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Abstract

This chapter summarizes the insights of the previous chapters. It concludes that naturalists face a dilemma when trying to say what scientific justification amounts to, which in turn suggests that this is a non-empirical question. Furthermore, it assesses the prospects of naturalized epistemology based on this suggestion, and by drawing on the results of part one of the book.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a discussion of this issue, see Stanford (2015).

  2. 2.

    That, as a matter of fact, physical entities cannot be credited with such representations has been shown above. The present claim is merely that physicalism is in principle able to decide such questions.

References

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  • Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1969. Epistemology Naturalized. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 69–90. New York: Columbia University Press.

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  • ———. 1981. Five Milestones of Empiricism. In Theories and Things, 67–72. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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  • Stanford, P. Kyle. 2015. Catastrophism, Uniformitarianism, and a Scientific Realism Debate That Makes a Difference. Philosophy of Science 82 (5): 867–878.

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Correspondence to Reto Gubelmann .

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Gubelmann, R. (2019). Conclusion. In: A Science-Based Critique of Epistemological Naturalism in Quine’s Tradition. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5_10

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