The UCPD and Trademark Average Consumers: Two of a Kind?

Laustsen, Rasmus Dalgaard

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-26350-8_7

Rasmus Dalgaard Laustsen ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-5099-8820²

624 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter compares the UCPD average consumer with the European trademark law average consumer. Both fictions have the same characteristics, and they discount the least and most attentive consumers. With the reference by the UCPD to the average consumer though, the EU legislature has sent a significant message to the national legislatures and judiciaries to be careful when contextualising the average consumer. This is also seen by UCPD’s reference to the “social, cultural and linguistic factors, as interpreted by the Court of Justice.”

The UCPD’s reference to other consumer models, i.e. the “confident consumer,” the “vulnerable consumers” and an “average member” of “a particular group of consumers,” only to some extent manifests in substantial differences from the European trademark law average consumer. For the vulnerable consumers though, represented by children, the UCPD more narrowly protects consumers, including children, where European trademark law protects senior and junior trademark owners.

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Notes

1.
See among others, Friant-Perrot, Marine, ‘The Vulnerable Consumer in the UCPD and Other Provisions of EU Law’, in van Boom, Willem, Garde, Amandine and Akseli, Orkun eds., The European Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: Impact, Enforcement Strategies and National Legal Systems (1st edn, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014), 89; Trzaskowski, Jan, ‘Behavioural Economics, Neuroscience, and the Unfair Commercial Practises Directive’, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 34/no. 3, (2011), pp. 377, Trzaskowski, Jan, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and Vulnerable Consumers’, Conference Paper, (2013), pp. 1; partly Mak, Vanessa, ‘Standards of Protection: In Search of the ‘Average Consumer’ of EU Law in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive’, European Review of Private Law, vol. 19/no. 1, (2011), pp. 25; Incardona, Rossella, and Poncibò, Cristina, ‘The Average Consumer, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and the Cognitive Revolution’, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 30/no. 1, (2007), pp. 21; Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘The Average European Consumer: A Legal Fiction?’, in Wilhelmsson, Thomas, Paunio, Elina and Pohjolainen, Annika eds., Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (1st edn, Kluwer Law International, 2007), 243, Duivenvoorde, Bram B., ‘The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’, (1st edn, Springer, 2015). More broadly not only focus on the UCPD average consumer: Böhler, Christian, ‘A Thin Line between the Rationalization of Consumer Choices and Overburdening Market Participants. Are the Courts Able to Keep the Balance?’, European Food and Feed Law Review, vol. 10/no. 1, (2015), pp. 34 and Wiebe, Andreas, ‘How Much Nature for the Consumer? Misleading Advertising, Trademark Law, the European Average Consumer Standard in the Food Sector’, Corporate Governance eJournal, no. 32, 2015, (2015), pp. 1 and Howells, Geraint, Twigg-Flesner, Christian, Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘Rethinking EU Consumer Law’, (1st edn, Routledge, 2018), p. 27-31 and p. 66-73.
2.
Duivenvoorde, Bram B., ‘The Consumer Benchmarks in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’, (1st edn, Springer, 2015), p. 52.
3.
Henning-Bodewig, Frauke, ‘Unfair Competition Law: European Union and Member States’, (1st edn, Kluwer Law International, 2006), p. x.
4.
Recital 18 of the UCPD.
5.
For an account of the early decisions of the Court of Justice, see the following chapter.
6.
Recital 18 of the UCPD.
7.
Ibid.
8.
Interflora v. Marks & Spencer, [2013] EWHC 1291 (Ch), para 209. The defendant (M&S) referred to recital 18 of the UCPD as a ground for finding that the average consumer test is normative and involves the usual characteristics. Arnold J affirmed this.
9.
Commission Staff Working Document Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices Accompanying the document “Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Regions – A comprehensive approach to stimulating cross-border e-Commerce for Europe’s citizens and businesses” (COM(2016) 320 final) of 25 May 2016 SWD(2016) 163 final, p. 37.
10.
See above footnote 1.
11.
Arts. 11-13 of the UCPD.
12.
Recital 11 of the UCPD.
13.
