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The West: Divided in Freedom and Fear?

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Contestations of Liberal Order

Abstract

This chapter takes a critical look at the prevailing narrative of transatlantic estrangement from the perspective of freedom, one of the constitutive pillars of the Western community of values. The articulations of freedom in US and European foreign-policy discourses can be perceived as a metric for gauging in which ways the value structures on the two sides of the Atlantic possibly differ. We find that both actors strongly emphasise sovereignty as an indispensable manifestation of freedom. However, with the Trump presidency, the respective takes on the world point to different directions: the European Union focuses on local resilience, whereas the United States emphasises a world of competition. In spite of this, seeking common ground through the various faculties of freedom theorised in the chapter might, over time, lead to a more legitimate rule-based system of global governance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Maier (1977).

  2. 2.

    Cf. Ikenberry (1998).

  3. 3.

    Kydd (2005).

  4. 4.

    Ikenberry (2008), 10; cf. Risse-Kappen (1996).

  5. 5.

    Ikenberry (2008), 7.

  6. 6.

    Adler and Barnett (1998), 34.

  7. 7.

    Shklar (1989).

  8. 8.

    Müller (2014).

  9. 9.

    It is important to bear in mind, though, that intra-European differences were large in this respect: while les six original EU member states subjugated themselves to the tutelage of Brussels, the efforts to build functioning national welfare states accelerated in Northern Europe, and Southern Europe remained under right-wing authoritarianism.

  10. 10.

    Gourevitch (2007), 32.

  11. 11.

    See for example Risse (2008).

  12. 12.

    Walt (1985), 34–41.

  13. 13.

    Anderson (2018), 624; Green Cowles and Egan (2016).

  14. 14.

    Cox (2012), 75.

  15. 15.

    Ikenberry et al. (2008). On the idea of the United States as the “indispensable nation”, see Albright (1998).

  16. 16.

    Wallace (2016), 359–60.

  17. 17.

    Layne (2008).

  18. 18.

    Kagan (2003); Forsberg and Herd (2006); see also Chap. 4.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Nye (2011); Zakaria (2011); Acharya (2018); Mahbubani (2018).

  20. 20.

    Layne (2008); Nau (2008); Wallace (2016).

  21. 21.

    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (2018).

  22. 22.

    See for example Risse-Kappen (1996) and Fuchs and Klingemann (2008). On a different view, consult Kupchan (2002).

  23. 23.

    Nicolaïdis (2005), 102–3; Sinkkonen (2015); Lucarelli (2006).

  24. 24.

    Mayer (2006).

  25. 25.

    Sjursen and Rosén (2017).

  26. 26.

    US Const. amend. 1.

  27. 27.

    Myrdal (1964).

  28. 28.

    The idea of American exceptionalism naturally has diverse meanings for different identity-political groups. It can, for instance, accommodate both an aloof, even “isolationist”, approach to the world or serve as a justification for a drive to remake the world in America’s image. For recent discussion, see for example Kupchan (2018) and Cha (2015).

  29. 29.

    Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3, 2010 O.J. C 83/01, at 17.

  30. 30.

    For a more in-depth discussion on the categorisation presented below, see Sinkkonen and Vogt (2019).

  31. 31.

    Berlin (1969).

  32. 32.

    Kioupkiolis (2009).

  33. 33.

    See for example Pettit (1996) and Skinner (2002).

  34. 34.

    Barnett and Duvall (2005).

  35. 35.

    On the level-of-analysis problematique in the study of international politics, see Waltz (2001) and Singer (1961).

  36. 36.

    See for example Gauchet (2016).

  37. 37.

    Cf. Honneth (2011).

  38. 38.

    Cf. e.g. Rosanvallon (2006).

  39. 39.

    Mogherini (2018), emphases added.

  40. 40.

    Juncker (2018).

  41. 41.

    On Merkel cf. Chap. 4.

  42. 42.

    Merkel (2018a). The original German formulation reads thus: “Nun ist es natürlich so, dass vielfältige Zusammenarbeit, der Multilateralismus, kein Altruismus ist. Vielmehr muss jedes Land seine Interessen vertreten und in der Weltgemeinschaft so zusammenarbeiten, dass das, was das eigene Volk, das eigene Land ausmacht, auch zur Geltung kommt. Aber angesichts vieler Herausforderungen spüren wir doch, dass wir als globale Gemeinschaft eine Schicksalsgemeinschaft sind. Deshalb werden wir uns auch weiter in die weltweite, gemeinsame, multilaterale Zusammenarbeit einbringen und versuchen, sie zu stärken, wo immer wir das können” (Merkel 2018b).

