Key Agreement via Protocols

  • Andrew William RoscoeEmail author
  • Lei Wang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11565)


Inspired by the ideas of no cloning and measurable degrading that quantum key agreement protocols rely on, we devise novel key agreement protocols for the classical world. Our protocols are based on identical devices that are mass produced and distributed among parties participating in the protocol. We thus use protocols a little outside their normal range and seemingly achieve the impossible by relying on certain assumptions on the devices.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University College Oxford Blockchain Research CentreOxfordUK
  2. 2.Oxford-Hainan Blockchain Research InstituteOxfordUK

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