1 Introduction

As diversely discussed in this volume, the European Union (EU) has progressively tried to develop its own approach to the field of culture in external relations, starting from the 2007 European agenda for culture in a globalising world , which made it one of its pillars. Successive Council Conclusions (Council of the EU 2008), European Parliament (EP) resolutions (EP 2011) and an ad-hoc Preparatory Action (EU 2014) led to the 2016 Joint Communication Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations (hereafter 2016 Communication) presented by the European Commission (EC) in June 2016 (EC 2016), later endorsed by the Council and the EP and currently in its specification and early implementation phase. International cultural relations (ICR) were also incorporated in broader EU cultural policies, becoming one of the three objectives on the 2018 New European Agenda for Culture (EC 2018) and one of the five priorities of the Work Plan for Culture 2019–2022 adopted by the Council (Council of the EU 2018). At the moment of writing, the Council is expected to adopt a ‘strategic approach’ on EU ICR in the near future, i.e. in the second half of 2019 (Council of the EU 2018).

Regular debate and cooperation between EU services and key stakeholders, most importantly national institutes for culture, have tried to flesh out the concept of EU ICR and define an added value for EU-level cooperation vis-à-vis national approaches, which have so far constituted the norm. Despite steady advancements, the emergence of well-defined EU ICR is still faced with challenges which are both internal and external to the EU, and both conceptual and practical in nature. The current chapter seeks to shortly analyse the solidity of EU ICR, taking a two-step approach.

First, Sect. 2 discusses the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) affecting the development of EU ICR. The SWOT analysis takes into account factors internal and external to the EU which affect the emergence of this policy field and promise to influence its future consolidation and implementation. On the global level, hard power seems to be gaining prominence over soft power and persuasion. Additionally, in the framework of growing identity politics , culture is increasingly regarded as a set of national features defined in oppositions to others, rather than a tool for dialogue and cooperation. Within the EU, reflection of these global trends is accompanied by the more general rise to prominence of political forces that oppose further ‘communitarisation’ of competences across policy fields and might particularly wish to keep control over sensitive areas such culture and foreign policy.

Second, the chapter uses this basis to assess how the EU has so far defined this emerging policy and how it could capitalise on strengths and opportunities and address (or consider) weaknesses and threats. Section 3 looks at conceptual issues, particularly with regard to the delicate choice between the two diverging but partially overlapping approaches of centralised cultural diplomacy (CD) and decentralised cultural relations. A choice of field between the two has strong practical implications in the deployment of culture in external relations, which are subsequently analysed in Sect. 4. The policy formulation documents and EU practices point at the ongoing development of EU cultural relations based on subsidiarity, co-creation and mutual exchange with third countries, which largely appears as a promising strategy to face the SWOT identified in this contribution. However, ambiguities remain not only in this choice of fields, but also with regard to the means of definition and potential implementation of the policy.

Through this discussion, this contribution mainly engages with two aspects highlighted in Carta’s introduction to this book: the definition of the field of culture in external relations, with specific reference to the EU, and the setting up of a network supporting the emergence of this new policy, both within and outside the EU.

2 The Emergence of EU ICR: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

The emergence and future implementation of EU ICR are likely to depend upon factors which can be presented as internal and external to the EU. A SWOT analysis provides an analytical instrument to categorise them and help reflection on these two levels. Strengths and weaknesses are here treated as internal factors, depending on the resources and capabilities within the EU in the specific sector of ICR, as well as key general ones which are likely to impact ICR. Opportunities and threats concern the external environment in which the EU will have to operate, which can be more or less favourable to the development and affirmation of EU ICR (cf. EC JRC 2010). Clearly, trying to categorise contemporary political, security and cultural trends as internal or external to defined political and geographical borders is a simplification and a heuristic device for policy analysis. In reality, these factors influence each other and transcend boundaries.

