Abstract
This chapter concludes the work by reflecting on the results discussed in the different chapters and adding an in-depth analysis of some of the more striking conclusions. The main themes emerging from the work—(semi-)autonomy, forum shopping activities, flexibility, (non-contractual) moral activity within the commercial sphere and public-private coexistence—are discussed and brought together in this conclusion. In this way, a novel conceptual framework emerges, which allows us to examine the field of corporate investigations without having to refer back to the state-centric approaches which do not provide a right fit with the social realities of corporate investigations into internal norm violations, their corporate settlements and the public-private relationships that develop in these contexts.
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Notes
- 1.
This is not necessarily a case of ‘deceit’ by the organisation. Coming back to the quote of respondent 43 presented in Chapter 4: the information which has been asked for is provided, but that may not necessarily be the full story. Access to an employee’s laptop for example does not mean access to the internal system of the organisation. The criminal investigations of the laptop will then thus be limited to the hardware of the laptop.
- 2.
They still are present in police investigations as well—however there the control and procedural guarantees are more strictly regulated.
- 3.
However, in recent years, the position of the victim has been strengthened, for example by the formal right to speak in court (see, e.g., Pemberton & Reynaers, 2011).
- 4.
Although individual law enforcement professionals may take private interests into account as well.
- 5.
An important side note here is that although the activities are largely similar, they are not interchangeable. The fact that corporate investigators do not have powers of investigation means that they cannot perform all the activities law enforcement professionals could in the same situation. Similarly, corporate investigators can provide their clients with services law enforcement agencies do not provide (such as asset recovery and the improvement of compliance systems).
- 6.
However, because it might boost the reputation of the involved corporate investigators, it might be a commercially smart move in the long run.
- 7.
The authors refer for example to problems of poor quality of staff, ‘cowboy traders’ and a connection to (organised) crime. These issues are less pronounced in the corporate investigation sector: the quality of staff for example is regarded as higher than in the public sector (although, as Chapter 2 shows, there is no uniform system of education or quality markers available).
- 8.
This cooperation is formed by the advice the Data Protection Authority provides to the Minister of Justice and Security when a request for a permit is being assessed.
- 9.
The CBP is the former name of the Data Protection Authority, which is currently called the AP [Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens].
- 10.
Too much familiarity is not to be aspired to either, since that may lead to collusion and informal (illegitimate) information sharing. As of yet, this does not seem to be a major concern in corporate investigator-police relations. However, it would be wise remain wary of the possibility.
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Meerts, C.A. (2019). Discussion. In: Corporate Investigations, Corporate Justice and Public-Private Relations. Crime Prevention and Security Management. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26516-8_6
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