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International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management

ICMSEM 2019: Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management pp 105–118Cite as

Research on the Motivation of Government Intervention in Executive Compensation of State-Owned Enterprises-An Empirical Study Based on the State-Owned Listed Enterprises

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Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 1002))

Abstract

This paper  makes an in-depth analysis of the characteristics, the motivation and the intervention effect of government intervention in executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The research shows that the local government always makes and implements differentiated compensation regulation policies according to the marketization degree, the income gap, the financial deficit level, the unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate. However, from the perspective of intervention effect, such government intervention in executive compensation weakens the compensation performance sensitivity of SOEs executives, effects the future performance of Chinese SOEs, and it has a greater negative impact on competitive SOEs. The conclusion indicates that the government should improve the pertinence and validity of government behavior and try to establish differentiated executive’s compensation incentive mechanism that matches the governance behavior of modern SOEs with Chinese characteristics.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Business School, Chengdu University, Chengdu, 610106, People’s Republic of China

    Sheng Ma, Shuang Li & ChuanBo Chen

  2. Business School, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu, 610066, People’s Republic of China

    Rui Wang

Authors
  1. Sheng Ma
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  2. Shuang Li
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  3. ChuanBo Chen
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  4. Rui Wang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shuang Li .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China

    Jiuping Xu

  2. Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Brock University on McMaster, Hamilton, ON, Canada

    Syed Ejaz Ahmed

  3. Department of Management, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Fang Lee Cooke

  4. Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova

    Gheorghe Duca

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Ma, S., Li, S., Chen, C., Wang, R. (2020). Research on the Motivation of Government Intervention in Executive Compensation of State-Owned Enterprises-An Empirical Study Based on the State-Owned Listed Enterprises. In: Xu, J., Ahmed, S., Cooke, F., Duca, G. (eds) Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management. ICMSEM 2019. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 1002. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21255-1_9

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