The internal strengths and weaknesses concern policy entrepreneurs and resources found at multiple (interconnected) levels of governance: supranational (EC, EP and European External Action Service—EEAS), member states (MS) (Governments), MS (cultural institutes) and broader cultural networks . Also, other transversal political and cultural factors need to be considered.

2.1 Strengths (Internal)

2.1.1 Supranational: A Solid Basis for Policy Development

Since the 2007 European agenda for culture in a globalising world , the EC and the EP have been active in creating a policy for culture in EU external relations. Willingness to bring the process forward was shown by all key actors, particularly the EC Directorate General for Education and Culture (cultural policy), the EEAS under the leadership of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/EC Vice-President (HRVP) Federica Mogherini and the EP, including in the work of its Cultural Committee. Financial and human resources for the new approach to EU ICR were also progressively created, including for support, advise and training through the establishment of a Cultural Diplomacy Platform (CDP), to strengthen the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) network as the partner of choice for the EU institutions (Crossroads for Culture project) and to innovate and strengthen collaboration between EUNIC members, EU delegations and local stakeholders (European Houses of Culture project).

2.1.2 Member States (Governments): Political Endorsement and Understanding of the Strategic Role of Culture

Willingness and consensus were also gathered and formalised in several documents signed by the governments of EU MS, which were included in the discussion on the EU strategic approach to ICR at an early stage, making sure that their competences and sensitivities would not be intruded by the emergence if the new policy. On top of specific Council Conclusions (Council of the EU 2008) and endorsement of the EC communication, the Council included culture in external relations in the two Work Plans for Culture adopted for the periods 2015–2018 and 2019–2022 (Council of the EU 2015, 2018). The Council is expected to adopt a ‘strategic approach’ on EU ICR in the near future, i.e. in the second half of 2019 (Council of the EU 2018).

2.1.3 Member States (Cultural Institutes): Leading Policy Definition, Pilots and Implementation

Accompanying the policy-making process, EUNIC and the national institutes for culture, with a prominent role of Goethe-Institut and British Council among others, had a leadership role in defining its content and approach. They produced studies, reports, debates and actively worked together in third countries to implement innovative projects based on stronger cooperation at the level of EUNIC clusters and pilots for the future strategic approach. Tunisia and Ukraine, where 2 EU contracts of 4 and 1.4 Million Euro respectively entrust the EUNIC clusters with the implementation of financial and technical assistance projects to local actors, constitute best practices of advanced cooperation in the spirit of the 2016 Communication, and set the standard for future implementation (EUNIC Global 2018).

2.1.4 Cultural Networks : Building on Pre-Existing Grounds

The EU ICR strategy is designed to primarily rely on the large networks, experience and resources of EU MS, which reach actors and geographical areas and cover thematic expertise well beyond those of EU delegations. The strategic approach to EU ICR does not build a new policy from scratch, but relies on existing experience and networks of pan-European and international cultural cooperation. Brussels is populated by many European networks bringing together museums, libraries, cultural managers, artists and more, which often work beyond EU’s borders, and have been at the forefront of animating initiatives like the 2018 European Year of Cultural Heritage. Also, long-standing institutional partners of the EU like UNESCO have been an integral part of the policy debate and expect to remain implementers and partners of EU programmes and initiatives.

2.1.5 Role of Culture Internally: Compatible with EU Role and Resources

In terms of content, it was decided to mostly keep the focus on domains which are compatible with EU competences and where stronger EU cooperation is possible and promises better impact, for example in the context of EU development cooperation , where the advantages of donor cooperation, joint programming and stronger co-funding from recipient countries are clear. In the 2016 Communication, three work streams were proposed: supporting culture as an engine for social and economic development; promoting culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful intercommunity relations; and reinforcing cooperation on cultural heritage for cultural diversity to be internationally protected. These are domains where the EC has experience and resources, being the largest provider of Official Development Assistance in combination with its MS, and managing large instruments like the European Development Fund and Development Cooperation Instrument.

