We Istrians,” 291–92.
79.
On propaganda material see Quinto Antonelli and Sergej I. Filonenko, “Vincere! Vinceremo!” Cartoline sul fronte russo (1941–1942) (Trento: Fondazione Museo storico del Trentino, 2011). For the home front’s view of the Russians, see Giannuli, Le spie, 97–102.
80.
Virtue, “We Istrians,” 282, 293; Duggan, Fascist Voices, 373.
81.
Ibid., 376. Yet Duggan’s reference—beyond his own sources—to Nuto Revelli as proof of Fascist sympathies and ideological racism vis-à-vis locals is somehow problematic (as will be described below).
82.
Giusti, La campagna, 94, 159–67. An opposite view is held by Osti Guerrazzi and Schlemmer, “I soldati italiani,” 408–9.
83.
Giusti, La campagna, 164; also Della Volpe, Esercito e propaganda, 89ff.
84.
Antonelli, “Fronte russo,” 181–82.
85.
Filatov, La campagna orientale, 53, 57ff. Some of his claims based on Soviet interrogations of prisoners should be considered more carefully. What else should Italian POWs have told the Soviets? It was clearly not a good idea to stress one’s hatred of Communism and belief in ultimate Fascist victory.
86.
Virtue, “We Istrians,” 293.
87.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 125ff.
88.
Mario Isnenghi, “La campagna di Russia nella stampa e nella pubblicistica fascista,” in Gli italiani sul fronte russo, ed. Enzo Collotti (Bari: De Donato, 1982), 377–423; Osti Guerrazzi and Schlemmer, “I soldati italiani,” 391ff.
89.
Virtue, “We Istrians,” 290–91.
90.
ACS, T-821/247/IT 2259/120, Zingales– CSIR- Ordine del giorno n.1, 8 July 1941.
91.
ACS, T-821/247/IT 2259/279, Messe– CSIR- Ordine del giorno n.2, 4 Aug. 1941.
92.
ACS, Fondo Diamanti, b.1, f.Camp. Russia, ‘Diario Storico 3 Gennaio’, 5 Nov. 1942.
93.
Diamanti had told his men that service on the Eastern Front was a honourable duty for “legionnaires and fascists”, thereby he also making references to the Blackshirts’ service in the Spanish Civil War, ACS, Fondo Diamanti, b.1, f.Camp. Russia, doc. vari, Letter, 5 Nov. 1942.
94.
Scotoni held that they fulfilled the same duties and were only used for propaganda acts, such as tearing down Communist symbols, Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 138. The Blackshirts were the only units with real volunteers; thus, we should not exclude clear anti-Communist sentiments, Filatov, La campagna orientale, 35.
95.
Compare Zingales’ speech on 5 November to Messe’s on 11 September 1942 in ACS, Fondo Diamanti, b.1, f.Camp. Russia, ‘Diario Storico 3 Gennaio’.
96.
Ibid., Messe speech, 11 Sept. 1942.
97.
The time period might also play a role. Messe became more distant from Mussolini and the regime as the war progressed and the chances of victory diminuished, Giusti, “Messe,” 19ff. For his use of fascist parlance and enthusiasm for Mussolini in letters to his wife in 1940 and early 1941, see ibid., 29–30, 40; Messe, Lettere, 93–94. His letters in 1942 show a notable decline in sympathy for the regime, repeatedly stressing his loyalty to the Patria above else, see e.g. ibid., 144. He hardly used the term ‘bolsheviks’ in his letters; if so, it was in context of describing harsh actions by the Soviet government against its own population, see ibid., 117–18. Yet, these letters were edited by his son, so caution is advised as to their reliability and we should complement them with other sources.
98.
ACS, T-821/256/IT 3061/821-827, Messe– Relazione morale e condizioni spirituali, 11 Feb. 1942, f.825.
99.
ACS, T-821/255/IT 3057/1042, Messe to Mussolini, 5 Dec. 1941. Messe spoke in derogatory terms of the low professional and cultural standards of Soviet officers. Yet, he compared them to Italian NCOs – which was certainly no praise for them, ACS, T-821/257/IT 3062/112-120, Messe to Ufficio Addestramento, 24 Mar. 1942, f.116.
