Are there illusions of duration? Certainly, many experiences of an event’s duration differ from its measure in clock duration, the measure of that event in seconds, minutes, hours, and so forth. However, I argue that an illusory duration requires more than difference from a real duration; it requires difference from a duration that is relevant to experience. It is plausible to hold that there are many kinds of real duration and reason to question the relevance of all of them. In particular, the interpretation of experienced duration as illusory is typical because it is compared to clock time; the experience of duration goes wrong by being different from a clock measurement of duration. However, I argue that clock duration is not obviously relevant to evaluating the experience of duration.
In response, one might hold that it is plausible to evaluate experience by clock duration because clocks more closely match reality than experiences do; on the scale of experience, clock time is no different to real duration. It is not that experienced duration is an illusion because it is merely different from clock duration; it is an illusion because it is different from real duration and we know this because of its difference from clock duration. It is like illusions of size: some object seems to be a size it is not and we know this by comparing it to an object we can otherwise accurately measure by meters.
However, unlike size illusions, it is not clear what the ‘real duration’ is against which we should evaluate apparent duration. What is meant by ‘real duration’ involves either (a) an appeal to the duration of substantial absolute time or (b) some kind of duration in things, for example, duration which is the measure of change in some kind of process. (a) is an irrelevant duration; few positions hold that we experience absolute time. As for (b), if real duration is a measure of change, then, for experienced duration to match clock duration, they must both agree on the relevant change. If there is a difference in what is treated as the real duration, then neither experience nor clocks can be treated as evaluable in terms of the other.
Finally, we may have an illusory duration because there are cases of variation between experiences of the same duration. Yet, even here, we may be misled; we may not be directly comparing experiences. We compare the experienced durations through first measuring each in terms of clock duration. If there is a variability in the relationship between clock standard and some relevant standard for experience, then one expects anything accurately meeting one standard to differ from anything accurately meeting the other. The error is holding there is a stable relationship between the standards. This error is not a matter of our experience of duration, and so is not an illusion of duration.
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For a detailed discussion on the difference between illusions and other kinds of errors relevant to experience (such as illusions), especially as it relates to experience and time, see Power (2018).
In fact, there is a clock standard that matches the day-night cycle. This is the traditional Japanese standard, and the hybrid that developed once Japan introduced European clocks. Japanese clockmakers later copied and modified the mechanism to suit traditional Japanese time telling. A day in the traditional system had 12 hours: six for day and six for night. The hours changed in length according to the season. In summer, daytime hours were long and nighttime hours short. In winter, daytime hours were short and nighttime hours long. (British Museum, 2019)
This is false: things appear three-dimensional (contrary to Berkeley) and the size of an object (even a circle drawn on paper) is not determined merely by its spatial relation to the subject.
This, again, is false and physically impossible with our eyes (although, perhaps, not with all animals’ eyes, e.g., a snail’s stalked eyes are mobile and may be capable of this, for whatever that possibility is worth in this context).
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This paper developed out of two talks: the first was for a session at the 2015 Towards A Science of Consciousness conference (in Turku), to which I was invited by Valtteri Arstila; the second at a session at the 2016 Pacific meeting of the American Philosophical Association, to which I was invited by Adrian Bardon. I am grateful to Valtteri and Adrian for their invitations, as well as their feedback and interesting discussions. I am also grateful to the thoughtful and thorough comments from Natalja Deng following the 2016 workshop. Thanks also to the audience at each conference for their helpful responses to the talks.
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Power, S.E. (2019). Against Illusions of Duration. In: Arstila, V., Bardon, A., Power, S.E., Vatakis, A. (eds) The Illusions of Time. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22048-8_10
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