2.2 Weaknesses (Internal)

2.2.1 Supranational : Policy Priorities Change with Individuals and Politics

Standing in between the recent eagerness for a common European approach to ICR and its interiorisation and implementation there is a fundamental political factor: the role of informal attitudes in the EU policy-making decision process. Due to the nature of the EU as a fragmented multi-governance system with differentiated competences according to policy area, decisions are usually formulated informally in an ad-hoc fashion in response to specific problems (Tatenhove et al. 2006) and often depend on the personal attitudes of the EU officials (La Porte and Pavón-Guinea 2017). This is particularly the case for ICR, a field where the EU has very limited competence and is still in the process of setting up adequate institutional frameworks to perform a role in the field. In this sense, Pietro de Perini (2018) has concluded that change and continuity in the promotion of intercultural dialogue within the EU in the period 1990–2016 heavily depended on the personal attitudes of EU officials. Under the current term, the leadership of HRVP Federica Mogherini and the support of European Commissioner Tibor Navracsics have been central in bringing culture in external relations higher on the agenda. There are no guarantees that the next EC will be interested in EU-level cooperation in external cultural relations. Furthermore, after the European elections in May 2019, a EP and Commission with a larger component of Eurosceptic political forces engaged in identity politics are less likely to ensure the level of political commitment that this still nascent initiative would need to strengthen its strategy and instruments.

2.2.2 Member States (Governments): Political Equilibria Can Change Quickly. Competition Exists and Remains Unaddressed

Political uncertainty and the rise of Euroscepticism affect even more national governments, which will need to define the strategic approach and support its implementation. Culture remains mainly a MS’ competence, with the EU only having a supplementary role (Articles 6 and 167.3 TFEU). If future governments will oppose further integration in such a politically sensitive field, this risks nipping the nascent policy in the bud. Another important internal weakness is the impact of Brexit on ICR. Three are the biggest risks for the EU in a post-Brexit context: first, the loss of capability, expertise, and networks in theory and practice of ICR that the UK currently provides; second, reduced opportunities for study and work in the UK in the light of a potential no-deal scenario; and, third, the loss of access to the UK’s research and innovation centres. Particularly, the UK’s withdrawal as a full member of EUNIC is a possibility. As a result, the UK could become a competitor and not a partner in the field of ICR (MacDonald 2017).

2.2.3 Member States (Cultural Institutes) : Cooperation Remains Limited and Autonomy Is Being Questioned

Another weakness is that competitive visions of the role of culture in external relations exist, and they might prevail. Cooperation among cultural institutes and cultural attachés abroad might result easier in cultural relations with developing countries and in the EU neighbourhood (e.g. Tunisia and Ukraine), where common approaches have been piloted in the framework of development assistance, capacity building and intercultural dialogue. By contrast, relations with developed economies like the US are often characterised by more narrow understandings of CD as self-promotion, cultural display and competition for the host country’s political, economic and cultural attention, with the risk of underexploiting EU impact on themes of common interest (Trobbiani and Schunz 2018). A weakness of the future ‘enhanced cooperation’ is also found in dynamics which are internal to the MS themselves. While it has been argued that the capacity of engaging in mutual cultural relations and building trust with third countries depends on the arm’s length status of cultural institutes from governments (Rose and Wadham-Smith 2004), recent years and the spreading of realpolitik approaches have seen an attempt by many governments to reduce the autonomy of such institutes and control their operations (Rose 2017: 1). This means that much emphasis is needed on EU’s proposed role of coordination and support, rather than suggesting the creation of additional level of political and administrative control.

