Unifying Decision-Making: A Review on Evolutionary Theories on Rationality and Cognitive Biases

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 414)


In this paper, we make a review on the concepts of rationality across several different fields, namely in economics, psychology and evolutionary biology and behavioural ecology. We review how processes like natural selection can help us understand the evolution of cognition and how cognitive biases might be a consequence of this natural selection. In the end we argue that humans are not irrational, but rather rationally bounded and we complement the discussion on how quantum cognitive models can contribute for the modelling and prediction of human paradoxical decisions.


Rationality Cognitive bias Evolutionary biology Behavioural ecology Quantum cognition Decision-making 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Information Systems, Faculty of Science and TechnologyQueensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia

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