Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games Through Environmental Personhood

  • Michèle BretonEmail author
  • Suzanne Zaccour
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 280)


This chapter opens a conversation between law and game theory on the personhood status of environmental entities. Specifically, we consider the granting of personhood status to a river that suffers from the production activity of a firm creating economic value, but also pollution emissions as a by-product. If no one lives downstream, for instance, traditional responses to the environmental problem are unsatisfactory. We show that environmental personhood can help achieve efficient bargaining solutions between polluters and environmental entities. We also report on various approaches that have been taken in some countries to endow environmental persons with means to protect their rights.


Environment Game theory Law Personhood 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HEC MontréalMontréalCanada
  2. 2.Oxford UniversityOxfordUK

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