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How to Solve the Problems of EI Theory?

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European Republicanism

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Abstract

In this chapter new approaches are presented that have emerged in the last years in order to overcome the weaknesses of European integration theory, illustrated in the previous chapters. These presented approaches are multilevel governance, new institutionalism, social constructivism and the definition of European public goods. The chapter concludes that a new approach is needed that combines the advantages of the new emerging theories and helps to overcome the weaknesses of European integration theory. This new approach could be the concept of economic externalities that need to be governed following a republican paradigm.

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  1. Cologne, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

    Thilo Zimmermann

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  1. Thilo Zimmermann
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Zimmermann, T. (2019). How to Solve the Problems of EI Theory?. In: European Republicanism . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25935-8_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25935-8_5

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-25934-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-25935-8

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