2.2.4 Cultural Networks: Little Debate Beyond Brussels

A fundamental weakness is that many of the future implementers and recipients of EU ICR, especially from third countries, have been hardly included in the policy discussions. The initial mandate of the CDP to provide policy support and advice and particularly ‘strengthen [the EU] ability to engage on an equal footing with [its] partners across with the globe – from international organisations, national governments, local authorities, civil society organisations and individual citizens’ (Mogherini 2016), remained mostly limited to European interlocutors and some previously EU-funded external actors. Debate and consultation in general have strongly relied on the community of practitioners and key stakeholders in Brussels, which risks creating a lack of ownership and trust in target countries. Also, cultural actors are traditionally wary of public intervention in their activities, and adding a supranational layer of supervision without extensive consultations at all levels could be perceived as an intrusive act and weaken the capacity to actually implement the policy .

2.2.5 Role of Culture Internally and Other Political Factors: The Politics of Cultural Clash and Competition Taint EU’s External Image

A final internal weakness is currently constituted by the retreat of liberal values in many European countries in the context of a growing ‘populist-nationalist zeitgeist’ (Higgott and Proud 2017, this volume), with Hungary and Poland representing most worrying cases among others (Proud this volume). The rise of nationalist and populist discourse and politics constitutes the new environment in which ICR would have to operate. These ‘conflict directly with the outward-looking orientation of the exponents of cultural dialogues (both public and private) in the wider foreign policies of many, although not all, of the EU MS, and indeed of the EU as a foreign policy actor in its own right’ (Higgott 2017: 4). In this sense, populism questions the basic assumptions of cultural policy since it directly highlights the exclusionary and competitive character of culture (Ada 2018) by capitalising on the politics of fear towards others who are ethno-culturally different (Kaya 2018). This constitutes an extremely competitive use of culture, which reacts to the alleged threats coming from outside enemies, be it globalisation, Islam, the EU itself or refugees (Rydgren 2007). This leads to a fundamental question which constitutes a further source of uncertainty, namely, what image can the EU project abroad in terms of culture, if it questions its own cultural and political achievements internally?

The external opportunities and threats concern an ampler spectre of issues than directly and indirectly affect EU’s capacity to develop its own policy in ICR. These include external perceptions of the EU; global perceptions of the role of culture as a source of cooperation (or competition); the presence of emerging players and new modes of communication.

2.3 Opportunities (External)

2.3.1 External Perceptions: Europe Remains an Attractive Cultural Pole

Internationally, Europe is perceived as an attractive pole for its rich cultural heritage and production. A 2015 study (Public Policy and Management Institute et al. 2015) on the external perceptions of the EU and its policies surveyed the EU’s ten strategic partner countries and found confirmation of the great attractiveness of European culture in fields as diverse as history, music, theatre, cinema, monuments, museums, modern architecture, design, food and cuisine and more. The EU has progressively learnt to capitalise on these assets by supporting showcasing events bringing together the cultural diplomacies of its MS in third countries under a shared European theme or narrative: movie, literature and music festivals , EU days with open doors in embassies and cultural institutes and more. In these events, cinema , sports, education exchanges and music are described as the most attractive to local audiences (EEAS 2015).

2.3.2 Role of Culture Globally: Beyond Showcasing, Culture in Development Cooperation Promises a Role of Leadership for the EU

The progressive emergence of new players coming from the developing world potentially constitutes an opportunity for the EU, which already enjoys a role of leadership in development cooperation . Recent data calculates that ‘all developing countries (including China and India) represented an increasing portion of the global flow of cultural goods, and accounted for 45% of global trade of cultural goods in 2014, compared to 25% in 2005’ (Deloumeaux 2018: 125). At the moment, most EU funding for culture comes from programmes dealing with development cooperation , human rights and humanitarian assistance (See Helly and Galeazzi 2017) which allows the EU, if a sustained leadership for EU ICR persists, to carve out a central role for itself in future global cultural relations.

