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A Phenomenological Analysis of the Distinction Between Structural Rules and Particle Rules in Dialogical Logic

  • Mohammad ShafieiEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 44)

Abstract

As it is well-known, Husserl distinguishes between three levels of formal logic: pure morphology, consequence-logic and truth-logic. The distinction between the second level, which concerns the peculiarities of the derivation of propositions from each other, and the third level, which concerns the deduction or any kind of proof as a whole in which the truth of the premises and the consequences are at work, is very important to understand Husserl’s conception of pure logic. Such a distinction remains unnoticed for the truth-functional approaches toward logic, for they define the meaning of logical connectives on the basis of truth and falsity. Therefore, they cannot recognize the peculiarities of the derivation or consequence-relation as such. My aim in this paper is to show that the dialogical distinction between particle rules and structural rules, and also the distinction between play-level and strategy-level, may be considered as representing the distinction between the second and the third levels of logic; and thus the dialogical semantics provides us with a device to explore the phenomenological idea in a precise way. On the other hand, certain themes of the overall phenomenological analysis of logic help to show the philosophical significance of those dialogical features.

Keywords

Dialogical logic Transcendental logic Truth Consequence Structural rules Particle rules Phenomenology Intentionality Play-level Strategy-level 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This paper is a revised version of the talk I gave in the workshop Constructive Semantics. I warmly thank the organizer, Dr. Christina Weiss, for the invitation and also the participants for the valuable comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Shahid Beheshti UniversityTehranIran

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