100.
TNA, GFM 36/240, Vidussoni – Appunto per il Duce, 24 Oct. 1942, fos.13, 16.
101.
Ibid., fol.16.
102.
ACS, T-821/259/IT 3068/236-242, Gen. Marazzani– Note sullo schieramento e sistemazione a difesa, 14 Sept. 1942, fs.241–42.
103.
See e.g. the laudatory message from Messe to the Pasubio , which contained hopes for new victories, ACS, T-821/20/IT 98/971, Messe to Giovanelli, 18 Nov. 1941; also ACS, T-821/257/IT 3062/549-558, Messe to CS – La campagna invernale, 5 Mar. 1942, f.558.
104.
ACS, T-821/257/IT 3062/107, Hoth to Messe, 25 Mar. 1942.
105.
Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, 372–76; Shepherd, Hitler’s Soldiers, 122–23.
106.
For this argument see Osti Guerrazzi and Schlemmer, “I soldati italiani,” 406ff.
107.
Virtue, “We Istrians,” 298.
108.
Giusti, La campagna, 189, 198.
109.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato; Giusti, La campagna, 191. Her reliance on memoirs for factual claims about the Italian troops’ behaviour vis-à-vis the civilian population is, of course, problematic, ibid., 192ff.; Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 68, 108ff., 116. The author contrasts the content of Italian propaganda to Bartov’s main argument of ideology and barbarisation regarding the German case, Bartov, Hitler’s Army. However, Bartov’s claims have also been disputed, see in general Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, and Ulrike Jureit, eds., Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Bilanz einer Debatte (Munich: Beck, 2005); Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 321ff.; Shepherd, Hitler’s Soldiers, 188–89.
110.
Roatta complained about the lack of caution Italian soldiers had shown in their close relations with civilians of newly conquered territories before the Russian campaign, ACS, T-821/354/IT 4507/589-601, Roatta – Addestramento e operazioni, 28 July 1941, f.599.
111.
On the general organisation of the Italian rear see Emilio Tirone, “La politica italiana verso la popolazione civile e i prigionieri di guerra sul fronte russo,” in Battaglie in Russia. Il Don e Stalingrado 75 anni dopo, ed. Olga Dubrovina (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 2018), 189–212, here 191ff.
112.
The literature on German occupation policies is vast, see Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht. Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2011); Mawdsley, Thunder, 228–32; Shepherd, Hitler’s Soldiers, 274–96.
113.
ACS, T-821/247/IT 2259/428-432, Direttive sulle potestà militari, sulla sicurezza e amministrazione nei territori conquistati ad est del Nistro, [transmitted] 23 Aug. 1941.
114.
Initially the CSIR was envisaged to transfer them to camps in Italy, but soon the Germans requested the handover of all captured Soviets, Giusti, La campagna, 237. Still, there are Italian propaganda videos from the Eastern Front that show the employment of Soviet POWs for assistance duties (e.g. at airfields, which violated conventions).
115.
Schlemmer, Italiener, 32–38.
116.
Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 50. Commissars were meant to be immediately handed over to the Germans, ACS, T-821/247/IT 2259/428-432, Direttive sulle potestà militari, sulla sicurezza e amministrazione nei territori conquistati ad est del Nistro, [transmitted] 23 Aug. 1941, here f.432; BA-MA, RH 31-IX/11, Gyldenfeldt to Eighth Army, 16 July 1942, fol.357. Most Commissars were shot by members of German motorised and armoured formations, i.e. those units who were most likely to encounter them first, Felix Römer, Der Kommissarbefehl: Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/42 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008). Kleist’s First Panzer Group killed the highest number of Commissars and Römer showed that half the divisions under its command were directly involved—yet, he could not find evidence for the involvement of Italian units, ibid., 244, 391. I would like to thank Felix Römer for this information regarding the Italian divisions.
117.
Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 62; Schlemmer, “Die comandi tappa,” 522. Schlemmer could demonstrate that 200 Jews had been handed over to German authorities, which has to be placed in contrast, however, with over 200,000 Jews the Romanians either shot themselves or handed to the Germans, DiNardo, Germany, 133.
118.
Most detailed in Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 130–34, 138. Helmut von Alberti, liaison to the CSIR, also held positions as local commander of Dnepropetrovsk, Taganrog, and Novorossisk, where thousands of Jews were executed, ibid., 133.
119.
See the reports in TNA, GFM 36/240, Vidussoni – Appunto per il Duce, 24 Oct. 1942, fos.8–9.
120.
Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 11.
121.
ACS, T-821/247/IT 2259/448-450, Messe– Promemoria, 27 Aug. 1941, here f.449.
122.
NARA, T-312/360/7934956-57, Cpt. Becker – Erfahrungsbericht Verb.Offz. Pasubio , 15 Aug. 1941, fol.2.
123.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/25, Heidkämper to Tippelskirch, 27 Aug. 1942.
124.
Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 39–40.
125.
Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 217.
126.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/25, Wessel to Tippelskirch, 30 July 1942.
127.
Burgwyn, Mussolini , 217; Giusti, La campagna, 199ff.; Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 213–14.
128.
ACS, T-821/254/IT 3051/449-450, Messe– Schieramento delle truppe e contatti con gli indigeni, 11 Sept. 1941, quoted on f.450.
129.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 171ff.
130.
ACS, T-821/247/IT 2259/188, Messe– Difesa antiparacadutista, 25 July 1941.
131.
ACS, T-821/247/IT 2259/296, Lt. Ferrarese – Paracadutisti in civile, n.d.
132.
Tirone, “La politica,” 190–91.
133.
Burgwyn, Mussolini , 219.
134.
Schlemmer provided the number of twelve executions in one district, Schlemmer, “Die comandi tappa,” 528, and named other instances without providing figures over a longer period, see also Schlemmer, Italiener, 35ff.
135.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 286ff.; Giusti, La campagna, 203–8. Giusti cited one allegation of 615 executed civilians under the watch of one Italian captain, but she did not follow it up further. This would have constituted a very substantial war crime and needs further investigation. One has to note, however, that the high number, e.g. of executed Hungarian generals, also owed to the Cold War situation and the purges by the new regime in Budapest.
136.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 270ff.
137.
Schlemmer, “Die comandi tappa,” 529–30. Parts of the reports, which obviously are less convincing in their claims that the more objective Soviet ones, are printed in ibid., 532–46.
138.
Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 26–27, 156ff.
139.
Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 217.
140.
Giusti, La campagna, 195–97. The Italians trained around 80 Cossacks under command of a former Tsarist colonel at Millerovo in Autumn 1942, see TNA, GFM 36/240, Vidussoni – Appunto per il Duce, 24 Oct. 1942, fol.20; also Piero Crociani, “Cosacchi in grigio-verde,” in La campagna di Russia. Nel 70 ^o anniversario dell’inizio dell’intervento dello CSIR , eds. Antonello Biagini and Antonio Zarcone (Rome: Nuova Cultura, 2013), 201–14.
141.
See the report (probably by Marras), in ACS, T-821/456/IT 5469/222-233, Fronte dell’Est, 24 Oct. 1942; Pelagalli, Marras , 164ff.; Giannuli, Le spie, 201–2.
142.
Giusti, La campagna, 199.
143.
Especially in the countryside, see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 114ff.; also Pohl, Herrschaft, 291; Oleg Zarubinsky, “Collaboration of the Population in Occupied Ukrainian Territory: Some Aspects of the Overall Picture,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10, no. 2 (1997): 138–52.
144.
See e.g. Marsetic, Dall’Adige al Don, 64–65. The men were sometimes surprised by Soviet hospitality—even during the retreat from the Don—which, they argued, would not be offered by Italians on this scale to foreign soldiers, Cavallo, Italiani in guerra, 184.
145.
