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Key Reminiscences

  • Paul SyversonEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11565)

Abstract

I offer some reminiscences about work by Cathy Meadows as well as about working with and for Cathy Meadows. I also recall cryptographic protocol properties introduced in our work in the 1990s and show their applicability to analyzing novel protocols today. Specifically, I describe a recent protocol [8] for anonymous proof of account ownership using the novel primitive of secure channel injection (SCI). And I describe how the claim of transcript privacy for a specific SCI protocol depends on an implicit and not necessarily justified assumption of key virginity. I also discuss ways to modify the protocol to achieve intended goals.

References

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    Dierks, T., Rescorla, E.: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, August 2008. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246
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    Kemmerer, R., Meadows, C., Millen, J.: Three systems for cryptographic protocol analysis. J. Cryptol. 7(2), 79–130 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Rescorla, E.: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, August 2018. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
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    Syverson, P., Meadows, C.: A formal language for cryptographic protocol requirements. Des. Codes Crypt. 7(1/2), 27–59 (1996)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Wang, L., Asharov, G., Pass, R., Ristenpart, T., shelat, a.: Blind certificate authorities. In: Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2019), May 2019. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1022

Copyright information

© This is a U.S. government work and not under copyright protection in the U.S.; foreign copyright protection may apply 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.U.S. Naval Research LaboratoryWashington, D.C.USA

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