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Transnational Law’s Legitimacy Challenge for International Courts

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Judicial Power in a Globalized World

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Abstract

Transnational law raises important but complex questions, not least with respect to our understanding of legitimacy. This chapter reflects on how the development of transnational law may affect the legitimacy of international courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR). It does so through the adoption of an organizational sociology model of legitimacy, which is able to address some—though not all—of the new challenges raised by the characteristics of transnational law. It becomes clear that as international law is used as a vehicle for the development of transnational legal norms, international courts are increasingly used to legitimize such norms. While this can strengthen the position of international courts through continued and increased relevance in transnational processes, it can also weaken their legitimacy if such developments alienate the respective courts from their original constituencies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See in detail Sect. 2. See also Shaffer and Bodansky (2012).

  2. 2.

    The debate on what constitutes legitimate law, and the rule of law, is long standing. For an impression, see Bellamy (2015).

  3. 3.

    O’Donnell (2014) and Rosenfeld (2001).

  4. 4.

    See e.g. Weiler (2004) and Kumm (2004).

  5. 5.

    There is a rich body of work on this issue within criminology, see for example Jackson et al. (2012) and Meares (2000).

  6. 6.

    In the context of international law, consider Franck (2006).

  7. 7.

    On the link between social organization theory and criminal law enforcement/compliance, see Meares (1998).

  8. 8.

    In some contexts, this has also been referred to as “unilateral regulatory globalization”, see e.g. Bradford (2012), p. 3.

  9. 9.

    Shaffer and Bodansky (2012).

  10. 10.

    For a detailed overview of types of transnational regimes within environmental law, see Heyvaert (2019) chapter 2.4.

  11. 11.

    See in detail Cashore (2002).

  12. 12.

    This is particularly interesting in the context of this chapter as the EU’s legal system is not easily captured by existing models of national or international law but (arguably) also has not quite developed into a transnational legal system. See for a recent inquiry into the nature of EU governance, see van Zeben and Bobic (2019).

  13. 13.

    Schmidt (2013). A similar approach is applied by Cohen et al. in discussing the legitimacy of international courts. They refer to “source, process and result-oriented factors”. See Cohen et al. (2018), pp. 4–5.

  14. 14.

    Schmidt (2013), p. 2. See also Cohen et al. (2018), p. 2.

  15. 15.

    Schmidt (2013). See also Cohen et al. (2018).

  16. 16.

    Suchman (1995), p. 574.

  17. 17.

    Table adapted from Cashore (2002), p. 515.

  18. 18.

    Cashore (2002), p. 516.

  19. 19.

    Cashore (2002), p. 516.

  20. 20.

    Arguably, Suchman’s definition of legitimacy depends more heavily on whether an organization is perceived to act in a certain way, rather than actually acting in a certain way. Space precludes a detailed discussion of the important questions this raises regarding events and information that form people’s perceptions and how “sticky” these perceptions tend to be when people are faced with a change in facts. On this, see also Rowell (2019).

  21. 21.

    On the EU, see Weiler (2012).

  22. 22.

    See Rowell (2019).

  23. 23.

    Rowell (2019), pp. 516–518, refers to these audiences as Tier I (directly affected) and Tier II (indirectly affected civil society) audiences.

  24. 24.

    An illustration of this is the existence of the journal Transnational Environmental Law, available through https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/transnational-environmental-law. Accessed 5 Apr 2019.

  25. 25.

    On this, see also Shaffer and Bodansky (2012).

  26. 26.

    Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) [2007] OJ L136/3.

  27. 27.

    See Bradford (2012).

  28. 28.

    See discussion in Heyvaert (2019), p. 15 onwards.

  29. 29.

    This includes EU Regulation 1272/2008/EC on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 [2008] OJ L353/1.

  30. 30.

    See e.g. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (2003).

  31. 31.

    While this may be a positive development with respect to the durability of that specific transnational legal regime, it also increases the risk of path dependency within the regime, making it less flexible and able to respond to changes in the needs of the affected audience. On path dependency more generally, see Peters et al. (2005). On the need to responsive regulation, see Bennear and Wiener (2019).

  32. 32.

    For foundational (and diverging) texts, see Dicey (1982) and Dworkin (1986).