The Luftwaffe had heavily bombarded Voronezh and subsequent German ground operations further devastated the city—resulting in the second highest death toll any city suffered (after Stalingrad), Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 265.
146.
Ibid., 204–24, especially 208, 210.
147.
Tirone, “La Politica,” 194–97. In the area around Rossosh, the Italians were lucky to be deployed in a very religious and monarchist zone, see Virtue, “We Istrians,” 295.
148.
Sergey I. Filonenko, “Popolazione locale ed occupazione sul Don tra il 1942 ed il 1943: Contrapposizione ed antagonismo,” in La campagna di Russia. Nel 70 ^o anniversario dell’inizio dell’intervento dello CSIR , eds. Antonello Biagini and Antonio Zarcone (Rome: Nuova Cultura, 2013), 137–47, here 145.
149.
See Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, “Italians at War: War and Experience in Fascist Italy,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22, no. 5 (2017): 587–603, here 590.
150.
Mawdsley, Thunder, 237–40.
151.
Tolloy, Con l’Armata, 92–93.
152.
Argued e.g. by Giusti, La campagna, 240–41. Osti Guerrazzi and Schlemmer cited an order by General Zanghieri in which he demanded that no prisoners should be taken, yet both scholars did not further analysis this question, ibid., “I soldati italiani,” 410.
153.
Giusti, La campagna, 236–37.
154.
ACS, T-821/258/IT 3064/91-92, Col. Utili– Trattamento dei prigionieri di guerra e disertori sovietici, 1 May 1942.
155.
Giusti, La campagna, 236ff. The Italians had employed Soviet prisoners for labour since winter 1941, but on a lesser scale, see also Tirone, “La politica,” 199–200.
156.
The camp numbers depend on the method of counting, i.e. if only those camps in the rear or also the ones close to the front are included, for the differentiation see Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 224ff.
157.
Medical and nutritional supply was above the levels of German camps, Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 51–55; Giusti, La campagna, 240–41.
158.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 228. Yet, the Italians also employed forced labour that they received from the Organisation Todt.
159.
Tirone, “La politica,” 201ff.
160.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 229, 232, 235.
161.
On the persisting fear over paratrooper drops see BA-MA, RH 31-IX/9, Gariboldi telegram, 2 Nov. 1942, fol.158.
162.
ACS, T-821/255/IT 3053/102, Pasubio to CSIR, 12 Oct. 1941.
163.
ACS, T-821/255/IT 3056/804, Pasubio to CSIR, 18 Nov. 1941.
164.
Giusti, La campagna, 183. It is unclear what happened to these 249 persons.
165.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 173–84.
166.
Shepherd, War in the Wild East, 84ff.
167.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 179ff.
168.
A detailed study on the Carabinieri’s action could shed further light on the Italian occupation approach.
169.
ACS, T-821/256/IT 3060/535, Messe– Repressione attività di informatori del nemico e di partigiani, 26 Jan. 1942.
170.
ACS, T-821/256/IT 3060/599-601, Messe– Difesa retrovie, 30 Jan. 1942.
171.
They were interrogated, but the report does not state what happened to them afterwards, ACS, T-821/257/IT 3062/63, Attività C.S. [Counter-Espionage], 27 Mar. 1942.
172.
ACS, T-821/256/IT 3060/536-537, Maj. Bianchi – Attività di partigiani e spionaggio nemico, 16 Jan. 1942.
173.
Krisztián Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine 1941–1942: The Historiographical Context,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 1 (2007): 81–120, here 86–88.
174.
On the organisation see Gentile, “Alle spalle dell’ARMIR,” 162–64; Schlemmer, “Die comandi tappa,” 514ff. For the Italian rear organisation in November 1942, ibid., 528.
175.
Stefano Basset and Filippo Cappellano, “L’esercito italiano e la guerra antipartigiana in Russia (1941–1943),” in Battaglie in Russia. Il Don e Stalingrado 75 anni dopo, ed. Olga Dubrovina (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 2018), 119–43, here 120–21.
176.
Giusti, La campagna, 185–86.
