Skip to main content

Annotated Natural Deduction for Adaptive Reasoning

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency

Part of the book series: Outstanding Contributions to Logic ((OCTR,volume 18))

  • 473 Accesses

Abstract

We present a multi-conclusion natural deduction calculus characterizing the dynamic reasoning typical of Adaptive Logics. The resulting system AdaptiveND is sound and complete with respect to the propositional fragment of adaptive logics based on CLuN. This appears to be the first tree-format presentation of the standard linear dynamic proof system typical of Adaptive Logics. It offers the advantage of full transparency in the formulation of locally derivable rules, a connection between restricted inference-rules and their adaptive counterpart, and the formulation of abnormalities as a subtype of well-formed formulas. These features of the proposed calculus allow us to clarify the relation between defeasible and multiple-conclusion approaches to classical recapture.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    See also footnote 10 of Batens (2008) for a discussion of this distinction.

  2. 2.

    ‘A is finally derived from \(\Gamma \) on line i of a proof at stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.’ [Batens 2007, 229].

  3. 3.

    See Allo (2016, 18ff) for a more detailed reconstruction of this debate.

References

  • Allo, P. (2016). Logic, reasoning and revision. Theoria, 82(1), 3–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Batens, D., De Clerq, K., Verdée, P., & Meheus, J. (2008). Yes fellows, most human reasoning is complex. Synthese, 166(1), 113–131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Batens, D. (1980). Paraconsistent extensional propositional logics. Logique & Analyse, 23(90–91), 195–234.

    Google Scholar 

  • Batens, D. (1989). Dynamic dialectical logics. In P. Graham, R. Richard, & J. Norman (Eds.) Paraconsistent logic—essays on the inconsistent (pp. 187–217). Philosophia Verlag, München/Hamden/Wien.

    Google Scholar 

  • Batens, D. (2000). Minimally abnormal models in some adaptive logics. Synthese, 125(1), 5–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Batens, D. (2001). A general characterization of adaptive logics. Logique & Analyse, 173–175, 45–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Batens, D. (2007). A universal logic approach to adaptive logics. Logica Universalis, 1, 221–242.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Batens, D., & Provijn, D. (2001). Pushing the search paths in the proofs. a study in proof heuristics. Logique & Analyse, 44(173–175), 113–134.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beall, Jc. (2012). Why Priest’s reassurance is not reassuring. Analysis, 72(3), 517–525.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beall, J. C. C. (2011). Multiple-conclusion LP and default classicality. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 4(2), 326–336.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pfenning, F. (2004). Handout on automated theorem proving. Technical Report, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Priest, Graham. (1991). Minimally inconsistent LP. Studia Logica, 50, 321–331.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Priest, G. (2006). In contradiction (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Priest, Graham. (2012). The sun may not, indeed, rise tomorrow: a reply to Beall. Analysis, 72(4), 739–741.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schütte, K. (1960). Beweistheorie. Berlin, Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strasser, C. (2014).Adaptive logics for defeasible reasoning. Trends in Logic. Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Troelstra, A. S., & Schwichtenberg, H. (2000). Basic Proof Theory (2nd ed.). New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Patrick Allo—Supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 657017.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Giuseppe Primiero .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Allo, P., Primiero, G. (2019). Annotated Natural Deduction for Adaptive Reasoning. In: BaÅŸkent, C., Ferguson, T. (eds) Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Outstanding Contributions to Logic, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3_19

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics