Skip to main content

Conclusion

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Economic Perspectives on Government

Part of the book series: Foundations of Government and Public Administration ((FGPA))

  • 316 Accesses

Abstract

This concluding chapter brings together the major lessons of the book to consider some major criticisms of economics as a discipline and its application to government. Although such criticisms are not without merit, the economic method remains a useful tool for the positive and normative analysis of government.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Boettke, P. J., Horwitz, S., & Prychitko, D. L. (1986). Beyond equilibrium economics: Reflections on the uniqueness of the Austrian tradition. Market Process, 4, 6–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, G., & Lomasky, L. E. (1993). Democracy and decision: The pure theory of electoral preference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The limits of liberty: Between anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. M. (1984). Politics without romance: A sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications. In J. M. Buchanan & R. D. Tollison (Eds.), The theory of public choice II (pp. 11–22). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. M., & Vanberg, V. (1991). The market as a creative process. Economics and Philosophy, 7, 167–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caplan, B. (2007). The myth of the rational voter. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colander, D., Holt, R., & Rosser, B. (2004). The changing face of mainstream economics. Review of Political Economy, 16, 485–499.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conly, S. (2013). Against autonomy: Justifying coercive paternalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, H. (1969). Information and efficiency: Another viewpoint. Journal of Law and Economics, 12, 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dowding, K. (2005). Is it rational to vote? Five types of answer and a suggestion. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7, 442–459.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dowding, K., & Hindmoor, A. (1997). The usual suspects: Rational choice, socialism and political theory. New Political Economy, 2, 451–463.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, D. D. (1989). The machinery of freedom: Guide to a radical capitalism (2nd ed.). La Salle: Open Court Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grether, D. M., & Plott, C. R. (1979). Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon. American Economic Review, 69, 623–638.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hindmoor, A. M., & Taylor, B. R. (2015). Rational choice (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, D. B., & Stern, C. (2007). Is there a free-market economist in the house? The policy views of American Economic Association members. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66, 309–334.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kliemt, H. (2004). Contractarianism as liberal conservatism: Buchanan’s unfinished philosophical agenda. Constitutional Political Economy, 15, 171–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McClure, J., & Watts, T. (2016). The greatest externality story (n)ever told. American Economist, 61, 157–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems. American Economic Review, 100, 641–672.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation. New York: Farrar & Rhinehart.

    Google Scholar 

  • Potts, J. (2001). Knowledge and markets. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 11, 413–431.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Self, P. (1993). Government by the market? The politics of public choice. London: Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Self, P. (2000). Rolling back the market: Economic dogma and political choice. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. L. (2008). Rationality in economics: Constructivist and ecological forms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). The price of inequality: How today’s divided society endangers our future. New York: W. W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stringham, E. P. (2015). Private governance: Creating order in economic and social life. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Keith Dowding .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Dowding, K., Taylor, B.R. (2020). Conclusion. In: Economic Perspectives on Government. Foundations of Government and Public Administration. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19707-0_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics