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Human Dignity as a Normative Concept. “Dialogue” Between European Courts (ECtHR and CJEU)?

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Judicial Power in a Globalized World

Abstract

Although the concept of human dignity is increasingly invoked in the international debate, some commentators consider appeals to human dignity to be little more than rhetoric. It is beyond doubt that dignity has become the informing principle of old and new bills of rights and of international instruments of different kind, which find a common element in the respect of a value, not depriving human dignity of semantic ambiguities that often invalidate its normative contents. From being an ethical and pre-juridical value, a principle informing catalogues and deontological codes, human dignity aims, more and more, to assume, in International and European Law, a juridical value as a normative concept, basis and source of the respect of all (or almost all) human rights.

The paper explores some jurisprudential trends of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the subject of dignity with reference, on one side, to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (despite the lack of explicit reference to “respect for human dignity”) and, on the other, to European Union Law (including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). The study will also verify possible elements of convergence with reference to dignity in the so called “dialogue” between the two European Courts (ECtHR and CJEU).

Angela Di Stasi is Full Professor of European Union Law and International Law, Jean Monnet Chair Judicial protection of fundamental rights in the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Department of Legal Sciences, University of Salerno.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Any attempt at a historical-philosophical reconstruction of the concept of human dignity clearly lies beyond the purpose of this chapter. On the relationship between dignity and freedom we will limit ourselves to mentioning the perspectives outlined by Kant (see in Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi, Italian translation by Mathieu, Milano, 1944, pp. 144–145), according to whom human dignity resides in personal autonomy and in its promotion and respect for the individual’s dignity is respect for the individual’s autonomy.

  2. 2.

    See above all, Portinaro (2008), p. 221 when, by drawing on Häberle, he affirms that human dignity is the anthropological-cultural basis for the Constitutional State. The idea of equal dignity for all human beings can be found, among others, in the French Constitution dating back to 1789. In the Italian Constitution, the reference to human dignity appears in the first paragraph of art. 3 as “equal social dignity” of citizens and in the second paragraph of art. 41 as a limit to the freedom of private economic enterprise which “cannot be carried out in a way that may cause damage […] to human dignity”. But the reference to human dignity as the fundamental value of the whole legal system appears in several other constitutions (see e.g. the Canadian, Danish, Portuguese, Swedish, Swiss, and American Constitutions). Remember the provision of the German Constitution which in art. 1 states: “Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is a duty of each power of the State”.

  3. 3.

    There is an extensive legal literature on this subject that concerns, of course, several sectors of the legal system. See the publications dating back to the 1980s, by Schachter (1983), pp. 103–110; Feldman (1999), pp. 682–702. See the wide references included, among others, in Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001), Kretzmer and Klein (2002) and Blengio Valdés (2007). We dare refer to Di Stasi (2011). See more recently in the Italian Literature Pirozzoli (2012), Ripepe (2014) and Turco (2018).

  4. 4.

    Among the critics of such a notion, see above all, Macklin (2003), pp. 1419–1420. In the opposite direction see Andorno (2005), pp. 95–102.

  5. 5.

    The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16th 1966 and entered in force on March 23rd 1976, in accordance with article 49. The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16th 1966 and entered in force on January 3rd 1976, in accordance with article 27.

  6. 6.

    The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10th, 1948 with the Resolution 217 A (Doc.A/810), at 71.

  7. 7.

    The article continues providing that: “They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.

  8. 8.

    We only refer, among all of them, to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 issued on November 20th 1989 and in force from September 2nd 1990) and the provisions of its Preamble (“Considering that … recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, … reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person…”).

  9. 9.

    See the large number of references to dignity included in the Preamble of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (OAS Res. XXX), adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (April 1948).

  10. 10.

    So Arbuet-Vignali (1997), p. 30 et seq., in particular p. 34. See Lauterpacht (1950), p. 69 where he affirms “… in relation to both rights and duties the individual is the final subject of all law”. We dare refer to Di Stasi (2011).

  11. 11.

    Adopted by acclamation on 19 October 2005. The Preamble of UNESCO’s Constitution refers to “the democratic principles of the dignity […]”, and … stipulates “that the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of men”. In the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UNESCO), adopted on 11 November 1997, references to human dignity are very many and dignity seems to be linked to the uniqueness and identity of human beings. A similar number of references can be found in the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data adopted on 16 October 2003.

