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The Great Story Theodicy

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Is God the Best Explanation of Things?
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Abstract

Rasmussen develops a story theodicy, which serves as a tool for investigating the problems of evil. To illustrate the tool, Rasmussen describes scenes of what he calls “the Great Story.” In the Great Story, all events flow along lines of purpose and goodness. In one scene, Rasmussen points to the value of including kingly creatures, who add suspense, and who have some freedom from the foundational character. Here, Rasmussen seeks to show how this scene fits with Leon’s analysis of the free will defense. Rasmussen then turns to Leon’s cumulative case from evil, which brings to light some of the most perplexing of the events. Rasmussen suggests why even such events could actually make the most sense in light of a great, unfolding story.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I say more about this root property and its implications in Rasmussen (2019).

  2. 2.

    See Prestopnik (2016).

  3. 3.

    But note: if Leon’s principle of material causation is true, then not even God could create beings from nothing.

  4. 4.

    I develop these reasons in How Reason Can Lead to God (forthcoming).

  5. 5.

    For more on reasons for randomness, see Rasmussen and Wessling (2015).

  6. 6.

    Evidence indicates that variable (unpredictable) rewards are more interesting than determined rewards. See, for example, Brunner et al. (1994).

  7. 7.

    See Rasmussen “On the Value of the Freedom to Do Evil” (2013) as a response to Morriston’s “What’s So Good About Moral Freedom” (2000).

  8. 8.

    Rasmussen (2013).

  9. 9.

    For more on the value of indeterminism for God, see Rasmussen and Wessling (2015).

  10. 10.

    I will assume for sake of argument that there is a real risk. But note that if God could use middle knowledge to ensure that everyone freely does right all the time, per Leon’s suggestion (and my argument in Rasmussen 2004), then it looks like there’s no risk. In that case, God has all the more reason to create kingly creatures (or less reason not to), since God takes no risk in doing so. (I will discuss the implications of this middle knowledge account for the free will defense in the main text below.)

  11. 11.

    For more on this connection-building theodicy, see Collins (2011).

  12. 12.

    Another idea is that God has middle knowledge but, for the sake of risk and adventure, God is able to bracket that knowledge in the creation of the world.

  13. 13.

    Besides all these points, even if God could make an evil-free world with moral freedom, it doesn’t follow that such a world would be better. An evil-free world would be missing all the valuable experiences I mentioned in my discussion of Upside. If anything, one may expect the greatest type of story to include moral dramas that unfold into incomparably greater goods.

  14. 14.

    For a recent assessment of the prophetic data relevant to this most famous character in human history, see Scott (2018).

  15. 15.

    Contrary to popular impression, studies show that despite diminishment along physical lines, people actually tend to increase in happiness as they age, see Rauch (2018).

  16. 16.

    For more on the nature of humor, see Morreall (2016). (Ironically, as I type this note, my wife is in the other room laughing because my kids are crying so intensely in her ear.)

  17. 17.

    My own evolution simulation never generated anything so sophisticated, and in fact, sophistication of the organisms and their interactions decreased over time.

  18. 18.

    See Easterbrook’s, It’s Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear (2018).

  19. 19.

    See this meta-analysis by Masters and Spielmans (2007).

  20. 20.

    Schwartz and Begley (2002).

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Rasmussen, J. (2019). The Great Story Theodicy. In: Is God the Best Explanation of Things?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_15

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