Abstract
Having established a theory of moral responsibility, the Just Deserts proposal needs to integrate this within a theory of desert. First, I delimit the scope of what I mean by distributive desert. Then I present a formal representation of desert and sketch various lines of argument that I see as important to defending its intrinsic connection to agent responsibility. Having covered the basal grounds of desert, I then turn to the appraisal grounds—specifically, the sensitivity principle. Here I present a novel solution, luck-egalitarian desert.
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Notes
- 1.
“A necessary condition for actively deserving anything is that one is responsible for some act for which some treatment is fitting.” Pojman (1999), 286; “When we are pronouncing judgments of desert, we are inevitably making judgments about persons whom we hold responsible for their actions.” Sadurski (1985), 117; “How do basally deserving acts differ from basally responsible acts? The answer is, I think, that there is no difference.” Knight (2011), 162; “..which suggests that responsibility matters not non-instrumentally, but as a reliable indicator of something else, e.g., moral deservingness.” Lippert-Rasmussen (2011); “The concept of desert serves to signify the ways of treating people that are appropriate responses to them, given that they are responsible for those actions or states of affairs.” “Treating people as they deserve is one way of treating them as autonomous beings, responsible for their own conduct.” Rachels (1978), 157, 159; Also, cf. Feinberg’s “theory of responsibility” that deals with “the complex situation in which persons... are therefore said to deserve...” Feinberg (1970c), vii; “...for an agent to be morally responsible for an action is for this action to belong to the agent in such a way that she would deserve blame if the action were morally wrong, and she would deserve credit or perhaps praise if it were morally exemplary.” Pereboom (2003), xx; “It would seem that there are some things like rewards and punishments which, to be deserved, presuppose the responsibility of the person concerned.” Kleinig (1973), 57–58; and, a bit more obliquely, “a person’s having been able to have done otherwise is a necessary condition of ascribing desert.”[Barry’s emphasis] Barry (1965), 108.
- 2.
In Part III, more narrowly, “economic desert.” Cf. “Where I talk of theories of economic desert, I have in mind theories which specify distributions of income and wealth in accordance with desert.” Wolff (2003), 220.
- 3.
While perfectly transferable means there is no portion of the reward that is non-transferable, fully transferable shall mean that there is no individual, i, whose deserved reward, Rd, is less than their current portion of non-transferable reward, Rnt. For interesting analyses of non-transferable rewards, cf. Olsaretti (2003b), 19; Scheffler (2003), 83–87; Kagan (2003), 98.
- 4.
“Now some modes of treatment–reward and punishment in particular–presuppose a responsibility on the part of the recipient.” Cupit (1996b), 167ff.
- 5.
Cf. Miller (2003), 29–32.
- 6.
Hurka (2003), 45.
- 7.
Hurka (2003), 52.
- 8.
Some have claimed that all justice requires plurality. “Justice is a concept which … makes no sense if applied to somebody considered completely in isolation from everybody else.” Ewin (1981), 72.
- 9.
Allegedly, “ ‘Personal desert’ is no pleonasm.” Feinberg (1970d), 55.
- 10.
- 11.
McLeod (2003), 126.
- 12.
- 13.
Or stakes (Olsaretti (2015), 263ff.).
- 14.
Wollner (2015).
- 15.
It should be noted that this is completely separate from “ultimate responsibility” which of course does not exist for any individual with respect to any of their observed outcomes of interest such as hours studying or their score on a test. Persson (2007), 91ff.
- 16.
There is comfortable agreement with the statement that “giving people what the deserve on account of their efforts is not the same as giving them what they are responsible for.” Hurley (2003), 9.
- 17.
Pace Sher (2014), 36.
- 18.
- 19.
For a rare counterargument, cf. Feldman’s attempt to attack the temporality requirement of desert. Cf. Feldman (1995b).
- 20.
Temkin (2011), 65.
- 21.
Zaitchik (1977).
- 22.
For this view and links to historical antecedents in Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, cf. Temkin (2011), 54, 67.
- 23.
Olsaretti (2003a), 194–195.
- 24.
Lamont (1994).
- 25.
“One possibility, which seems to me attractive, is that... only a principle of desert that sanctions only and all those departures from equality that result from factors over which the relevant individuals have control satisfies [a principle of desert that is defensible as a principle of distributive justice].” Olsaretti (2003a), 202.
- 26.
Olsaretti (2003b), 6.
