This chapter summarizes the insights of the previous chapters. It concludes that naturalists face a dilemma when trying to say what scientific justification amounts to, which in turn suggests that this is a non-empirical question. Furthermore, it assesses the prospects of naturalized epistemology based on this suggestion, and by drawing on the results of part one of the book.


Naturalism Scientific justification Naturalized epistemology Metaphilosophy Epistemology 


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ZurichZurichSwitzerland

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