2.3.3 The International Environment: New Actors and New Modes of Communication

The complexity of the contemporary diplomatic environment in light of new actors, communication technologies and public expectations of openness and engagement (Gilboa 2001) can open the way for the EU to have a leading role in ICR. Transformational changes in the network society, such as globalization and technological innovations in media and communications have created a world order in which nation-states do not have entire control over traditional spheres of politics and non-state actors have otherwise become more prominent and powerful in world affairs (Fitzpatrick 2011). In the twenty-first century diplomatic environment, there is a general skepticism towards unidirectional models of communication: top-down and linear processes of communication are no longer conceived as strategic and the emphasis is now laid upon two-way communication processes that focus on engaging publics rather than on the unilateral dissemination of information. Publics are now strategically conceived as active participants, who aim to co-create the message’s content. In fact, there is a wide consensus in the academic literature that the US Public Diplomacy campaign to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Muslim word after 9/11 failed because it was focused on one-way, top-down communication processes (Comor and Bean 2012; Zaharna 2007; Dutta-Bergman 2006; Kennedy and Lucas 2005). Hence, listening, dialogue and collaboration emerge as the preferred means of contact within an environment of multiple communication choices, competing communication actors and multiple possibilities of making meaning (Pamment 2012: 27).

2.4 Threats (External)

2.4.1 External Perceptions: The EU Is Not Seen as an Autonomous Cultural Actor

While culturally attractive, positive perceptions mostly refer to ‘Europe’, and the EU as an institution is hardly recognised as a cultural actor, which constitutes a threat to the affirmation of EU ICR if this trend is not inverted. When asked to associate the topic of ‘culture and sports’ with either ‘EU’ or ‘Europe’ only 17.6% of the global respondents to the 2015 survey picked the EU, while 49.1% indicated ‘Europe’, 20.7% stated that there is no difference between them and 12.6% could not answer. Compared to ‘politics’, ‘economy’, ‘social development’ and ‘science, research and technology’—‘culture and sports’ was the topic least often associated with the EU (Public Policy and Management Institute et al. 2015, Annex III). This suggests that the EU is not perceived as a self-standing cultural actor with an artistic and creative production to display externally.

2.4.2 Role of Culture Globally: Political Shifts and Hard Power Undermine the Promise of Cultural Relations

As noted by Martin Rose, we live in an era of ‘culturisation of international politics’, characterised by ‘the replacement of old-fashioned politics [e.g. class-based] with much more culturally defined identities’ (Rose 2017: 2). The perception of culture as a factor of competition and definition of cultural identities in opposition to others constitutes a threat to the EU role in ICR globally. In the context of rising nationalist and populist politics, the EU has been chosen as the ideal target for political discourses opposing globalisation, multiculturalism and supranational delegation of power. When it comes to competitive visions of culture as showcasing of national production in the context of narrow CD, the EU struggles to find a role and added value compared to its MS. Of course, EU Open Days, EU cinema fairs and similar events constitute positive example of European collaboration, but often consist of a limited physical or temporal space bringing together individual national products. Also, the resurgence of hard power capabilities as a determining factor shaping relations between states seems to undermine the promise of soft power, and culture therein, as a tool influencing international politics (Higgott 2017). These interlinked factors constitute threats to the emergence of the EU as an actor in the field.

2.4.3 Competition: A Crowded Environment and New Technologies Does not Necessarily Mean More Opportunities

Developing an ICR approach does not mean that the EU should neglect the existence of spaces of competition in the cultural field, especially concerning rising economic and cultural powers, or related to specific geographical areas. Regions which perceive the power of attraction of European culture and norms are at times also targeted by other actors with alternative models and narratives. For example, EU and its MS’s attempts to support cultural and higher education relations with Central Asia hardly match the role of leadership and influence of Russia in the region, rooted in stronger cultural and historical ties as well as larger resources invested (Valenza and Boers 2018). Additionally, a more culturally assertive EU in the development world could re-ignite accusation of neo-colonialism playing against the acceptance of its role and action in third countries, for instance in the Muslim-majority European Neighbourhood. Taking a broader view on CD and cultural relations in the digital era, the US predominance in ICT through giants like Google, Amazon, Facebook or Apple belittles European efforts in this fundamental sector, which functions as an important media for culture in a broad sense. The probability that the EU will lag behind in the development and use of ICT for cultural relations and that it will have the necessary means and political willingness to address cultural competition constitute threats to the efficacy EU ICR.