  33. 33.

    For examples from the United States, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) and Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). See also Kersch (2004) (discussing the use of foreign practices as a yardstick for American decisions) and Waters (2005). For a more general overview (covering 70 jurisdictions) see the Oxford Reports on International Law in Domestic Courts, available via http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/ILDC/oxford-reports-on-international-law-in-domestic-courts. Accessed 5 Apr 2019.

  34. 34.

    See Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, 41; Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585 ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, 41.

  35. 35.

    Created by the Rome Statute, document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by process-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.

  36. 36.

    Created by Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

  37. 37.

    Created through Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).

  38. 38.

    Important work is being done on the legitimacy of international courts through the University of Oslo’s PluriCourts project, see https://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/. Accessed 5 Apr 2019.

  39. 39.

    See Kmiec (2004) and Abraham (1993).

  40. 40.

    See Wallace (1998).

  41. 41.

    Conversely, in countries where such base legitimacy of the state is missing, courts can either be seen as cures to this problem or expressions of this.

  42. 42.

    See Shany (2014), pp. 145–147.

  43. 43.

    The Court of Justice of the EU has a relatively special position in this respect. The effect on its perceived legitimacy is debated, see Pollack (2018), p. 143.

  44. 44.

    It may be noted that some commentators have compared this lack of police power with the position of national constitutional courts, see Staton and Moore (2011).

  45. 45.

    von Bogdandy and Venzke (2012), p. 41.

  46. 46.

    The ECrtHR has also been instrumental in strengthening national democracies, see e.g. App. No. 24833/94, Matthews v. Great Britain, ECtHR (1999).

  47. 47.

    See by means of contrast the suggestions provided by von Bogdandy and Venzke as to how legitimacy of international courts may be increased, which prioritize the development and strengthening of national processes—such as expanding roles for the public in judicial elections and judicial proceedings and stressing the role of national organs in implementing international decisions. See von Bogdandy and Venzke (2012), p. 40.

  48. 48.

    For an overview, see Boyle (2012).

  49. 49.

    This has led to calls for an environmental protocol to be added to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which have been consistently rejected. The latest rejection was on 16 June 2010, when the Committee of Ministers again decided not to add a right to a healthy and viable environment to the ECHR. However, it also led to the adoption of a Manual on Human Rights and the Environment. See Council of Europe (2005) (‘Council of Europe Report’). See e.g. Desgagné (1995), Francioni (2010), pp. 48–54; Verschuuren (2015).

  50. 50.

    See generally Guerra v. Italy, 26 EHRR (1998) 357; Taskin v. Turkey, 42 EHRR (2006) 50, at paras 113–119; Tatar v. Romania [2009] ECtHR, at para. 88; Budayeva v. Russia [2008] ECtHR.

  51. 51.

    See cases López Ostra v Spain [1994] App no 16798/90, ECHR 46, (1995) 20 EHRR 277; Fadeyeva v Russian Federation, App No 55723/00, ECHR 2005-IV, [2005] ECHR 376; Öneryıldız v Turkey, App no 48939/99, ECHR 2004-XII, (2005) 41 EHRR 20. For the Aarhus Convention, see Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43, 38 I.L.M. 517.

  52. 52.

    See also Heyvaert (2019), p. 224.

  53. 53.

    See e.g. Guerra v. Italy, 26 EHRR (1998) 357 (where failure to provide information was found to affect right to life).

  54. 54.

    See e.g. European Court of Human Rights., Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary objections), judgement of 23 March 1995, para.75.

  55. 55.

    See e.g. the Conservative Party’s Manifesto for the 2010 General Election, available via https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Manifesto2010. Accessed 5 Apr 2019. At page 79: “To protect our freedoms from state encroachment and encourage greater social responsibility, we will replace the Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of Rights.”

  56. 56.

    On this, see also Land (2018), p. 83.

  57. 57.

    See e.g. Ssenyonjo (2017).

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  1. Worcester College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

    Josephine van Zeben

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    Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque  & Krzysztof Wojtyczek  & 

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van Zeben, J. (2019). Transnational Law’s Legitimacy Challenge for International Courts. In: Pinto de Albuquerque, P., Wojtyczek, K. (eds) Judicial Power in a Globalized World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20744-1_40

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