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Experience and Reality

  • Davood Gozli
Chapter
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Abstract

Three dimensions of experience are outlined. Experiences can vary in self-reference, valuation, and presence. Variation along these dimensions results partly from external factors and partly from our own thoughts and descriptions. Implications are drawn with respect to the subjective and objective domains, the nature of illusions, and description as a type of action. Through its descriptions, the experimental approach sets a uniform image of research participants with respect to self-reference, value, and presence.

Keywords

Self Self-reference Value Visibility Invisibility Presence Absence Description Perspective Objective Subjective Intersubjective Thought Action 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Davood Gozli
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of MacauTaipaMacao

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