2.4.4 Other Factors: Traditional Gatekeepers of National Culture Are Losing Power

Finally, there is a broader challenge concerning the changing role of traditional ICR leaders in the digital era. The national cultural institutes like the British Council, Goethe-Institut, Instituto Cervantes, and even more dramatically smaller ones, progressively see their control over their country’s image abroad diminished in the ever-growing flow of digital communications and fast evolution of ICT. Of course, the importance of face-to-face interactions in areas like promotion and exposition of arts and the control of official certificates in language learning are likely to keep them afloat in the future. However, their role as the main gatekeepers of a country’s image abroad is substantially undermined and can only partly be compensated by their engagement on social media or in e-learning, as this remains a drop in the ocean of uncontrolled and fast-paced communications concerning their countries’ cultural activities. Digital transformation and ICT occupy a very minor place in the EU’s discussion concerning ICR, and this seriously threatens the range, durability and overall impact of such an approach.

The SWOT analysis (Table 1) calls for a critical assessment of how the EU has so far defined this emerging policy and how it could capitalise on strengths and opportunities and address (or consider) weaknesses and threats.

Table 1 SWOT of culture in EU external relations
Full size table

3 Shaping Successful EU ICR: Conceptual Factors

A first problem remains conceptual, although with strong practical implications. Much of the balance between strengths and weaknesses, as well as the capability of the EU to take advantage of opportunities and minimise threats, depend on the choice between approaching culture as an instrument for competitive showcasing of national cultures, or rather for capacity building, intercultural dialogue and co-creation with third countries. The first option flags an internal weakness in terms of legal competence further affected by the growth of nationalist politics, as well as a threat that the EU will not have the actorness and persona to compete in this field externally. As a means of simplification for the sake of policy analysis, and to reflect their different prescriptive implications, these two approaches can be respectively described as the development of EU cultural diplomacy or EU cultural relations. Both terms have been used in policy discussion on EU external relations (e.g. Cultural Diplomacy Platform), and the 2016 Communication committed to both promoting ICR through enhanced cooperation at the EU level as well as supporting EU MS through CD. The EU’s intentions have progressively become more focused on ICR, and in the 2017 partnership arrangement between the EC, the EEAS and the EUNIC network, milestone of that enhanced cooperation, the word CD had purposely disappeared (EC et al. 2017).

From an academic viewpoint, it has been argued that the two concepts overlap and the choice between them is often normative and cosmetic (see Carta and Badillo in this volume). Indeed, ambiguities exist. Besides a lack of agreement on the meaning of the word ‘culture’ (see Mark 2009: 5), there is a problem of nomenclature between the concepts of CD and ICR in the area of ‘how nations and people relate to each other through culture’ (Rose 2017: 1). CD and cultural relations have come to be used interchangeably as the ‘reigning culturalism of our time has made the concept of culture increasingly appealing’ (Ang et al. 2015: 367) and as geopolitical, social and economic transformations have led to a new relevance for international cultural policies.

Nonetheless, CD and ICR pose different conceptual and empirical challenges in the use of culture in external action. From a policy perspective, they are not synonyms that can be used interchangeably without any implications, not least because conceptual confusion ‘casts massive shadows over policy effectiveness’ (Higgott 2017: 5). CD and ICR diverge in their means, objectives and motivations and most of these differences ‘can be traced to the particular role of government’ (Rivera 2015: 9) in their design and implementation. Cultural diplomacy refers to ‘the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy’ (Mark 2009: 7). In other words, CD understands culture as part of foreign policy processes and as a means of wielding soft power through the attractiveness of a given national culture in the international arena (Zamorano 2016: 166). Cultural relations, in contrast, refer to the ‘mutual exchange of culture between peoples to develop long-term relationships, trust and understanding for the purpose of generating influence abroad’ (Rivera 2015: 11). ICR, at least theoretically, remains free of political influence and is independent of foreign policy objectives. If ICR supports national interests is normally indirectly and as a ‘byproduct of the trust, understanding, and relationships developed through cultural relations’ (Rivera 2015: 11).