  43. 43.

    Obama (2016a).

  44. 44.

    Ibid. Obama often returned to the idea that the “arc of history” can be steered in the direction of justice. See for example Goldberg (2016). The notion is also taken up, in a critical vein, by the Trump administration in its National Security Strategy: “[t]here is no arc of history that ensures that America’s free political and economic system will automatically prevail”, Trump (2017a), 37.

  45. 45.

    Obama (2016a), emphasis added.

  46. 46.

    Obama (2015).

  47. 47.

    Obama (2016b).

  48. 48.

    Obama (2016c).

  49. 49.

    Laderman and Simms (2017) and Daalder and Lindsay (2018).

  50. 50.

    Trump (2018).

  51. 51.

    See esp. Bolton (2018).

  52. 52.

    Trump (2017b).

  53. 53.

    EEAS (2016).

  54. 54.

    In the autumn of 2018, in connection with the 100th anniversary celebrations of the end of the First World War, Macron even started to propagate in favour of an independent European army. The proposal was, however, met with a healthy dose of scepticism in many an EU member state—and even by the American president, despite his incessant calls for more equitable burden-sharing.

  55. 55.

    Macron (2017a), emphasis added. The speech in the original French reads as follows: “Comme je l’ai assumé à chaque instant devant les Français, je le dis aujourd’hui avec une conviction intacte: l’Europe que nous connaissons est trop faible, trop lente, trop inefficace, mais l’Europe seule peut nous donner une capacité d’action dans le monde, face aux grands défis contemporains. L’Europe seule peut, en un mot, assurer une souveraineté réelle, c’est-à-dire notre capacité à exister dans le monde actuel pour y défendre nos valeurs et nos intérêts. Il y a une souveraineté européenne à construire, et il y a la nécessité de la construire. Pourquoi? Parce que ce qui constitue, ce qui forge notre identité profonde, cet équilibre de valeur, ce rapport à la liberté, aux Droits de l’Homme, à la justice est inédit sur la Planète” Macron (2017b).

  56. 56.

    Larik (2018).

  57. 57.

    EEAS (2016), 24.

  58. 58.

    Ibid., 23–24.

  59. 59.

    European Commission (2017), §9.

  60. 60.

    For example, Ibrahim (2006).

  61. 61.

    European Commission (2017), §16.

  62. 62.

    For example, Bourbeau and Caitlin (2018) and Mckeown and Glenn (2017).

  63. 63.

    Mogherini (2017).

  64. 64.

    Obama (2015), 12, emphasis added.

  65. 65.

    This is compatible with its predominant post-Second World War grand-strategic leitmotif, namely that “deep engagement” with the world serves US interests (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016).

  66. 66.

    Obama (2015), 7, 29; see also U.S. Department of State (2015), 9.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Obama (2016a); Goldberg (2016). America’s China policy, for instance, has, for the better part of the post-Cold War era, been beset by a dilemma. On the one hand, it has been deemed important to pursue deepened immersion of China into the institutions of the liberal international order. On the other hand, there has always been an element of fear in the background, a fear that China might use that very immersion to grow powerful and seek to overthrow the incumbent hegemon, along with the order that the United States has fostered since the end of the Second World War. See for example de Graaff and Van Apeldoorn (2018); Campbell and Ratner (2018); and Foreign Affairs (2018). With respect to Russia, each US president since the end of the Cold War has arguably entered office with the wish to improve relations—none of them has succeeded due to a confluence of divergent interests, worldviews and perceptions between Washington and Moscow. Katz (2018).

  68. 68.

    McMaster and Cohn (2017).

  69. 69.

    Mattis (2018), 2, emphasis added.

  70. 70.

    Trump (2017a), 3.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., 45.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., 27; Trump (2018).

  73. 73.

    Trump (2017c); see also Chap. 8.

  74. 74.

    Raik et al. (2018), 15–22.

  75. 75.

    On the notion of global flows and their relevance for US power, see Aaltola et al. (2014).

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Correspondence to Ville Sinkkonen .

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Sinkkonen, V., Vogt, H. (2020). The West: Divided in Freedom and Fear?. In: Lehti, M., Pennanen, HR., Jouhki, J. (eds) Contestations of Liberal Order. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22059-4_5

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