See art. 1 of the UCPD, and the Preamble in general. More precisely, in recital 6 it is stated that “[i]n line with the principle of proportionality, this Directive protects consumers from the consequences of such unfair commercial practices where they are material but recognises that in some cases the impact on consumers may be negligible. It neither covers nor affects the national laws on unfair commercial practices which harm only competitors’ economic interests or which relate to a transaction between traders.” See also Nemzeti v. Magyarország, Case C-388/13, [2015], paras 32 and 51, including referred case law in para 32.
14.
Howells, Geraint G., Micklitz, Hans-W, and Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘European Fair Trading Law the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’, (1st edn, Ashgate, 2006), preface.
15.
Nemzeti v. Magyarország, Case C-388/13, [2015], paras 31-37. The Court of Justice clearly disagreed with the conclusion of Advocate General Wahl that stated: “It is (…) my understanding that B2C conduct such as the communication of erroneous information to a single consumer cannot, to the extent that it constitutes an isolated event, be regarded as a ‘commercial practice’ within the meaning of the UCP Directive.” Nemzeti v. Magyarország, Case C-388/13, [2015] (opinion of AG Wahl), para 35.
16.
Nemzeti v. Magyarország, Case C-388/13, [2015], para 52 (italics added). See also BKK Mobil Oil v. Zentrale, Case C-59/12, [2013], para 36.
17.
Recital 8 of the UCPD.
18.
Recital 2 of the UCPD.
19.
Recital 3 of the UCPD.
20.
Commission Staff Working Paper Extended Impact Assessment on the EP and Council Directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market and amending directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) of 18 June 2003, COM(2003)356 final. Ibid, p. 3.
21.
See Chap. 1, Sect. 1.3.3.
22.
Recital 4 of the UCPD.
23.
See UCPD Working Paper 2003, footnote 33 where reference is made to a green paper drafted by the EU Parliament on consumer protection law.
24.
Weatherill has stated that the UCPD is an example of “a shift from minimum to maximum harmonisation – whereby the EU sets both floor and ceiling of regulatory protection.” Weatherill, Stephen, ‘EU Consumer Law and Policy’, (2nd edn, Edward Elgar, 2013), p. 25. See also Nemzeti v. Magyarország, Case C-388/13, [2015], para 32 and Howells, Geraint G., ‘Europe’s (Lack of) Vision on Consumer Protection: A Case of Rhetoric Hiding Substance?’, in Leczykiewicz, Dorota, and Weatherill, Stephen eds., The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (1st edn, Hart, 2016), 431, p. 436-439. For a recent analysis of the scope and gaps of the maximum harmonisation of the UCPD, see Howells, Geraint, Twigg-Flesner, Christian and Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘Rethinking EU Consumer Law’, (1st edn, Routledge, 2018), p. 47-48 and 73-84.
25.
Mediaprint v. ‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag, Case C-540/08, [2010] ECR I-10909, (opinion of AG Trstenjak), para 61. Trstenjak has based this finding on recitals 11, 12, 14, 15 and arts. 1 and 4 of the UCPD. Ibid, paras 62-64. See also the Court of Justice in Europamur Alimentación v. Dirección General de Comercio y Protección del Consumidor, Case C-295/16, [2017], para 39 and the earlier opinion of Trstenjak in Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs v. Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft, Case C-304/08, [2010] ECR I-217, (opinion of AG Trstenjak), paras 69-72.
26.
Cf. art. 2(k) of the UCPD (italics added).
27.
Cf. art. 5(4)(a), cf. arts. 6 and 7 of the UCPD.
28.
Cf. art. 6 of the UCPD.
29.
Cf. art. 7 of the UCPD.
30.
Cf. art. 5(4)(b), cf. arts. 8 and 9 of the UCPD.
31.
Cf. art. 9 of the UCPD.
32.
Cf. art. 5(5) of the UCPD. Those practices are set out in Annex I of the UCPD.
33.
Cf. art. 6(2)(a) of the UCPD (italics added).
34.
Bernitz, Ulf, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: Its Scope, Ambitions and Relation to the Law of Unfair Competition’, in Weatherill, Stephen and Bernitz, Ulf eds., The Regulation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Under EC Directive 2005/29 (1st edn, Oxford, Hart, 2007), 33, p. 42.
35.
See Chap. 9, Sect. 9.2.1.
36.