Of course, this division should not be taken in absolute terms. In the age of globalisation, ‘culture can be instrumentalised without government intervention and cultural relations might contribute to foreign policy goals without formal steering from national governments’ (British Council and Goethe-Institut 2018: 11). However, despite grey zones and overlaps (see Carta and Badillo in this volume), the conceptual distinctions between CD and ICR should remain as they convey different attitudes, approaches, means and goals. For instance, in contrast to ICR, CD is related to nation-branding strategies to the extent that it relies on cultural showcasing to improve a given country’s image and reputation in its external relations. In this context, a country’s image defined by of factors like tourism, exports, people, governance, culture and heritage and investment (Anholt and Hildreth 2004). Nation-branding relies on nationalism and marketing to create both a strong image and a good reputation of a given country (Anholt 2007).

When applied to the EU as analysed in the context of this chapter’s SWOT analysis, these conceptual differences between CD and ICR bear practical implications. The next section will provide a discussion of these aspects and expand on the practice of culture in EU external relations.

4 Shaping Successful EU ICR: Practical Factors

The EU does not have a single cultural identity to deploy in the field of external relations, nor do its common values amount to a single ‘European cultural persona’ (Higgott and Van Langenhove 2016: 6). Therefore, it is not strategically prepared to compete in the fields of nation-branding and showcasing. On top of considerations on its appropriateness as a policy, the use of CD as a label for EU external communication appears problematic. In fact, the word ‘diplomacy’ potentially alienates support of EU MS protecting their foreign policy competences, cultural actors guarding their independence, and foreign audiences—especially in the postcolonial developing world. Cultural relations seem more suitable for EU’s external action due to its nature as a postmodern and post-Westphalian diplomatic actor (Batora and Hocking 2008). The EU is well equipped to complement MS’ actions by enabling frameworks for cultural cooperation. By deploying a role of coordination and support of the common activities of its members without a stake in terms of national cultural promotion, the EU can effectively provide an added-value based on its strengths in fields like development cooperation (See Helly and Galeazzi 2016), protection of cultural heritage and intercultural dialogue.

This approach is already visible in multiple projects created to pilot ‘enhanced cooperation’ between EUNIC clusters and EU delegations based on the 2017 partnership arrangement. However, upscaling it requires the adaptation of existing resources and networks (strengths) to the new approach. For example, EUNIC highlighted how the organisation of culture as a topic within EU delegations influences the way in which culture in external relations is conceived: as strategic communication and/or political dialogue if managed within the Press and Information section, or as a tool for development if managed within the Cooperation section, which makes it more likely to be in line with the spirit of the 2016 Communication. Also, more support, guidelines and advice from headquarters of EUNIC, EUNIC members and EU are required to communicate and implement the new approach (EUNIC Global 2018).

To rely on existing networks, such an approach should be based on decentralisation and subsidiarity, enabling the construction of spaces for cultures to interact, thus also increasing the EU legitimacy as a public sphere (c.f. Castells 2008: 78). As individual case studies have revealed (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010), the more distance between a cultural diplomatic action and governmental agency, the more likely it is to succeed among the target audiences. Also, the more inclusive of non-state actors the strategy is, the more likely it is to be sustainable and therefore successful (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried 2010: 23). Therefore, the definition of EU ICR should be as inclusive as possible, keeping in mind that there will be a large set of actors implementing the new approach. This applies to smaller EU MS, which have less capacities for ICR, but potentially see more advantages in terms of increased visibility and reach in working under shared settings such as the ‘European Culture Houses’ proposed by the 2016 Communication (Trobbiani and Schunz 2018: 27). Also, civil society networks are considered key for building cultural resilience and supporting cultural relations in the EU’s internal and external engagement (Higgott 2017). This includes European diaspora communities (Stone and Douglas 2018), which are largely overlooked by the policy process so far. Finally, it would be strategic to listen to European and key foreign cultural actors (e.g. working in the Mediterranean) which are not directly consulted in Brussels (weakness), for instance many foundations, museums, theatres, libraries, universities which will have an important role in the implementation phase.