  12. 12.

    In no. 2 of the same article it is provided that: “The interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society”.

  13. 13.

    So Andorno (2009), p. 224.

  14. 14.

    Open to be joined by other extra-European States, such as the United States and Canada.

  15. 15.

    Oviedo, 4 April 1997, hereinafter Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Para 9 of the Explanatory Report (Council of Europe, Directorate of Legal Affairs, DIR/JUR(97) 5) provides that “The concept of human dignity, which is also highlighted, constitutes the essential value to be upheld. It is at the basis of most of the values emphasised in the Convention”.

  16. 16.

    In Chapter II, devoted to Consent, Art. 5 defines as a “General rule” the “free and informed consent” (no. 1) while in no. 3 it provides for the revocability of a given consent.

  17. 17.

    Such references get, as it is well known, a full normative relevance because (Art. 6, para 1) of the equalization of the legal value of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union with that of the Treaty on the European Union (TUE) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE). See Olivetti (2001), pp. 3–11; Alpa and De Simone (2017), pp. 15–38.

  18. 18.

    In this regard, we must not forget that the respect for human dignity assumes, in the same treaties, the role of a founding value of the European Union (Art. 2 TUE), and also a principle of the Union’s external action (Art. 21, para 1).

  19. 19.

    On the so called “triangle of Constitutionalism” see Baer (2009), pp. 417–468.

  20. 20.

    For this definition see Pistorio (2009), p. 39.

  21. 21.

    See Official Journal of the European Union, C-83/02 of 30 March 2010. On the Explanations we dare refer to Di Stasi (2010), pp. 425–454.

  22. 22.

    So Silvestri (2007), p. 2.

  23. 23.

    Costa (2013), pp. 665–724; McCrudden (2008), pp. 655–724; Kuteynikov and Boyashov (2017), p. 83 et seq. Moreover “dignity” has been included in several later Council of Europe Conventions, notably the Revised European Social Charter (Preamble and Art. 6) and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (cited above).

  24. 24.

    Protocol no. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all circumstances, Vilnius, 3.V.2002.

  25. 25.

    Among others, appl. C.R. (ECtHR 22 November 1995), para 42 and S.W., para 44.

  26. 26.

    Appl. No. 2346/02, Pretty (ECtHR 29 April 2002) para 65. See also appl. No. 28957/95, Goodwin (ECtHR 11 July 2002) para 90; appl. No. 18968/07, V.C. (ECtHR 8 November 2011) para 105; appl. Nos. 66069/09, 130/10, 3896/10, Vinter and others (ECtHR 9 July 2013) para 113; appl. Nos. 32541/08, 43441/08, Svinarenko and Slyadnev (ECtHR 17 July 2014) para 118; appl. No. 61243/08, Elberte (ECtHR 13 January 2015) para 142; appl. No. 23380/092, Bouyid (ECtHR 8 September 2015) para 89; appl. No. 16483/12, Khlaifia and others v. Italy (ECtHR 15 December 2016) para 158; appl. No. 23229/11, Karachentsev (ECtHR 17 April 2018) para 48.

  27. 27.

    Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cit., para 118.

  28. 28.

    Appl. No. 78103/14, Fernandez de Oliveira v Portugal (ECtHR 28 March 2017).

  29. 29.

    See appl. No. 14038/88, Soering (ECtHR 7 July 1989) para 88. According to Art. 15 ECHR para 2, no derogation from Art. 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Art. 3, shall be made under this provision. See among others Webster (2018).

  30. 30.

    See East African Asians, applications nos. 4403/70, 4404/70,4405/70, 4406/70, 4407/70, 4408/70, 4409/70, 4410/70, 4411/70, 4412/70, 4413/70, 4414/70, 4415/70, 4416/70, 4417/70, 4418/70, 4419/70, 4422/70, 4423/70, 4434/70,4443/70, 4476/70, 4477/70, 4478/70, 4486/70, 4501/70, 4526/70, 4527/70, 4528/70, 4529/70, 4530/70, para 192.

  31. 31.

    Appl. No. 5856/72, Tyrer (ECtHR 25 April 1978) para 33.

