Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Living Certainties

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Rorty, Liberal Democracy, and Religious Certainty

  • 135 Accesses

Abstract

In this central chapter the “Quasi”-Wittgensteinian resolution to what we have called the Epistemic non-Distinctiveness thesis proposed by Duncan Pritchard is analysed. The conclusion is drawn that although it too seeks to bring “epistemic peace” to the reflective believer the proposal does not meet our two requirements. It is concluded nevertheless that Wittgenstein’s On Certainty does give us resources for developing a self-understanding of our cognitive situation that is not undermined either by the fear of relativism or the threat of “deistic” vacuity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Boncompagni, A. 2016. Wittgenstein and Pragmatism. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, T. 1972. The Legacy of Skepticism. The Journal of Philosophy 69 (20): 754–769.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coliva, A. 2010. Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. 1974. On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, ed. D. Davidson, 183–198. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1983. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In Reading Rorty, ed. A. Malachowski, 120–134. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1987. Afterthoughts. In Reading Rorty, ed. A. Malachowski, 134–138. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1988. The Myth of the Subjective. In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, ed. D. Davidson, 39–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies, M. 2004. Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 78: 213–245.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gascoigne, N. 2007. The Legacy of Clarke. In Wittgenstein-Studien Jarhbuch 3, ed. W. Lütterfelds, S. Majetschak, R. Raatzsch, and W. Vossenkuhl. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, I. 1929. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kerr, F. 1997. Theology After Wittgenstein, 2nd ed. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Misak, C. (ed.). 2016. Cambridge Pragmatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moser, P.K. 2008. Religious Skepticism. In The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, ed. J. Greco, 200–224. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moyal-Sharrock, D. 2004. Understanding Wittgenstein’s on Certainty. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagl, L., and C. Mouffe (eds.). 2001. The Legacy of Wittgenstein: Pragmatism or Deconstruction. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga, A. 1983. Reason and Belief in God. In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff, 16–93. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pritchard, D. 2007. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2012. Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism. In Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 4, ed. J. Kvanwig, 144–158. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2016. Epistemic Angst. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2017. Faith and Reason. Philosophy 81: 101–118.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2018. Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3): 51–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stroud, B. 1968. Transcendental Arguments. In Kant on Pure Reason, ed. R. Walker, 117–131. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. 1967. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. C. Barrett. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1969. On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. v. Wright. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009. Philosophical Investigations, trans. D. Paul and ed. G.E.M. Anscombe et al., 4th ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C. 2004. Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)? In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 78: 167–212.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

    Neil Gascoigne

Authors
  1. Neil Gascoigne
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Neil Gascoigne .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Gascoigne, N. (2019). Living Certainties. In: Rorty, Liberal Democracy, and Religious Certainty. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25454-4_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation