In this section, interview based data from the two case studies are presented and discussed in order to show how the situation of TMWs is perceived and presented by various key actors involved in the politics of (dis)integration that specifically affects migrant workers.
A major difference between the two countries is that the UK chose to discontinue these programmes while Canada has demonstrated an ambivalent attitude (Samuk 2015), although the government in 2016 and 2017 talked of reforming its TMPs. The Conservative administration decided to decrease the numbers who arrive via temporary channels and better inform the migrant workers of their rights (Open Government Canada 2015). Nevertheless, those who stayed for 4 or 5 years suddenly faced the risk of deportation because they were forced to leave (CBC News 2015). In the UK, programmes were discontinued not because they resulted in unjust consequences and the deterioration of the lives of migrant workers but because the labour force was thought to be available from the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, and thus not needed from outside the EU.
Both Canada and the UK have been keen on increasing their highly skilled labour force and to ensure the labour-market integration of TMWs but do not consider other aspects of their integration. For instance, in an interview I conducted on 11 October 2013 in Ottawa, a migrant lawyer particularly stressed how important the highly skilled are for the labour market and that they integrate more easily compared to low-skilled migrant workers. Still labour-market integration is given priority over cultural, social and residential integration. Mirroring official policy discourses, demographic reasons for immigration, while highly considered in Canada, seem to be avoided in the UK as a discourse for encouraging immigration. Demographic growth is not a consideration in the UK: security and keeping the numbers down were more often used by interviewees to explain the logic of immigration policies.
4.4.1 The Case of Canada
While integration is not planned for in Canada’s TMP, some efforts to integrate TMWs at the local level are visible. Two Liberal Party MPs I interviewed in Ottawa seemed ambiguous when it comes to people migrating under temporary schemes, while the so-called ‘Ottawa Immigration Strategy’ prepared by the Ottawa Local Immigration Partnership (OLIP) and other local parties is explicitly open to providing settlement opportunities for TMWs, as confirmed by an OLIP and by a United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) representative. Despite the fact that temporariness goes against the historical way of drawing up immigration policies, it has become institutionalised in Canada (Goldring et al. 2009; Rajkumar et al. 2012). Hence, temporary schemes which allow migrant workers to stay for up to 5 years with limited rights are set to remain.
Due to the understanding of Canada being a ‘settlement country’ or ‘immigration country’ (Freeman 1995) Canadian authorities demonstrate more flexibility in terms of understanding the shortcomings of temporary migration and its limitations for the rights of migrant workers. It is true that policy-makers incline more towards a policyFootnote 3 that would grant TMWs permanent residence in the country and support their transition to permanent migration status. Nevertheless, the numbers of those transiting to permanent residence status are below 3% (Lu and Hou 2017, p. 13). Being temporary and low skilled, family reunification and voting are out of question as social and political rights. Moreover, TMPs are known to cause the exploitation of migrant workers. Policy-makers from diverse parties accepted the exploitative aspect and were aware of the deterioration of the situation of TMWs’ living conditions. For instance, a Liberal Party MP told me in an interview:
We are talking about people working in Tim Horton’s [Canadian coffee chain store]. Canadians do not want to go to work in Tim Horton’s. I don’t buy that either. I think that they bring people in some cases and exploit them. And pay them less. I think that it is a programme that I know too well that is easily exploited [by employers].
TMPs demand sacrifices not only in the social but also in the private lives of the migrant workers (Hughes 2012). A representative of the UFCW emphasised that these policies have many negative outcomes: ‘We don’t want to separate families for four years. Those who have jobs, we want to bring the families too and let them work then they can get to stay here’. He clearly stated that family reunification as a social right is under threat for the migrant workers’ families. When I asked him about the argument in the media (Hari 2018) about the replacement of Canadian workers by migrant workers, he said:
Employers should pay decent wages, and then more Canadian people would be employed. I am saying if TFWP was not there, the employers would have been forced to pay the Canadian workers better. As TFWs [Temporary foreign workers] they take anyone and treat them as badly as they want, they think that that way… We have a Human Rights department at UFCW…
This interview reveals that economic rights are not guaranteed fully for temporary migrant workers in regard to wages. As a result, employers can undercut minimum wage levels, which in return lowers the general wages in the labour market. Furthermore, TMWs who work in agriculture have limited rights to become a member of a rights-based labour union or organisation, a right that depends on the province they are in, as provincial regulations might limit their political opportunities to defend their rights (Makin 2011).
The possibility of a transition to permanence helps guarantee better social and political rights (and even economic rights) for migrant workers. Interestingly, when the transition-to-permanence programmes are considered, the most knowledgeable policy organisation was the Chamber of Commerce; it was impressive to see to what extent the Chamber of Commerce in Ottawa was well-informed about the amended immigration laws, and ‘transition to permanence’ Schemes. A representative of the Chamber said:
The provincial nominee programme has been very successful as a complement, right, as an addition to, well, the other programmes but certainly in some of the provinces there were very high skill shortages, like Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Manitoba has always been considered the best with respect to its provincial nominee programme because of how it brought together the players so that employers and the provincial representatives were together at the table…. I think the same is happening in Saskatchewan, too, you know the premier of Saskatchewan has gone to Ireland on a recruiting mission, that is how vested he is on the part of his province recognising ‘We need these workers’ you know, so we need to show some real interest in attracting the right workers [with high skills or matching skills] to our province and to our projects. … So the Canadian Experience Class, very pleased to see that they have increased the numbers for that, so that is … a great addition, because it allows that ‘segue from temporary to permanent residency’ that is very encouraging.
This observation proves that the Chamber of Commerce is closely following the developments regarding temporary migration policies. Within this context, employer-based and pro-employer institutions have higher leverage in design and criticism of immigration policies. The expansiveness (letting higher numbers of immigrants enter the country and giving them permanent status) aspect – within so-called liberal democracies – is fulfilled (Freeman 1995) via the involvement of private interests, whilst the integration aspect (further social and political rights) is not planned in detail by pro-immigration private institutions.
Regardless of who contemplates inclusiveness within public and private bodies, temporary integration has become a social reality for migrant workers who stay and work in a place for often more than 3 years. A government official from Citizenship and Immigration in Canada (CIC) admitted that some of the TMWs are definitely integrated and do not want to return to their country of origin: ‘Some of them are very integrated already so they won’t go back. […] So it is a big challenge for us to force people to go back [even if they are temporary] if they are eligible to stay here’. In line with Schweitzer’s analysis of ‘integration against the state’ (2017) this interview confirms that there is ‘integration despite temporariness’. Hence, in Canada, sending people back after their temporary work permit has expired, is still taboo, although it does happen in some cases.
Interviewees in Canada used phrases such as ‘bridge building’ and ‘multi-sector cooperation’ which meant that integration necessitates collaboration of many institutions and that there should be bridge building between these institutions, which is precisely the intention behind the OLIP. Multidimensionality of integration also includes ‘cultural and language interpretation’ as a representative of the Immigrant Women Services Ottawa (IWSO) suggested: years of experience of immigration and settlement bring forward the fact that the interpretation of culture is not the job of the interpreter but it depends on the migrant who interprets her/his own culture. This is a historically valuable experience Canadian institutions possess. Regarding migrant workers, however, not speaking English or French is still a disadvantage as they need to learn/read more about their economic, political and social rights.
Overall, the ambiguity regarding the role of immigrants as a ‘demographic contribution’ and about possible limitations to immigration come to the fore in more technical terms such as ‘absorptive capacity’ and ‘skills set’, which pay attention to bringing highly skilled couples rather than low skilled, as observed in the discourse of one of the Liberal Party members.
Integration starts at the local level, whilst decisions on TMPs (which cause disintegration) are made at the national level. Immigrants are categorised before they arrive in Canada, since they are entering via diverse schemes which determine their potential status and the extent to which they can benefit from integration policies. While for highly skilled foreign workers there are explicit integration policies (Rajkumar et al. 2012) – such as benefiting from language courses and easier rules for family reunification – for low-skilled TMWs social rights are not easy to implement due to the time limitations; political rights are almost non-present and economic rights can be violated due to lower hourly wages.
4.4.2 The Case of the UK
My interviews in the UK reveal that there was less ambiguity about temporariness: the rules of the game were clearer – in other words, once one is temporary, one is temporary. On the other hand, ways of preventing exploitation were more institutionalised compared to Canada. The Gangmasters’ and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA)Footnote 4 – was established in 2004 to protect the rights of migrant workers and to check for violations of their working conditions. However, the GLAA has its limitations, since it can only check officially registered legal agencies, employers and documented migrant workers but is unable to make inquiries on the situation of undocumented migrant workers.