  32. 32.

    See, for example, appl. No. 30210/96, Kudła (ECtHR 26 October 2000) para 94; appl. No. 44558/98 Valašinas (ECtHR 24 July 2001) para 102; appl. No. 39084/9711 Yankov (ECtHR 11 October 2003) para 114; Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cit., para 138.

  33. 33.

    Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cit., para 138.

  34. 34.

    For some critical findings, see Mavronicola (2016), p. 1, that emphasizes that largely because the ill-treatment was isolated and its concrete effects on the applicants were not significant or in long-term. What the Court failed to appreciate “is that it was the wrong committed against the applicants which reached the minimum level of severity, rather than the harm endured by them”. On this topic see also Webster (2016), pp. 371–390. About the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Art. 3 see the well written dissenting opinion of the Judges De Gaetano (with Lemmens and Mahoney).

  35. 35.

    See, in respect of police custody, appl. No. 21986/93, Salman v. Turkey (ECtHR 27 June 2000) para 99, and Bouyid, cit., para 83.

  36. 36.

    Among others, see Kudła, cit., paras 92–94, and appl. No. 8687/08, Rahimi (ECtHR 5 April 2011) para 60; appl. No. 5826/03, Idalov (ECtHR of 22 May 2012), para 93; Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cit., para 116; appl. No. 11138/10, Mozer (ECtHR 23 February 2016) para 178; Valašinas, cit., para 102; appl. Nos. 42535/07, 60800/08, Ananyev and Others (ECtHR 10 January 2012) para 141; appl. No. 7334/13, Muršić (ECtHR 20 October 2016) para 98–99.

  37. 37.

    See, inter alia, appl. No. 28524/95, Peers (ECtHR 19 April 2011) para 74; appl. Nos. 5774/10, 5985/10, Mandić and Jović (ECtHR 20 October 2011) para 80; appl. No. 35972/05, Iacov Stanciu (ECtHR 24 July 2012) para 179.

  38. 38.

    See, amongst many others, appl. No. 7064/05, Mamedova (ECtHR 1 June 2016) para 63; appl. No. 17885/04, Orchowski (ECtHR 22 October 2009) para 153; appl. Nos. 36925/10 21487/12 72893/12 73196/12, 77718/12, 9717/13, Neshkov and Others (ECtHR 27 January 2015), para 229; appl. Nos. 14097/12,45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, 64586/13 Varga and Others (ECtHR, 10 March 2015) para 103.

  39. 39.

    Mozer, cit., para 178.

  40. 40.

    See appl. No. 46468/06, Aleksanyan (ECtHR 22 December 2008), para 140.

  41. 41.

    Appl. No. 55080/13, Provenzano (ECtHR 25 October 2018).

  42. 42.

    Appl. No. 46470/11, Parrillo (ECtHR 27 August 2015) para 153; appl. No. 2346/02, Pretty …cit. para 61.

  43. 43.

    Case C-353/16, Judgment of the Court of 24 April 2018 para 36.

  44. 44.

    Case C-377/98, Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2001. It is interesting to note that the Court based its decision nor on Art. 1 of the Charter though it was mentioned in the Advocate General’s Conclusions.

  45. 45.

    Case C-266/06 P, Judgment of the Court of 22 may 2008.

  46. 46.

    Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 158 (2004), pp. 77–123.

  47. 47.

    Case 246/17, Ibrahima Diallo (ECJ 27 June 2018) para 64.

  48. 48.

    Case 131/85, Emir Gül (ECJ 7 May 1986) para 25; Case 413/99, Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ECJ 17September 2002) para 50.

  49. 49.

    Case 179/11, Cimade, Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) (ECJ 27 September) para 42–43.

  50. 50.

    Case 23/12, Mohamad Zakaria (ECJ 17 January 2013) para 40.

  51. 51.

    In Joined Cases 148/13, 149/13, 150/13, A, B, C (ECJ 2 December 2014) para 65.

  52. 52.

    Case 61/11, Hassen El Dridi, alias Karim Soufi (ECJ 28 April 2011) para 31. See also: case 474/13, Thi Ly Pham, (ECJ 17 July 2014) para 20; case 181/16, Sadikou Gnandi (ECJ 19 June 2018) para 48; case 82/16, K.A., M.Z., M.J., N.N.N.,O.I.O., R.I., B.A. (ECJ 8 May 2018) para 100; case 47/15, Sélina Affum (ECJ 7 June 2016) para 4; case 562/13, Centre public d’action sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (ECJ 18 December 2014) para 42.

