Abstract
The scientificity of legal science depends both on a correct definition of which are its tasks and on the grade of compliance with demarcation criteria. With the former, legal science can be differentiated from other subject areas that also deal, more or less proximately, with law; from that definition, legal science gains its identity. With the latter, legal science obtains scientific reliability and becomes able to produce truth or truthlikeness outcomes; from that compliance, legal science can be purged from bad practices, removing its significant extents of wrongdoing. However, both conditions cannot ascertain and develop with the traditional descriptions of the tasks performed by legal scholars. Scientificity of legal science demands for a normative epistemological approach in order to establish a perimeter of what might be “good science” and to define the goals to be accomplished within an activity with the specificity of the “ought to be” as object of inquiry.
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- 1.
By “activity of legal scholars” it is meant the organized study of law, essentially realized by academics, and purportedly independent from any kind of external interests (Peczenik 2001, pp. 75 and 76; Nino 1989, p. 6). In other words, the activity usually designated as legal science, legal dogmatics or legal scholarship, even if these designations are not synonymous or are not seen as such (on designations, Guastini 2012, p. 149; Brunet 2014, p. 273). Obviously, law appears in others subject-object connections, irrelevant, however, for the present purposes: judges, public prosecutors, attorneys, administrative officials or addressees deal with law mainly for its practical or technologic functions (deciding on what ought or not to be done, how specific interests might be strategically defended or merely on reasons for action). On these roles, Frändberg (2018, pp. 5 and ff.). On science and technology, somehow here presupposed, Pearce (1989, p. 407); Vernengo (1986, p. 293).
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No doubt that with the exception everyone would be more “morally comfortable”, but the point is that the solution has nothing to do with language. On overinclusiveness, Schauer (1991, pp. 31 and ff.).
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Obviously, false in the sense that, from the single norm enacted, the consequence does not follow.
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Usually included within a general freedom of action or alike: for instance, articles 26/1 of the Portuguese Constitution or 2/1 of the German Constitution.
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Particularly, because lex superior conflicts here with lex specialis, asking for an “inexistent” second order norm of conflicts (given that a permissive statutory norm would be a special one in relation to both constitutional norms). Therefore, a balancing has to be carried out. On this, Zorrilla (2007, p. 153); Duarte (2010, p. 57). On the requirements of balancing, Alexy (2003, p. 436).
- 10.
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Something not difficult to demonstrate. If publishing such ultra-private irrelevant details will seriously interfere with privacy (“4” on the weight formula), the opposite gain in freedom of press does not amount to more than a light one (“1” on the weight formula for what would be the opposite interference). On this basis, quite inside reasonable borders, compliance with the substantive law of balancing cannot be seriously uttered. On the weight formula and its scales, Alexy (2014, pp. 514 and ff.); Lindahl (2009, p. 363).
- 12.
Obviously, these causes are no more than speculative hypotheses. However, from common experience, they seem to be the main causes for bad science in the legal field. No serious demonstration, however, can be presented. On reasons for bad science and pseudoscience, Hansson (2017, p. 43). On lies, fraud and bad science, Ladyman (2013, pp. 53 and ff.).
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As it happens when a norm sentence has more than one meaning (NS → N1 ∨ N2 ∨ N3) or a conflict of norms leads to a balancing solving consequences that are incompatible (N1 [Fx] ∨ N2 [Px]).
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On this reliabilism, Bird (1998, pp. 178 and ff.).
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Similarly, Margolis (2004, p. 629).
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Ladyman (2013, p. 50).
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Aligica (2003, p. 1038).
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Ladyman (2007, p. 358).
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Bird (1998, p. 103).
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For the next scheme, Niiniluoto (1980, p. 445).
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Popper (2002b, pp. 47 and ff.).
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For this history, Bird (1998, pp. 65 and ff.).
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Oreskes (2017, p. 19).
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As it happens with scientific models (Humphreys 2004, p. 560).
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Wrong subjectivism as biased argumentation or imposition of mere beliefs in opposition to correct subjectivism as described above. See Douglas (2004, p. 469).
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On cherry picking, Hansson (2017, p. 40).
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In the current activity of legal science these two spheres of incidence are not always visible; however, and for the sake of the universality of propositions, at least they have to be discoverable.
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On the norm of recognition in international law, Hart (1997, pp. 233 and ff.).
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Moreso and Navarro (1998, p. 276).
- 67.
Which is, in contemporary legal orders, the main way of changing a legal order. However, besides norms enacted by normative authorities, there are also customary norms, produced by human behavior. On the linguistic context of norms, Sandro (2015, pp. 267 and ff.); Duarte (2011, pp. 112 and ff.). On customary norms, Lamond (2014, pp. 43 and ff.); Guastini (1993, pp. 255 and ff.).
- 68.
- 69.
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Not forgetting, though, that the underlying problem of norm individuation is significantly more complicated than this (for instance, Raz 1980, pp. 72 and ff.; d’Almeida 2009, pp. 398 and ff.). However, and for the present purposes, presenting this structure is enough (Sartor 1991, pp. 155 and ff.). On the necessary presence of the antecedent, von Wright (1963, p. 74).