177.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/13, Gariboldi circular, 1 Sept. 1942, fos.164–66. On the employment of Russian forces under Italian command see Crociani, “Cosacchi in grigio-verde.” In total, 2423 locals served in 249 police formations that helped Italian forces in the rear areas, Basset and Cappellano, “L’esercito,” 132.
178.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 186ff.
179.
The regular frontline formations had to send detachments of sixty men to form these squads, Schlemmer, “Die comandi tappa,” 524ff. Service in these units was meant to constitute a “title of honour”, BA-MA, RH 31-IX/13, Direttive per l’azione dei nuclei cacciatori, 15 Sept. 1942, fol.71.
180.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 239–40.
181.
See Basset and Cappellano, “L’esercito,” 137–41.
182.
The Italians estimated around 250 partisans near Kharkov, an important logistical hub, ACS, T-821/373/IT 4885/214-217, Comando II Corpo d’Armata, 18 June 1942; BA-MA, MSg 2/4388, Distler – Verbindungsoffizier, fos.8, 18, 23, 29; Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 122, 138ff.
183.
BA-MA, MSg 2/4388, Distler – Verbindungsoffizier, fos.33, 63–64.
184.
Vladimir V. Korovin, “Azioni militari dei partigiani sovietici contro gli eserciti tedeschi, italiani e ungheresi negli anni 1942–1943,” in Battaglie in Russia. Il Don e Stalingrado 75 anni dopo, ed. Olga Dubrovina (Milan: Ed. Unicopli, 2018), 39–71, here 41–42.
185.
Ibid., 44.
186.
Ibid., 47–48, 68. On preparations and activities before the December attack, see ibid., 50ff.
187.
USSME, Le operazioni, 323. The same argument is made in Giusti, La campagna, 187. Some partisan formations had been revealed and captured, Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 190.
188.
ACS, T-821/259/IT 3068.
189.
DS CS, VIII:I, 25 Nov. 1942. Also possibly inflated numbers of killed partisans, have to be treated with caution, as they could be intended to report ‘successes’.
190.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/19, Malaguti to Army Group B, 28 Dec. 1942, fol.3.
191.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/19, Malaguti to Army Group B, 17 Dec. 1942, fol.7. At the cost of one Italian dead.
192.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/19, Malaguti to Army Group B, 28 Nov. 1942, fol.13. In this context, ‘concentration camp’ simply means a collection camp. The Italians lost eighteen men (three officers) in this period.
193.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/19, Ditfurth [?] to Eighth Army, 7 Oct. 1942, fol.30.
194.
Schlemmer, “Die comandi tappa,” 518. On the low activity in the Alpini’s sector see Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 236ff.
195.
Giusti, La campagna, 187.
196.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 246.
197.
The daily summaries for the Comando Supremo frankly listed those numbers, e.g. for the Slovenian theatre.
198.
Gentile, “Alle spalle dell’ARMIR,” 166.
199.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 237. Further, one joint attempt of German, Hungarian, and Italian troops to hunt down partisans in December failed utterly, see Jörn Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik in der Sowjetunion. Die Befehlshaber der rückwärtigen Heeresgebiete 1941–1943 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010), 433.
200.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 244ff.; Burgwyn, Mussolini , 219; Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 141f.; Hamilton, Sacrifice, 133.
201.
For the Torino see BA-MA, RH 31-IX/35, Hammann – Gefechtsbericht Torino, 5 Mar. 1943, fol.22; The Ravenna in BA-MA, RH 31-IX/35, Pertner – Gefechtsbericht Ravenna, 20 Mar. 1943, fos.65, 67.
202.
USSME, Le operazioni, 436.
203.
ACS, T-821/354/IT 4511/647-661, Lt. Col. Manaresi – Rapporto sull’invio del 9^o treno A.P.E. in Russia (febbraio–marzo 1943), 24 Mar. 1943.
204.
Burgwyn, Mussolini , 219.
205.
Lelyushenko, Moskva-Stalingrad-Berlin-Praga, 157.
206.
Giusti, La campagna, 187.