Cf. art. 5(2)(b) of the UCPD (italics added). Covered is also a commercial practice which “is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence.” Art. 5(1)(a) of the UCPD.
37.
Cf. arts. 6(1), 7(1) and 8 of the UCPD (italics added).
38.
Hence, in a 2016 working paper on the UCPD, the EU Commission stated that “[n]ational enforcement authorities should therefore investigate the facts and circumstances of the individual case (i.e. in concreto), but assess also the ‘likelihood’ of the impact of that practice on the transactional decision of the average consumer (i.e. in abstracto).” The UCPD Working Paper 2016, p. 36.
39.
McKenna, Mark P., ‘A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trade Mark Law’, Virginia Law Review, vol. 98 (2012), pp. 67, Petty, Ross D., ‘Initial Interest Confusion Versus Consumer Sovereignty: A Consumer Protection Perspective on Trademark Infringement’, Trademark Reporter, vol. 98/no. 3, (2008), pp. 757, Glazer, Daniel C., and Dhamija, Dev R., ‘Revisiting Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet’, Trademark Reporter, vol. 95/no. 5, (2005), pp. 952 and Klein, David M., and Glazer, Daniel C., ‘Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet’, Trademark Reporter, vol. 93/no. 5, (2003), pp. 1035. Fhima, Ilanah S., ‘Initial Interest Confusion’, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 8/no. 4, (2013), pp. 311.
40.
Rothman, Jennifer E., ‘Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law’, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 27/no. 1, (2005), pp. 105, p. 108.
41.
Interflora v. Marks & Spencer, [2014] EWCA Civ 1403, para 158, and overall paras 150-158. The decision overrules the finding by Arnold J in Och-Ziff v. Och Capital where it was concluded that initial interest confusion was actionable. Och-Ziff v. Och Capital, [2010] EWHC 2599 (Ch), para 101.
42.
See recital 18 and arts. 5(2)(b), 6(1)(2), 7(1)(2) and 8 of the UCPD.
43.
See recitals 4 and 13 of the UCPD.
44.
See recitals 18 and 19, and art. 5(2)(b) of the UCPD.
45.
See recital 18 and art. 5(3) of the UCPD.
46.
Recital 18 of the UCPD.
47.
Therefore, the average consumer in the UCPD, as it has been seen, is also “reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect.” Recital 18 of the UCPD.
48.
See the UCPD Working Paper 2003, p. 26.
49.
The UCPD Working Paper 2016, p. 38.
50.
Recital 18 of the UCPD. See on the UCPD Konsumentombudsmannen v. Ving Sverige, Case C-122/10, [2011] ECR I-3903, para 22 and Canal Digital Danmark, Case C-611/14, [2016], para 39.
51.
See Chap. 8, Sect. 8.6.
52.
DHL Express v. Chronopost, Case C-235/09, [2011] ECR I-2801, paras 47-48. Advocate General Jacobs also addressed this factor in Lloyd. Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer v. Klijsen Handel BV, Case C-342/97, [1998] ECR I-3819, (opinion of AG Jacobs), para 12.
53.
Matratzen Concord v Hukla, Case C-421/04, [2006] ECR I-2303, paras 25 and 32.
54.
Ornua v. Tindale & Stanton, Case C-93/16, [2017], para 2, second question.
55.
Ibid, para 42 (italics added). Here, the Court of Justice explicitly agreed with Advocate General Szpunar giving the opinion in the case. See Ornua v. Tindale & Stanton, Case C-93/16, [2017], (opinion of AG Szpunar), paras 41-42.
56.
Enterprise v. Europcar, [2015] EWHC 17 (Ch), para 139 (italics added).
57.
Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘The Average European Consumer: A Legal Fiction?’, in Wilhelmsson, Thomas, Paunio, Elina and Pohjolainen, Annika eds., Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (1st edn, Kluwer Law International, 2007), 243, p. 248.
58.
Wilhelmsson has mentioned “trust,” “understanding communications,” “rationality patterns,” “role of commercial communications in decision-making” and “values and preferences.” Ibid, p. 259-264.
59.
See the UCPD Working Paper 2003, p. 8.
60.
Nemzeti v. Magyarország, Case C-388/13, [2015], paras 39 and 41.
61.
Ibid, para 34, BKK Mobil Oil v. Zentrale, Case C-59/12, [2013], para 40 and Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag v. ‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag, Case C-540/08, [2010] ECR I-10909, para 21.
