Institutional Turn(s) in Theories of Legal Interpretation



The paper gives an overview of recent doctrines of legal interpretation that can be subsumed under the common name “institutional turn” in theories of legal interpretation. Among the reviewed theoretical positions are the ones from Jeremy Wаldron, Victoria Nourse, Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Scott Shapiro. It is concluded that the institutional turn in legal interpretation offers some significant insights into legal interpretation and interesting perspectives on the appropriate interpretative methodologies. The turn, however, does this by eschewing parts of traditional accounts of legal interpretation that are arguably worth preserving in any theory of legal interpretation.


Legal interpretation Institutions Legislation Courts 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Belgrade, Faculty of LawBelgradeSerbia

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