207.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 249ff. Also the Hungarian Second Army was assaulted by civilians, partisans, and regular forces—not least after requisitioning houses and forcefully taking food and other vital resources, Wimpffen, “Zweite Ungarische,” 294.
208.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/35, Schlubeck to Tippelskirch, 18 Feb. 1943, fol.108. Detailed in Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 192ff.
209.
BA-MA, RH 31-IX/35, Col. Carloni – Gefechtsbericht. Brückenkopf Pawlograd – Dnjepropetrowsk, 17 Feb. 1943, fos.113–15, here fol.115.
210.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 247ff., 251ff.
211.
Schlemmer, “Die comandi tappa,” 523.
212.
Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 200–2.
213.
Burgwyn, Mussolini , 220.
214.
As argued by Scotoni, Il nemico fidato, 191.
215.
Virtue, “Fascist Italy,” 9.
216.
Basset and Cappellano, “L’esercito,” 128–30.
217.
It would be interesting to analyse whether Italian soldiers refrained from anti-partisan duties and which consequences they faced—given that Italian military justice was rather lenient between 1940 and 1943 (especially in comparison to 1915–1918) there certainly was some leverage. On the military justice see Giorgio Rochat, Duecento sentenze nel bene e nel male. La giustizia militare nella guerra 1940–1943 (Udine: Gaspari, 2002). Also Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 34.
218.
Giusti, La campagna, 186. Leading scholars have found similar results for the Balkans: the Italians were certainly no saints, but the sheer existence of harsh orders (such as the infamous “3C” circular in Yugoslavia) was no proof that a war of extermination followed; and differentiations must be made regarding their victims or enemies, as partisans and civilians were not in the same category. Indeed, while Italians employed similar measures they differed in “frequency and intensity” to the Germans’, Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 415; Agarossi and Giusti, Una guerra.
219.
Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire, 339. On the escalation of violence from July onwards see Osti Guerrazzi, Italian Army, 92ff.
220.
For this argument see Paolo Fonzi, “The Italian Occupation of Crete During the Second World War,” in Italy and the Second World War: Alternative Perspectives, ed. Emanuele Sica and Richard Carrier (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 51–75.
221.
In spring 1942, the three divisions killed the same number of partisans as the entire Army Group Centre. The Hungarians also shot uniformed paratroopers, which was not common, and referred to collective reprisals without German orders, i.e. escalating on their own watch, Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation,” 84, 100, 113, 119. Later occupational methods on Polish territory were much more lenient, see ibid., 111; Krisztián Ungváry, “The Hungarian Theatre of War,” in Germany and the Second World War. Vol. 8: The Eastern Front 1943–1944, eds. Karl-Heinz Frieser et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 846–959, here 850ff.
222.
Besides strong partisan activity, the bad state of Hungarian troops—training levels, malnourishment, and medical supplies—also spurred violence, Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation,” 112, 116; on this case, see also Truman O. Anderson, “A Hungarian Vernichtungskrieg? Hungarian Troops and the Soviet Partisan War in Ukraine, 1942,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 58, no. 2 (1999): 345–66.
223.
Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, “Good Invaders? The Occupation Policy of the Spanish Blue Division in Northwestern Russia, 1941–1944,” War in History 25, no. 3 (2018): 361–86. For similarities between the Spanish and Italian cases, see Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, “Unable to Hate? Some Comparative Remarks on the War Experiences of Spaniards and Italians on the Eastern Front, 1941–1944,” Journal of Modern European History 16, no. 2 (2018): 269–89.
224.
Schlemmer, “Das königlich-italienische Heer,” 174. The Romanians, for example, had a much more pronounced anti-semitic demour, see Dennis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940–1944 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 127ff.; Axworthy, Third Axis; also Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation” on the situational factors.
225.
Faldella, Le truppe alpine, 180; Giusti, La campagna, 255.
226.
In addition to the ARMIR soldiers, the Soviets also sent captured Italian Military Internees (IMI) from Germany and RSI diplomats to their POW camps in 1945, which has led to some problems in providing exact figures, Burgwyn, Mussolini , 210–11; Elena Agarossi and Victor Zaslavsky, Togliatti e Stalin. Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), 163.
227.
Giusti, I prigionieri, 97. This, however, does leave out the vital factor when they were captured.
228.
Bob Moore, “Enforced Diaspora: The Fate of Italian Prisoners of War During the Second World War,” War in History 22, no. 2 (2015): 174–90, here 175ff.; Flavio Conti, I prigionieri di guerra italiani 1940–1945 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986); Giusti, I prigionieri, 97.
229.
Hammermann has calculated that 19,714 Italians (of 600,000) died from forced labour and malnourishment, and poor conditions – thus, the IMI had a mortality rate of around three per cent. See Hammermann, Zwangsarbeit, 584.
230.
Those Germans who fell into Soviet hands during the battle of Stalingrad had similarly high death rates, due to the harsh transports and generally poor conditions in winter 1942–1943, see Rüdiger Overmans, Soldaten hinter Stacheldraht. Deutsche Kriegsgefangene des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Munich: Propyläen, 2000), 89, 131.
231.
Buttar, Knife’s Edge, 189–90.
232.
Giusti, I prigionieri, 34.
233.
Ibid., 43, 59–109.
234.
Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, La Politica estera italiana e l’unione sovietica (1944–1948) (Rome: La Goliardica, 1985), 108.
235.
Giusti, I prigionieri, 45ff.
236.
Morozzo della Rocca, Politica, 94. Prison camp number 188, for example, held 2500 prisoners on 1 May 1943, but at the end of month a mere 160. The cause for this drop was probably a mixture of relocations, malnutrition, and diseases, Agarossi and Zaslavsky, Togliatti e Stalin, 162–63. See also Giusti, I prigionieri, 68ff.
237.
As cited in Morozzo della Rocca, Politica, 107.
238.
Agarossi and Zaslavsky, Togliatti e Stalin, 166; Giusti, I prigionieri, 111ff.
239.
Ibid., 137ff.
240.
Especially soldiers from Northern Italy feared reprisals against their families from German or RSI authorities, Moore, “Enforced Diaspora,” 180.
241.
Only 31 officers who had collaborated were investigated after their return and some were downgraded by Italian counter-intelligence, Petacco, L’armata, 208; Giusti, I prigionieri, 148–56. In contrast to the captured Wehrmacht officers, who founded the anti-Hitler National Committee for a Free Germany (NKFD) which included both Communists and non-Communists, the Italians never formed a similar organisation in captivity—despite some ideas in this regard, ibid., 142ff.
242.
Morozzo della Rocca, Politica, 108.
243.
Petacco, L’armata, 215–16.
244.
Eight out of twelve regimental commanders had been killed or captured, one of six generals died in battle, three were captured, and two led their troops out of encirclement. In contrast, all 21 generals of the II and XXXV corps reached Voroshilovgrad, two of the twenty regimental commanders fell in battle, and four were taken prisoner. All numbers in Petacco, L’armata, 154.
245.
TNA, FO 371/96269, WT 1191/2, The Italian Army in 1950, 8 Jan. 1951, fol.5.
246.
His publication with Carloni and others shows that some officers were arguably closer to Fascism than others (or had developed very strong anti-Communist tendencies during the Russian campaign), and that they remained in contact with influential in far-right circles. The publication referred to is Battisti, Carloni et al., eds., Italianzy kaputt.
247.
These debates will be described in more detail below. The vast majority of Italian soldiers had returned by 1946, Giusti, I prigionieri, 165ff.
248.
Petacco, L’armata, 163, 220ff.
249.
Morozzo della Rocca, Politica, 99.
250.
Rochat, “La prigionia,” 381–402.
251.
Moore, “Enforced Diaspora,” 189.

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Scianna, B.M. (2019). Narratives About Victimhood: Evil Germans, Good Italian Occupiers and Evil Soviets?. In: The Italian War on the Eastern Front, 1941–1943. Italian and Italian American Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26524-3_9

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