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Contemporary Vulnerabilities to Legitimacy

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Strategic Intelligence and Civil Affairs to Understand Legitimacy and Insurgency

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Abstract

Whenever any governing authority fails to maintain the trust of its constituents, it essentially invites an alternative to step into the gap. Current literature on governance and legitimacy suggests the primary common factor that ensures popular support of authority in a given geographic location is trust, a belief in the consistent application of laws or expressed social mores across the territory. Vulnerabilities to legitimacy can be difficult to identify. This is where the true complexity lies. Lessons from lost legitimacy are rife in past insurgencies or alternative governance structures, or in coups and other attacks on nation states. The key to accurately identifying and analyzing these dynamics and getting ahead of them is in having a deep understanding of the grievances of the people joining an insurgency, opposing the host nation, or supporting the alternative governance structure.

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Notes

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    Significantly, JP 3-07 alludes to grievances that segments of the population may attempt to have addressed nonviolently on p. 18, “In many cases, opponents of the government do not immediately resort to violence, and the response of the HN government may determine whether a crisis is resolved through peaceful political processes or escalates. Responding appropriately requires the HN government to accurately distinguish between legitimate criticism and determined subversion. HN governments may default to heavy-handed repressive responses that drive moderates into alliances with extremist hardliners, deepening the instability and pushing the crisis towards open violence. Escalation often involves deliberate attacks by both sides on important civic institutions, and the disruption of the norms that help societies function, creating physical and psychological trauma for individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole that can hamper efforts to resolve the conflict.” Unfortunately, JP 3-07 does not clearly define alternative governance and indicate when small-scale violence should be assessed and understood and to not have the automatic assumption be made that the Stabilizer is the intended target. Available from http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine-Pubs/3-0-Operations-Series/ accessed on March 13, 2018.

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    Anecdote told by U.S. Army War College International Fellow from Botswana, now Brigadier General Lingililani Joseph, during Security Sector Reform elective course taught by Dr. Raymond Millen in March 2016.

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    Diane E. Chido

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Chido, D.E. (2020). Contemporary Vulnerabilities to Legitimacy. In: Strategic Intelligence and Civil Affairs to Understand Legitimacy and Insurgency. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20977-3_3

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