The categorisation of immigrants into different ‘tiers’ reinforces the underlying hierarchy of skills, which highlights what the introduction of this book describes as the stratification of (dis)integration processes (Collyer et al. 2020). Tier 3 – designed as a work-permit route for the low skilled – was discarded. Tier 5, which is for temporary workers with medium to high skill levels, still exists. Other routes for migrant workers are via Tier 2 – for skilled workers with a job offer from outside the EU – and Tier 4 for students. The tiered admission system in the UK ensures that migrants have certain limitations regarding the timeframe of their residence, work permits and social rights. Within each tier ‘there are further differentiations to parameters of presence depending on what types of conditions applicants meet’ (Meissner 2018, p. 292). Finally, temporary programmes such as the Sector-Based Scheme and the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme were discontinued in 2013.
Following the end of these two of the TMW programmes in the UK in 2013, integration is now considered through a different lens and generally not in relation to temporary workers. This constitutes a major difference with Canada, where there are some attempts to integrate TMWs, as in Ottawa for instance. In the UK, the main focus of integration policies is on preventing radicalisation, promoting social cohesion, supporting liberal values and relying on local integration (Communities and Local Government 2012). However, if the government does not provide sufficient funding/support for local authorities, the latter are not able to support migrants in accessing their social, political and economic rights effectively.
The policy-makers I interviewed did not perceive any need to provide integration support to migrant workers who come via tiered immigration routes. Referring specifically to Tier 2 and Tier 5 visa-holders, a Home Office official told me that ‘from a policy point of view [there is] not much there to support integration. Also, it could be argued, they are coming from Australia, New Zealand… so integration issues will not be a problem’. Hence, policy-makers differentiate between English-speaking and non-English-speaking countries. However, Tier 5, which was not mentioned by the interviewee, is the channel also used by migrants from non-English-speaking countries such as Turkey, for instance.
In contrast with the policy-makers’ perspective, temporariness is a very fluid state which can unexpectedly change, as representatives of NGOs like the Haringey Migrant Centre in North London emphasised. For instance, temporariness can turn into permanence, as a caseworker for the Migrant Forum explained:
Temporary migrants… I just don’t really know if we can define them in the category of temporary migrants. There are people who say they just want to come to the UK to make enough money to build a house in their home [country], but then they end up staying for ten years. So, I don’t really know if we can define them as accepted … or [as] temporary migrants, because if you don’t give me a temporary time-frame I don’t really know.
The real picture is thus much more intricate than the categorisations established by the tiered visa system and other TMPs indicate. Migration regimes render the integration of third country nationals impossible via temporariness: in this sense, the high-skilled and the low-skilled face similar difficulties regarding temporary status. Moreover, those who came to the UK from one of the countries that joined the EU in 2004Footnote 5 are not considered as migrants under EU law but despite their relatively privileged status (full political and economic rights) they face significant levels of discrimination and everyday as well as institutionalised racism (Parachivescu 2016; Sahraoui 2020). Also the lack of language skills is a major factor hindering integration that affects EU citizens to the same extent as third country nationals, as confirmed by an interviewee working for the Haringey Migrant Centre:
…the migrants that we help can be coming from the EU and outside of the EU, I think [those from] outside of the EU would have more limited resources but of course those from the EU can benefit from more rights… I don’t know. I think that the people we help here [who come from] within the EU, their problem is mainly language it seems; and increasingly benefits and housing because those are being limited for EU [citizens].
In addition, there is a major problem about providing language training and support to foreigners whose integration is not explicitly desired by the host state. An interviewee who worked at the South East Strategic Partnership for Migration (SESPM) responded in the following way to my suggestion of creating a temporary integration policy that would guarantee access to such support: ‘They will be inclined to stay if we give them integration possibilities like teaching them the language’. So not wanting to encourage them to stay was an excuse for not supporting them to develop their language skills, which would ultimately also enable them to defend their rights. Nonetheless, the interviewee added, in Scotland migrant workers also receive English lessons during their stay, suggesting that regional practices regarding integration policies can differ greatly. An interviewee from UNITE indicated that they are directly involved in the provision of language support for migrant workers but struggling due to insufficient funding coming from central and local government since the budget for language courses was cut in 2010.
The policy-makers whom I interviewed suggested that integration policies require investment; some underlined that it is not worth having integration for those who will leave relatively soon. When I asked a case-worker at Migration Yorkshire about the concept of temporariness and how the policy conceives it she replied:
Yeah, I think, that’s… we know it is difficult to create policy that is actually for the people who are here temporarily. Then, kind of, you can spend a lot of resources on integration and they might not be here. So I think there are some interesting parallels with asylum here…
In accordance with the dilemma of temporariness and rights, a representative from CentreForum indicated that ‘Even if the state devised a temporary integration programme, the state would spend the minimum budget that it could spend’ – in other words, not enough money would be available for this cause.