62.
Nemzeti v. Magyarország, Case C-388/13, [2015], para 39.
63.
The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, No. 1277 of 8 May 2008.
64.
Purely Creative v. Office of Fair Trading, Case C-428/11, [2012], paras 31 and 49. Purely Creative relates mainly to interpreting para 31 Annex I of the UCPD, including what is “false impression,” and if a trader may impose a de minimis of costs on the consumer to claim a prize as seen in para 20 of Annex I. The commercial practices encompassed by Annex I are per se unfair, cf. art. 5(5) of the UCPD. The Court of Justice rejected that a de minimis of costs is allowed under para 31 of Annex I. Ibid, paras 36 and 42.
65.
Ibid, para 55. It may seem surprising that the Court of Justice has referred to the average consumer or vulnerable consumers, cf. art. 5(2)(b) of the UCPD, as benchmarks for the assessment of the information encompassed by the “black list” commercial practices in UCPD Annex I since these practices are per se unfair, cf. art. 5(5) of the UCPD stating: “Annex I contains the list of those commercial practices which shall in all circumstances be regarded as unfair.”
66.
Böhler, Christian, ‘A Thin Line between the Rationalization of Consumer Choices and Overburdening Market Participants. Are the Courts Able to Keep the Balance?’, European Food and Feed Law Review, vol. 10/no. 1, (2015), pp. 34, p. 39.
67.
Cf. art. 6(1) of the UCPD.
68.
Pereničová v. SOS financ spol, Case C-453/10, [2012], para 40.
69.
Ibid, para 41.
70.
Pereničová v. SOS financ spol, Case C-453/10, [2011], (opinion of AG Trstenjak), para 99.
71.
Konsumentombudsmannen v. Ving Sverige, Case C-122/10, [2011] ECR I-3903, para 59.
72.
It was thus stated by the Court of Justice in Purely Creative v. OFT on prize information that “[l]ike every other item of information provided by a trader to a consumer, information on the substance of the prize must be examined and assessed by the national courts in the light of recitals 18 and 19 in the preamble to the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and of Article 5(2)(b) of the directive. That concerns the availability of the information and how it is presented, the legibility and clarity of the wording and whether it can be understood by the public targeted by the practice.” Purely Creative v. OFT, Case C-428/11, [2012], para 55.
73.
Canal Digital Danmark, Case C-611/14, [2016]. Besides assessing art. 7 on misleading omissions, the Court of Justice also assessed if art. 7 of the UCPD was correctly implemented into the Danish Marketing Practices Act. Ibid, paras 24-35. Further, the court assessed how the art. 7 was to be interpreted, given art. 6 of the UCPD on misleading actions. Ibid, para 42.
74.
On the facts of the case, see ibid, paras 13-23.
75.
Ibid, para 41.
76.
Ibid, para 62.
77.
See Chap. 1, Sect. 1.3.2 and Chap. 12, Sect. 12.6.
78.
In the UCPD, the average consumer is referred to more broadly by the legislature, than is the case for the other consumer models under the UCPD only referred to in the general prohibition of unfair commercial practices. I.e. reference is made to the average consumer in relation to misleading actions (art. 6 of the UCPD), misleading omissions (art. 7 of the UCPD) and aggressive commercial practices (art. 8 of the UCPD), whereas the other consumer model are only referred to in the general prohibition of unfair commercial practices (art 5(2)(b) and (3) of the UCPD). See also Howells, Geraint, Twigg-Flesner, Christian and Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘Rethinking EU Consumer Law’, (1st edn, Routledge, 2018), p. 73.
79.
See Chap. 11.
80.
Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC Consumer Law’, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 27 (2004), pp. 317, Howells, Geraint G., ‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive – A Missed Opportunity?’, in Weatherill, Stephen and Bernitz, Ulf eds., The Regulation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Under EC Directive 2005/29 (1st edn, Oxford, Hart, 2007), 103, p. 107-108 and Twigg-Flesner, Christian, ‘The Importance of Law and Harmonisation’, in Leczykiewicz, Dorota and Weatherill, Stephen eds., The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (1st edn, Hart, 2016), 183 and chapter 7.
81.