Subsidiarity is also important in the EU’s management of the threats and opportunities constituted by external perceptions. When facing competitive threats from other powers, stepping up engagement in ICR, rather than trying to develop state-like CD capabilities, remains a valid option to attract emerging and independent players in the cultural field and those countries, especially developing ones, which are attracted by the promise of human and social development that culture can help bring about (opportunity). Developing EU ICR that capitalise on Europe’s cultural attractiveness, while creating alternative decentralised means to navigate the threats of global cultural competition requires a ‘remapping’ of the language and contents transmitted by the EU, which risk being based on postcolonial universalisation of its own values and model, by constantly assessing the perception of target audiences (Higgott 2017: 7).

‘Remapping’ also needs stronger data, data-driven objectives and evaluation mechanisms to be included at every stage of the policy-making process. This means developing transnational statistics and indicators, and quantitative and qualitative approaches for evaluation (Memis 2009), which can both serve to create specific geographic and thematic strategies.

Finally, reaping opportunities and addressing challenges in the field of ICR needs a strategy on the role of ICT. This has been almost inexistent in the current debate on ICR but cannot be avoided unless the EU wants to develop a strategic approach for a simply ‘physical’ cooperation, which would become increasingly limiting in the next decades. As ICR should be rooted in two-way communication, social media answer to its most basic needs of dialogue, collaboration, and engagement with the outside world (Molema 2015). Users are now able to co-produce, tailor and re-use the cultural content to better serve their needs for self-expression, community building, learning, and understanding. Indeed, there are also potential threats that need to be addressed including the spread of disinformation, the use of big data and the protection of personal data (Karvonen et al. 2017) and the fact that more engagement does not necessarily lead to more respect and understanding (Higgott and Proud 2017: 25).

5 Conclusions

The future of EU ICR is likely to depend upon factors which this chapter presented as internal and external to the EU. In reality, they influence each other and transcend political borders. Hard power seems to be gaining prominence over soft power and persuasion. Uses of soft power (and propaganda) persist in the framework of identity politics , where culture is increasingly regarded as a set of national features defined in oppositions to others, rather than a tool for dialogue and cooperation. In whatever direction these factors evolve, the analysis presented in this chapter points at a key finding: investing in stronger EU cooperation in cultural relations, rather than cultural diplomacy , would more likely allow the EU to better capitalise on its strengths and opportunities and minimise weaknesses and threats.

An EU strategic approach to ICR rooted in development policy and intercultural dialogue bears the promise to facilitate cooperation among EU institutions, MS and their cultural institutes, as well as broader cultural networks based on innovative models. A decentralised approach based on subsidiarity with cultural networks can serve EU interests better than a centralised CD. Building economic, social and human development as well as trust and peaceful relations with third countries starting from the European Neighbourhood are EU’s key priorities, all aims to which ICR can potentially contribute, depending on the size and quality of resources invested.

However, despite the clearer direction taken by the debate on enhanced cooperation on ICR, some attachment on the side of EU institutions to the term CD remains. The EC and EEAS show a desire for stronger strategic communications and more assertive policies in fields of competition with other powers, e.g. in counter-acting propaganda from countries like Russia. A separate approach could be developed, making clear that these are two different things. This more assertive aspect could be incorporated into a separate EU strategic communications strategy, comprising initiatives like the creation of East StratCom Task Force to fight Russian disinformation.