Abstract
This chapter first shows that prominent contributions to contemporary analytical philosophy of mind by Jaegwon Kim, John Searle and Daniel Dennett suffer from a pained dialectic between proud commitment to reason and despondent abandonment of reason. I then argue that their problems have not been remedied by the Wittgensteinian, ‘grammatical’ and ‘therapeutic’ contributions of Peter Hacker and John McDowell. The key issues in the philosophy of mind are intrinsically linked to controversial aspects of our moral and political self-understanding. The aims and criteria of success in philosophy of mind need to be reconsidered from this perspective. In the final sections I develop some suggestions with the help of tools derived from a sceptical reading of the later Wittgenstein.
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Notes
- 1.
There are parallels between my discussion here and the controversy in the phenomenological tradition between ‘Heideggerians’ and ‘Levinasians’ about the priority of fundamental ontology over ethics or vice versa. Heidegger’s aversion against moral concerns (how trivial!) cannot, I believe, be remedied by turning the tables on him. My proposal also stands in some tension with several of the contributions to the current volume.
- 2.
Are some mental phenomena or states of consciousness or brain-states better than others? (Is it better for a brain, organism or person to be in pain, or love, than not to be so?) This we may call the problem of moral value or the axiological problem in the philosophy of mind. From the perspective I pursue below it is striking that this issue, a potential P7 in RPPM, has received very little attention.
- 3.
I come back to the challenge coming from Peter Hacker and other Wittgensteinians below. I will not discuss challenges to the naturalistic paradigm stemming from phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty or from the Freud-tradition, including Lacan. I draw inspiration also from key authors in critical theory, including Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth and Arvi-Antti Särkelä. Their Left-Hegelian legacy allows them to keep social and political issues within view in their philosophy of mind (or Geist). Nevertheless I see them (even Apel, as I would argue,) as restricted in their philosophical imagination and ambition by the same kind of naturalistic strictures that we meet in the mainstream of analytic philosophy discussed here. Among the authors I have mentioned their closest affinity would be to McDowell some of whose views I will discuss below, and more so to Brandom, whose contribution I will not take on.
- 4.
RPPM owes much of its reliance on physicalism as a default framework in metaphysics to the debates in the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 30s, a debate to which Wittgenstein contributed through the Tractatus and through his intense exchange with Schlick, Waisman, Carmap and others. For discussion of the formation of physicalism and its varieties at the time see Stern (2007).
- 5.
- 6.
All quotes Q1–Q5 are from the first chapter of Kim (1998, pp. 1–3). Emphasis in original. I will introduce several quotes from this book. In order to facilitate later discussion of the material provided in the quotations I give them identifications, Q1, Q2, Q3 … and so on, as they appear.
- 7.
Quotes Q6–Q11 are all from Kim (1998, pp. 119f).
- 8.
Many authors who qualify as members of Kim’s community are more outspoken than Kim on seeing themselves as members of a club of excellence. For Kim’s attunement to this choir see e.g. Kim (1998, pp. 29f).
- 9.
‘Putting Consciousness back in the Brain’, in Bennett (2007, p. 123).
- 10.
- 11.
G.H. von Wright’s diagnostic essays on our times are mostly available only in Finnish and in the original Swedish. One of the finest aspects of these important essays, by a philosopher who also made important contributions to the philosophy of mind, is his keen interest in the self-understanding of science as a form of intelligibility and his hopeful openness to the notion that this self-understanding may yet undergo intrinsically induced transformations with huge cultural and political implications. Von Wright explicitly sees the discussion among scientists, not among philosophers, as the likely driver of change. See von Wright (1986, p. 153).
- 12.
Is Kim’s reductive physicalism really distinct from eliminative physicalism (or eliminative materialism to use the Churchland’s term). This is Kim’s gloss on the matter: ‘The reductive physicalist would claim that reductionism does retain mentality as a distinctive part of the physical domain, but its distinctiveness is physical distinctiveness, not some nonphysical distinctiveness.’ Kim (1998, p. 134, n. 35). I would like to ask: How much air can we pump into the distinction between physical distinctiveness and nonphysical distinctiveness? What meaning could Kim possible assign the notion ‘nonphysical distinctiveness’? Moreover: What is the physical distinctiveness that Kim holds on to which he thinks eliminativists give up?
- 13.