  53. 53.

    Case 474/04, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozess GmbH (ECJ 12 October 2007) para 78. See also, Case 279/02, Degussa Degussa AG (ECJ 5 April 2006) para 410: “It must be pointed out that, in inter partes procedures which are liable to result in the imposition of a penalty, the nature and amount of the penalty proposed are by their very nature covered by business secrecy until the penalty has been finally approved and announced. That principle follows, in particular, from the need to have due regard for the reputation and standing of the person concerned during a period in which no penalty has been imposed on that person”; Case 62/98, Volkswagen (ECJ 4 July 2000) para 281; Case 15/02, BASF AG (ECJ 15 March 2006) para 604.

  54. 54.

    Case 467/05, Giovanni Dell’Orto (ECJ 28 June 2007), para 56.

  55. 55.

    Case 105/03, Maria Pupino (ECJ 16 June 2005) para 52; Case 507/10 X (ECJ 21 December 2011) para 25–27.

  56. 56.

    Case 578/16 PPU, C. K., H. F., A. S. (ECJ 16 February 2017) para 59.

  57. 57.

    Case 292/86, Claude Gullung (ECJ 19 January 1988) para 22.

  58. 58.

    Case 13/94, P. e S. (ECJ 30 April 1996), para 22.

  59. 59.

    In Joined Cases 175/86 and 209/86, M. (ECJ 19 April 1988) para 23: “Although it is true that factors appertaining to an official’s private life cannot as a general rule justify the imposition of disciplinary measures, it must, however, be admitted that a deliberate failure to comply with several court decisions involving a very substantial sum of money constitutes a fact which may reflect on his position as an official. In this case, such conduct could therefore be regarded as aggravating circumstances”.

  60. 60.

    Case 104/13, Carlo De Nicola (ECJ 23 October 2014) para 43–54, particularly para 50: “In accordance with point 2.1 of the Workplace Dignity Policy, it is not relevant that the [harassment] behavior in question is intentional or not. The determining principle is that harassment and intimidation are undesirable and unacceptable behaviors that undermine self-esteem and the self-confidence of those who are victims of it”.

  61. 61.

    Case 585/16, Carina Skareby (ECJ 25 July 2018) para 59. See also: Case 132/14, CH (ECJ 15 December 2015) para 90 and Case 218/17, HF (ECJ 17 September 2017) para 117: “From the entry into force on 1 May 2004, of Art. 12 bis, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Statute, which provides that “the official shall refrain from any form of psychological or sexual harassment” psychological harassment now means “any inappropriate conduct that manifests itself in a durable, repetitive or systematic manner through behaviors, words, writings, gestures and intentional acts that damage a person’s personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity”. On the point, in para 147, it is specified that “negative observations addressed to an agent do not necessarily harm his personality, his dignity or his integrity, when they are formulated in measured terms and are not based on illegitimate accusations and without any relationship with objective facts”.

  62. 62.

    Case 339/15, Openbaar Ministerie (ECJ 4 May 2017) para 123.

  63. 63.

    Case 356/16, Wamo BVBA, Luc Cecile Jozef Van Mol (ECJ 26 October 2017) para 25.

  64. 64.

    Case 34/10, Oliver Brüstle (ECJ 18 October 2011) para 32.

  65. 65.

    Case 36/02, Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH (ECJ 14 October 2004) para 34.

  66. 66.

    See also, Case 9/74 Casagrande (ECJ 3 July 1974) para 773. See: Alpa (1997), pp. 415–426.

  67. 67.

    C-404/15 e C-659/15 PPU, 5 April 2016 para 90; C-220/18 PPU 25 July 2018, para 90.

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    Angela Di Stasi

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Di Stasi, A. (2019). Human Dignity as a Normative Concept. “Dialogue” Between European Courts (ECtHR and CJEU)?. In: Pinto de Albuquerque, P., Wojtyczek, K. (eds) Judicial Power in a Globalized World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20744-1_8

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