A researcher from the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) pointed to the hostile environment, which creates a kind of active strategy of disintegration:
…certainly with lower-skilled migrants it would appear that the more who come, the less you do to integrate them. And with the fewer rights they are able to enjoy and with policy and rhetoric suggesting that migrants are unwelcome, it creates a very hostile environment… Some of the changes [Immigration Acts 2014 and 2016] that have been made to the benefit system recently in response to concerns about EU migration, have made it more difficult for certain groups of migrant workers who might be on temporary contracts and who don’t have regular work, which might mean that their access to the benefits system is taken away and that tends to hurt the most vulnerable migrants, particularly the women migrants. I think that the changes that have been made recently have implications for the rights of migrant workers.
Likewise, my interviewee at the Haringey Migrant Centre in London underlined the gap between rights and their implementation: ‘They have rights [political, social and economic] but they cannot access them’ for reasons related to discriminative practices; she also said that there are ‘no integration policies but disintegration policies’. She used disintegration practices and policies to mean those that create a hostile environment by depriving people of their basic social, economic and political rights so that, in the long term, they give up and decide to leave the country.
On the other hand, there is the question of what TMWs deserve – as long as their opportunities to find other employment are limited because of legal restrictions to their permits (Chauvin et al. 2013). In relation to this notion of deservedness over time and of achievement, a representative of the Home Office told me:
It is not that Britain is unwilling to protect the rights of the migrant workers. As I have said, we treat, we expect the migrants to be treated equally with domestic workers [domestic and seasonal agricultural workers] in the same way, but obviously as migrants there are certain things that we expect from those who come to work – not to go directly onto benefits, for example, so there is a delay before they can apply for benefits. You know, we might expect migrants to come and find work before bringing their families. There are things in that declaration [ICMW] concerning the rights of migrant workers, which go further than British policy would like to go. For a lot of countries [it is like this] as well.
This interview explains how integration cannot go beyond where ‘British policy would like to go’ and how the expectations of migrant workers are shaped by the logic of deservingness. This can be seen even in the case of family reunification, for instance, whereby the human right to family life (Art. 8 ECHR) is severely limited through unrealistic wage thresholds or the temporariness. Despite the fact that these basic rights are indicated in international conventions like the ICMW, states can easily escape from their responsibility simply by not signing them.
In this sense, historical institutions and path dependency (Consterdine & Hampshire 2014) explain a great deal about how integration, and migration in general, are understood. For instance, the UK Home Office has mostly focused on national security and keeping the number of immigrants low than about economic competitiveness, as my interviewee from CentreForum emphasised:
Temporary migration is quite short in the government’s mind [meaning from six months to one year by law] and there is not so much integration you can do when you stay here for three months. Whereas if you are here for two years, that is plenty of time to integrate even if you are not going to stay longer. You have to define what you mean by integration.
In the UK, eliminating temporary migration policies is assumed to result in lower numbers of immigrants. Likewise, not providing any integration support is thought to further discourage potential migrants. Access to healthcare for instance, although it is a universal right, is rendered tricky and time-consuming via identity document checks, making sure that migrants are legally present and that their visa and work permit allow them to benefit from the health system. As Schweitzer discusses in this volume, those who enter the UK as ‘visitors’ (i.e. for 6–12 months) have no ‘recourse to public funds’, implying exclusion from the health system. The question of deservingness is hereby combined with the idea that the temporary visitor has not done anything to deserve access to public benefits, such as health.
Although, according to the Home Office, integration is primarily a matter of local policy in the UK, financial and administrative support to local governments is generally insufficient as my interview at Migration Yorkshire explained. Therefore, if integration is considered local, then there should be more funds for the integration of TMWs who stay in the same locality for the period over which they work. After all, TMWs have very similar needs to other newcomers, including housing, language learning and social protection, my Migration Yorkshire interviewee continued. Hence, both national and local integration policies could accommodate their needs.
On the other hand, the UK discontinued its TMPs as labour-market assessments suggested that there would be sufficient supply of foreign labour from within the EU. The government promised to check the numbers of labour migrants to ensure that there would be no shortages (NFU 2017). Currently, 75% of migrant workers are from Bulgaria and Romania whilst the rest are mostly from A8 countries (ibid.). If Brexit comes into force, however, there is a risk that the UK will re-establish and rely on ‘foreign’ labour even more than they did before 2013 (Consterdine & Samuk 2018). At least in the current situation, EU citizens have more political and social rights compared to third country nationals who migrate on a temporary basis. Therefore, violation of political, social and economic rights, are likely to be greater if also EU citizens become ‘foreign’ labour following Brexit.