Twigg-Flesner, Christian, ‘The Importance of Law and Harmonisation’, in Leczykiewicz, Dorota and Weatherill, Stephen eds., The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (1st edn, Hart, 2016), 183, p. 185 and chapter 7.
82.
See ec. recital 4 of the UCPD.
83.
Recital 13 of the UCPD.
84.
Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC Consumer Law’, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 27 (2004), pp. 317, p. 325.
85.
On discounting, see Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.
86.
The UCPD Working Paper 2003, p. 26 (italics added).
87.
Keirsbilck, Bert, ‘The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law’, (1st edn, Hart, 2011), p. 288. See also recently, Durovic, Mateja, ‘European Law on Unfair Commercial Practices and Contract Law’, (1st edn, Hart, 2016), p. 42.
88.
Durovic, Mateja, ‘European Law on Unfair Commercial Practices and Contract Law’, (1st edn, Hart, 2016), p. 42.
89.
Cf. art. 5(3) of the UCPD. The provision continues “in a way which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee.” On art. 5(3) of the UCPD, including its development, see Keirsbilck, Bert, ‘The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law’, (1st edn, Hart, 2011), p. 289-293. For an overview of how the vulnerable consumer appears in EU law, see Reich, Norbert, ‘Vulnerable Consumers in EU Law’, in Leczykiewicz, Dorota and Weatherill, Stephen eds., The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (1st edn, Hart, 2016), 139 and more recently with specific reference to the vulnerable consumers under the UCPD, Howells, Geraint, Twigg-Flesner, Christian and Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘Rethinking EU Consumer Law’, (1st edn, Routledge, 2018), p. 70-73.
90.
Konsumentombudsmannen v. Ving Sverige, Case C-122/10, [2011] ECR I-3903, (opinion of AG Mengozzi), footnote 11 of the opinion.
91.
Recital 18 of the UCPD.
92.
Cf. art. 5(3) of the UCPD.
93.
Weatherill, Stephen, ‘Empowerment is Not the Only Fruit’, in Leczykiewicz, Dorota and Weatherill, Stephen eds., The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (1st edn, Hart, 2016), 203, p. 215.
94.
Hence, art. 5(3) in fine of the UCPD states: “This is without prejudice to the common and legitimate advertising practice of making exaggerated statements or statements which are not meant to be taken literally.”
95.
European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market and amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) (COM(2003) 356 – C5-0288/2003 – 2003/0134(COD)) (Codecision procedure: first reading), P5_TA(2004)0298, art. 2(c).
96.
Howells, Geraint, Twigg-Flesner, Christian and Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘Rethinking EU Consumer Law’, (1st edn, Routledge, 2018), p. 71. Similarly, Wilhelmsson has stated when analysing the informed and the vulnerable consumer that “[o]ften a person needs protection not because he belongs to a certain group of people, but rather because he is in a certain situation.”, Wilhelmsson, Thomas, ‘the Informed Consumer v the Vulnerable Consumer in European Unfair Commercial Practices Law – A Comment’, in Howells, Geraint et al, The Yearbook on Consumer Law 2007 (1st edn, Ashgate, 2007), 211, p. 212. For further on this “situational” analysis of the vulnerable consumer, see ibid, p. 211-215.
97.
Abbamonte in Weatherill 2007, p. 25. This example was also referred to by Advocate General Trstenjak in Mediaprint v. ‘Österreich’-Zeitungsverlag, Case C-540/08, [2010] ECR I-10909, (opinion of AG Trstenjak), para 131, including footnote 102 of the opinion.
98.
Ibid, p. 216.
99.
Schuhmacher, Wolfgang, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’, in Hilty, Reto M. and Henning-Bodewig, Frauke eds., Law Against Unfair Competition: Towards a New Paradigm in Europe? (1st edn, Springer, 2007), 127, p. 134. Art. 5(3) in fine of the UCPD. See above footnote 94.
100.
Underhill, Paco, ‘Why we Buy: The Science of Shopping: Updated and Revised for the Internet, the Global Consumer and Beyond’, (1st edn, Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 158.
101.
Koktvedgaard, Mogens, ‘Lærebog i Immaterialret: Ophavsret, Patentret, Brugsmodelret, Mønsterret, Varemærkeret’, (5th edn, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag), 1999, p. 338.
102.
One of the most prominent litigating counsels in Denmark in disputes on unfair commercial practices and trademark law.
103.
In Danish: “gennemsnitsoplyst barn.” Bøggild, Frank, and Staunstrup, Kolja, ‘EU-Varemærkeret’, (1st edn, Karnov Group, 2015), p. 106. See also ibid, p. 105.
104.
Ibid, p. 106.
105.
Phillips, Jeremy, ‘Trade Mark Law a Practical Anatomy’, (1st edn, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 353 (italics added).
106.
Companhia Muller de Bebidas v. OHIM, T-472/08, [2010] ECR II-3907, para 41 (italics added).
107.
In Swedish: “dem som använder tobak i form av snus och som har fyllt 18 år och därmed lagligen får köpa varor av detta slag.” Swedish Match v. V2 Distribution, T 13352-1 and T 5357-12, [2013], p. 36 as affirmed by the SE Court of Appeal in Swedish Match v. V2 Distribution, T 768-14, [2015], SECA, p. 12.
108.
Bunker & BKR v. OHIM, Case T-423/04, [2005] ECR II-4035, para 25 (italics added).
109.
Gauselmann v. OHIM, Case T-106/09, [2010], para 20 (italics added). The decision also related to goods directed at a professional public. For further on the decision, see Chap. 11, Sect. 11.4.1.2.
110.
J & Joy v. EUIPO, Case T-389/15, [2017], para 23.
111.
Sadas v. OHIM, Case T-346/04, [2005] ECR II-4891, para 29. Bøggild and Staunstrup have also solely referred to this decision in their account on the relevance of vulnerable consumers under trademark law. Bøggild, Frank, and Staunstrup, Kolja, ‘EU-Varemærkeret’, (1st edn, Karnov Group, 2015), p. 106.
112.
This problem is addressed in Chap. 11, Sect. 11.4.1.2.
113.
Fetter Klovn Karl v. TOP-TOY, HR-1999-34-A, [1999], NOSC.
114.
In Norwegian: “Barn vil nok kunne feste seg ved Brio mer enn med Superlek. På den annen side vil voksne lett merke seg Superlek fordi det er et eiendommelig ord som nettopp på grunn av sin uklare betydning fester seg i bevisstheten.” Fetter Klovn v. TOP-TOY, LB-1997-3336, [1998], NOCA, p. 4.
115.
Fetter Klovn Karl v. TOP-TOY, HR-1999-34-A, [1999], NOSC, p. 646.
116.
VN Legetøj v. Hasbro Europe, U.2012.107H, [2011], (DKSC).
117.
The Danish wordmark was more precisely THE TRANSFORMERS.
118.
Bekendtgørelse af markedsføringsloven, Act No 1216 of 25 September 2013.
119.
In Danish: “og produktets målgruppe er børn, som er væsentlig mere påvirkelige end voksne.” VN Legetøj v. Hasbro Europe, U.2012.107H, [2011], (DKSC), p. 111.
120.
In Danish: “Ved markedsføring skal der udvises særlig omhu over for børn, da børn mangler kritisk sans til at skelne mellem mærker, der minder om hinanden.” Ibid.
121.
In Danish: “Målgruppen for legetøjet er børn, og børn er ikke mindre observante forbrugere end voksne.” Ibid, p. 112.
122.
In Danish: “Det må således formodes, at et gennemsnitligt dansk barn ikke vil relatere ordet “transformers” til det danske ord “transformator”, medmindre han/hun har forældre, som jævnlig bruger dette ord konkret i forhold til deres arbejde.” Ibid, p. 110.
123.
Ibid, p. 113.
124.
Ankenævnet v. Chantelle, U.2003.2366H, [2003], (DKSC), p. 2370. For further on the decision, see Chap. 11, Sect. 11.4.2.2.
125.
See Chap. 11, Sect. 11.2.1.
126.
See Chap. 11, Sects. 11.1 and 11.4.1.2.

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Laustsen, R.D. (2020). The UCPD and Trademark Average Consumers: Two of a Kind?. In: The Average Consumer in Confusion-based Disputes in European Trademark Law and Similar Fictions . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26350-8_7

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26350-8_7
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Print ISBN: 978-3-030-26349-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-26350-8
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

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