- 27.
- 28.
Feinberg (1970c), 59.
- 29.
Sher connects this “about” requirement to our status as deliberating agents. Sher (1987), chap. 9.
- 30.
Sher (1987), 152ff.
- 31.
Cupit (1996b), 139.
- 32.
Olsaretti (2004), 28 [Olsaretti’s italics].
- 33.
Sandel (1982), 85.
- 34.
Sher (1987), 40–52.
- 35.
Goodin (1985).
- 36.
Cupit (1996b).
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
For example, a suggestion that there may be innumerable desert-base types, but with a one-to-one relationship to rewards, along with the suggestion that innumerable desert-base types have a many-to-one correspondence to each and every reward (e.g., an apology, punishment, prize, medical treatment, wage, etc.). McLeod (1996), 277–280.
- 41.
McLeod (2003), 126n8.
- 42.
As noted in Chap. 2, I think I can also drop some premises about determinism and alternate possibilities by linking desert to autonomous effort—whether or not observed outcomes of interest ever depend upon autonomous effort or not. Cf. “determinism is incompatible with judgements of desert,” Miller (1999b), 99. Miller also marshalls Sidgwick in support of this proposition, “The only tenable Determinist interpretation of Desert is, in my opinion, the Utilitarian...”. Also, “a person’s having been able to have done otherwise is a necessary condition of ascribing desert.” Barry (1965), 108.
- 43.
As Geoffrey Cupit argues (toward a different conclusion than Just Deserts), an individual cannot typically deserve on the basis of a fact about one’s grandmother because such facts do not typically affect the status of the deserver. Recalling our fundamental moral intuition’s rejection of moral luck, it is quite clear that one’s moral status may never depend upon circumstances of chance and, thus, must depend entirely upon the agent’s autonomous effort. Cupit (1996b), 38.
- 44.
Lamont (1994).
- 45.
This of course presumes that virtue (and character) theorists mean something different from autonomous effort toward virtue or moral character.
- 46.
Miller (1999b), 93.
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
Pojman (1999), 286.
- 50.
- 51.
Admittedly, as McLeod has pointed out, many philosophers of desert want to distinguish between “entitlement” and desert where “entitlement” means “institutional desert.” This understanding of “institutional desert” is not what I mean when I say distributive desert. McLeod (1999a), 189.
- 52.
For the addition of “process-based” rewards, cf. Dick (1975), 251ff.
- 53.
Economics may also use the term “entitlement rules” rather than “entitlement.” Cf. Brandolini (1992).
- 54.
- 55.
Nagel (1979), 24.
- 56.
This also helps us to keep in mind that arguments against a particular appraisal grounds argument are not good arguments if one wishes to undermine the principle of desert as the best principle of distributive justice.
- 57.
“It is the notion of treating which provides the link between the desert basis and what is deserved.” Cupit (1996b), 47.
- 58.
For the analysis of “appraisal grounds” into (1) a correspondence between desert-basis and reward and (2) a sensitivity of reward upon desert-basis, cf. Knight (2011), 155.
- 59.
Lambert (2001), 138.
- 60.
Olsaretti also contends that desert requires vertical equity with the “comparative justice requirement.” Olsaretti (2004), 24.
- 61.
Roemer (2012), 179.
- 62.
- 63.
- 64.
Bedau (1967).
- 65.
By stipulation, we have divided the universe in such a way that Rawls’ and Miller’s arguments lack force as it is simply not possible for “choices and efforts [, i.e., autonomous effort, to] depend on contingencies that are not under [the individual’s] control [i.e.,circumstances of chance].” Miller (1999c), 148.
- 66.
For example, if doubling autonomous effort leads to a 50% change in outcome-type 1 (e.g., goodness of piano recital) but a 200% change in outcome-type 2 (e.g., average speed during a 400 m race), doubling autonomous effort will be associated with 50% greater reward in the former case and 200% greater reward in the latter.
- 67.
- 68.
- 69.
Temkin (1993), 13.
- 70.
Wolff (2003), 220.
- 71.
Rawls (1999 (1971)), 64; Knight (1935), 54–57; “It is this fundamental human plight of being born into our initial stations and their inequalities which is sometimes rather vaguely referred to by the phrases ‘chance of birth’ or ‘accident of birth.’ ” Spiegelberg (1999), 151, Spiegelberg (1944).
- 72.
- 73.
