Abstract
Rasmussen further develops the mind-first (fundamental mind) hypothesis. He works to accomplish three tasks. First, he seeks to incorporate Leon’s points by showing how they help us separate certain mind hypotheses from the core theory; rather than undermining the core theory, they extend its light. Second, Rasmussen seeks to highlight additional theoretical fruits of the foundational mind hypothesis. Third, Rasmussen seeks to sharpen the argument from arbitrary limits in view of Leon’s excellent questions about that argument. Altogether, these tasks serve to highlight the value of having the least arbitrary theory of the foundation’s person-building resources.
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Reference
Flint, T. P., and A. J. Freddoso. 1983. “Maximal Power.” In The Existence and Nature of God, edited by Alfred J. Freddoso, 81–113. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
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Rasmussen, J. (2019). Foundational Mind Theory Extended. In: Is God the Best Explanation of Things?. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_10
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