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On these forms, usually called as “soft law”, Jablonska-Blonca (1988, p. 64).
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From which it follows that the point is not to “stop speaking” about legal science (differently, Comanducci 2014, p. 287), but to “stop speaking” about legal dogmatics and to separate good from bad science within what is effectively done under this label. Additionally, accepting a semantic convention by which legal science is only legal theory and legal dogmatics is the branch of legal science related to specific areas of a legal order seems to be somehow absurd: there is no visible utility or reasonable justification in not calling science something that has to adjust to scientific parameters. It is more or less the same if, within zoology, the study of specific species would be named as “canonica” or something similar.
- 86.
- 87.
Nothing of this prevents the fact, as it will be addressed later on, that within legal science there are both formal and empirical propositions.
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Kelsen (1967, pp. 85 and ff.), although just paralleling with ethics.
- 89.
Which has to be understood, in the part related to what is the “deontic status of an action”, as both related to types of actions and their tokens (differently, Alchourrón and Bulygin 1998, p. 123; Lopes 2018, p. 24). It seems that nothing prevents legal science from expressing propositions regarding the “deontic status of John smoking in restaurant Z” as it does with the proposition expressing the “deontic status of smoking in restaurants”. On the contrary: the deductive character of “specific case” propositions shows that its strength (and trueness) is exactly the same assigned to “generic case” propositions.
- 90.
Rigorously, it seems that only pure interpretative propositions escape from this dual nature, since they do nothing else but describing the content of a norm. However, the criterion still stands: proposition individuation as presented can be operative even if a distinct function presupposes an underlying interpretative proposition. For a skeptic view, Mazzarese (1991, p. 59). Generally, Tuzet (2018, pp. 55 and ff.).
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On the other hand, if this would be the right place to insert propositions regarding the validity of a norm, the fact is that such a proposition whether is a norm conflictive one (regarding conflicts between superior and inferior norms) or of the membership type (if for validity on a situation of invalidity it is taken the consequence of a norm removal from the set). Therefore, a proposition of validity is a basic one (membership type) whenever it just states that a norm belongs or not to the set. On the ambiguity of propositions regarding validity, Frändberg (2018, p. 261); Mazzarese (1991, p. 41).
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Obviously, due to the dual nature of norm propositions (the interpretative presupposition), there is no chronological sequence between this category and the previous one.
- 94.
A good example of how much this is needed comes from unwritten antecedents: it is quite common that norms are expressed without a written antecedent (“all have freedom of expression”, for instance). However, if a norm defines the deontic status of an action, it logically entails as a condition the opportunities to perform such action (von Wright 1963, p. 74). Therefore, it would be reductive to describe a norm without signalizing, in the best way possible, under which conditions is a norm applicable.
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Hypothetical in the sense that it presents an hypothesis of “preferential” or “best” meaning. The topic will be addressed later on, though.
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Some specifications could have been done here, namely related to conflicts solvable by second order norms of conflicts, but they would not be more than internal variations of these categories. On the distinct scenarios of norms in conflict, for instance, Frändberg (2018, pp. 189 and ff.); Zorrilla (2007, pp. 86 and ff.).
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Or eventually not; but this is exactly the problem. See, Ratti (2015, p. 156).
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Niiniluoto (1991, p. 370).
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Bulygin (2015a, p. 305).
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Which means that with these kind of propositions legal science does not interfere with law. Even if some “indirect interference” can be conceivable (Pino 2019, pp. 29–45), it is not an interference in a proper sense: dynamics of law are strictly provided by law (Bulygin and Mendoca 2005, p. 63). However, interference as a reason for the lack of scientificity seems to have fragile grounds: even if the object might be somehow changed, which is more than doubtful, that change does not affect its external character; and a changed object is also an object of inquiry and also able for scientific knowledge (in the same way that a genetically modified animal does no suppress the scientificity of zoology). There seems to be, then, no contradiction between science and a changed object if its “externality” remains untouched (differently, Guastini 1999, p. 274, regarding Norberto Bobbio’s conception of legal science 1997, pp. 23 and ff.).
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It is relevant to notice, however, that in the rare situations where political suggestions coming from legal scientists become customary norms, the consistency of the whole process depends on a decisive acceptance showed (or validated) by courts. On the role of courts in customary norms, Canale (2009, p. 221).
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- 114.
Even though defeasibility has distant routes (for its history, Beltrán and Ratti 2012, pp. 11 and ff.; Brożek 2004, pp. 13 and ff.), only in the past 20 years it has become a central topic in legal theory. For instance, Prakken and Sartor (2004, pp. 118 and ff.); Hage and Peczenik (2000, pp. 305 and ff.).
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Haack (2007, p. 29).
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Or just seen as forms of science in a mere pre-paradigmatic stage (Hibbert 2016, p. 2).
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Duarte, D. (2019). Legal Science: The Demarcation Problem and the Perimeter of “Good Science”. In: Duarte, D., Moniz Lopes, P., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18671-5_9
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