While I tend to agree with Hurley’s arguments that we should only discuss “constitutive luck” rather than the “natural lottery,” I merely need the reader to see the “natural lottery” as circumstances of chance, thin luck. Hurley (2003).
- 74.
- 75.
- 76.
Wolff (2003), 224.
- 77.
This puzzle as to why our public policies do not match our moral beliefs, why a Just Deserts proposal is not already in place, is explained partly by the only recent acquisition of some conceptual and empirical tools as well as the obvious self-interest of those currently enjoying the greatest relative and absolute amounts of unmerited rewards.
- 78.
Pace Segall (2013), 150–151.
- 79.
Technically, this freedom does not include realizing an allocation equal to the entire reward although such an allocation is logically possible.
- 80.
Knight (2009), 230; also, contrary to most of the luck-egalitarian literature, Sher (2014), 32, those with a lesser allocation of the reward are not the “crucial party” able to make a claim of injustice. Even the individual with the greatest amount of reward may legitimately demand and receive compensation as redress.
- 81.
- 82.
Temkin (2011), 56.
- 83.
McLeod (1999a), 193.
- 84.
Knight (2011), 152, 166.
- 85.
Pojman and McLeod (1999), 63.
- 86.
For Pojman, this unites “active desert” and “compensatory desert,” Pojman (1999), 286–287.
- 87.
Feldman (1995b), 69.
- 88.
For the fact that bad luck reduced their quantity of some good(s) below their deserved quantity of R, isometric to the aforementioned good(s).
- 89.
Nonetheless, if we stipulated that there is a desert-relation between reckless driving and some punishment and I were asked to generate a theory of retributive desert, I would likewise find it perfectly intuitive to allocate an identical backward-looking punishment to all reckless drivers with the same autonomous effort toward safe driving based upon factors within their control, with no difference between the one who hit a child (by pure luck) and the 100 who did not (by pure luck).
- 90.
Of course, such a situation would also require a different kind of vertical equity than I have suggested.
- 91.
“...the justice of your treatment is (partly) constituted by how it compares to how others are treated. The epistemic correlate to this is that the justice of a particular person’s treatment cannot be known without knowing how others in the relevant comparison class are treated.” McLeod (2003), 126n10; Pace Lake (2001), 91ff.
- 92.
“The idea that there is some absolute amount of money that a person could deserve solely by virtue of the work that he has done and without regard to how others have performed makes no sense.” Miller (2003), 32; “Our beliefs about desert include a concern with patterns as patterns.” Hurka (2003), 50; “I wish to claim that justice is also necessarily comparative, that it always involves comparisons between persons or groups.” Sadurski (1985), 14ff.
- 93.
That is, I “hold that what a person is due is based on some essentially comparative consideration... and [] claim that justice requires that each individual get exactly what each is due.” Olsaretti (2003b), 21. I also think this is entirely compatible with the view that desert is ideally noncomparative but our best non-ideal option is comparative desert.
- 94.
I think this formalization of vertical equity as sensitivity to the entitlement-basis but dependence upon that basis and some constant is a clearer solution to the puzzle of the “aboutness” requirement fitting with comparative desert. Cf. McLeod (2003), 127ff.
- 95.
- 96.
Freiman and Nichols (2011).
- 97.
Temkin (2011), 64.
- 98.
The argument is for a “thick” concept of brute luck but could be scaled back to a “thin” concept. Hurley (2003).
- 99.
Feinberg (1999), 74; Also, “Now suppose A is sick on the day of the examination and consequently does not perform well,...” Lamont (1994); Also, “If I apprehend a wanted man by accident (e.g., the floor collapses and I fall on top of him) I do not deserve a reward, though I may be entitled to one.” Miller (1999a), 136.
- 100.
Pojman and McLeod (1999), 63.
- 101.
Feldman (1995b), 68.
- 102.
Kleinig (1999).
- 103.
Anderson (1999), 295–302.
- 104.
Knight and Stemplowska (2011), 9.
- 105.
Fleurbaey (1995a), 40–41.
- 106.
For a different rejection of option luck outcomes as just, cf. Cohen (2011b).
- 107.
Temkin (1993), 13.
- 108.
Vallentyne (2003), 183.
- 109.
For example, what if two individuals choose different indeterministic lotteries with non-overlapping outcomes?
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Dwyer, J.d.l.T. (2020). Autonomy and Desert. In: Chance, Merit, and Economic Inequality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21126-4_3
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