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Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning pp 214–238Cite as

Belenios: A Simple Private and Verifiable Electronic Voting System

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 11565)

Abstract

We present the electronic voting protocol Belenios together with its associated voting platform. Belenios guarantees vote privacy and full verifiability, even against a compromised voting server. While the core of the voting protocol was already described and formally proved secure, we detail here the complete voting system from the setup to the tally and the recovery procedures.

We comment on the use of Belenios in practice. In particular, we discuss the security choices made by election administrators w.r.t. the decryption key and the delegation of some setup tasks to the voting platform.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS, Inria, Univ. Lorraine, Lorraine, France

    Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry & Stéphane Glondu

Authors
  1. Véronique Cortier
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  2. Pierrick Gaudry
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  3. Stéphane Glondu
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Véronique Cortier .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Prof. Joshua D. Guttman

  2. George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

    Carl E. Landwehr

  3. University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA

    José Meseguer

  4. University of Hawai'i, Honolulu, HI, USA

    Prof. Dusko Pavlovic

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Cortier, V., Gaudry, P., Glondu, S. (2019). Belenios: A Simple Private and Verifiable Electronic Voting System. In: Guttman, J., Landwehr, C., Meseguer, J., Pavlovic, D. (eds) Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11565. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_14

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