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A Reflective Science

  • Davood Gozli
Chapter
  • 231 Downloads

Abstract

This final chapter reviews the methods of critique in to experimental research. The critique emphasizes the presence of active subjects (researchers and participants) and the hierarchy of goals that motivate their actions. The reliance on naïve and uninterested participants, who are treated as means to scientific ends, resembles the mode of participation that researchers assign to themselves. The active roles of subjects are disregarded on both sides of the relation, both turning into tools of research productivity, performing a set of unquestioned tasks within fixed normative-descriptive contexts.

Keywords

Experimental psychology Reflective science Meta-science Subjectivity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Davood Gozli
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of MacauTaipaMacao

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