I leave the claim without detailed warrant. Some of my discussion of McDowell’s views below are relevant for my theme here (the issue of what grounds Kim produces for the superiority of his views against eliminative materialism) and, that discussion will, as I believe, address it from a more fruitful perspective than can be won if we only focus on sifting out the moral drivers behind the proliferation within RPPM of a large number of various alternatives to ‘bald naturalism’ (to use McDowell’s phrase) or ‘eliminative materialism’.
- 14.
For Wittgenstein’s respectful attitude to metaphysical philosophy see also Drury (1981, pp. 114–21).
- 15.
Or: try to read the first paragraph of remark number 97 in the Philosophical Investigations and try not to see it as part of an investigation in which the relation between logical and metaphysical questions is at stake.
- 16.
McDowell does not give any idea of what he thinks mediaeval superstition was. One almost gets the impression that McDowell wants to place science (whatever that is) above all criticism and that he would have to say that only a crazy person could use, with disgust, the expression ‘soapy water science’ as Wittgenstein does. (In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein et al., 1980. p. 56)—But we shall see soon that McDowell does not think Wittgenstein is crazy.
- 17.
The irrational nature of philosopher’s commitment to naturalism is perhaps best seen when philosophers are anxious that they might discover anti-naturalism in their midst and the sense of relief when they satisfy themselves that the danger has been avoided. A perfect example is the volume Rorty and His Critics edited by Robert Brandom. The narrative of the volume, as explained by the book’s editor, is centred around that notion that there is one supreme God of analytical philosophy which even Richard Rorty did not betray, and that is naturalism. In his Introduction Robert Brandom writes, with the emphasis rightly placed by Brandom himself: ‘Indeed, Rorty’s pragmatism is itself [ … ] a form of naturalism. [ … ] Rorty insists that he is being more resolutely naturalistic than the fans of natural science among analytic philosophers.’ (Brandom , 2000, p. xiv). The volume that follows can be seen as a monumental testimony to the gap there is between the fascination contemporary philosophers have with questions of the type: What kind of naturalism am I or is s/he? and What is the correct, or responsible naturalistic view of that? as compared with their relatively limited preoccupation with questions of the form: As long as and as far as it is not clear to me what naturalism is or what the word means (as long as it is not clear what it is to be a naturalist) why do I call myself a naturalist? What is the relation between my calling myself a naturalist as a neutral description (however unclear the meaning of that self-description) and myself thinking of myself as standing under a moral obligation, or political pressure?, to call myself a naturalist?—Of course I, am not implying that we have no reason to call ourselves naturalists.
- 18.
Sellars’s original distinction is between concepts that are intelligible only in ‘the logical space of reason’ and other concepts that can be employed in ‘empirical description’ of phenomena belonging to the logical space of law, as McDowell is keen to note (McDowell, 1996, p. xiv). For McDowell’s development of Sellar’s notion, see McDowell (1996, p. 71, n2 and passim).
- 19.
McDowell (1996, pp. xiv and 78). McDowell claims that natural sciences allow us to find a ‘distinctive kind of intelligibility’ ‘in things’ (p. xix). His explication of what the ‘natural-scientific intelligibility’ (that he thinks it would be ‘crazy’ (p. 109) to put at risk) is surprisingly meagre. We may note the claim that in natural science we deal with ‘disenchanted nature.’ (p. 70. McDowell’s does give the Weber reference, but no discussion of Weber’s broader diagnosis of modernity follows.) Further cues could be taken from what McDowell has to say about the scientific study of ‘natural connections’ (e.g. p. xvi) understood as connections between phenomena in ‘the realm of law’ (p. xv) as opposed to the non-scientific idea that we could make intelligible the subject matters that modern science now makes intelligible by viewing them as ‘filled with meaning’ (p. 71).—McDowell draws on Sellars and also on Davidson in making the first distinction. In the fifth Postscript to the second edition of Mind and World, McDowell brings in Frege for the same purpose. (p. 180.) It is interesting that he does not bring in the young Wittgenstein even if the contrast made (and perhaps therapeutically dissolved) in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus between the realm of science (the realm of contingent truths, of what may or not be the case) and the realm of logic (the realm of form, of what is a candidate for contingent truth vs. for tautologies and contradictions) is historically and systematically related to the discourse McDowell addresses. McDowell thereby escapes the challenge of making out how Wittgenstein’s scathing criticism, already in the Tractatus, culminating at 6.371 and 6.372, of the idea that science explains anything at all, is related to the idea Sellars and McDowell cherish, that science does make things intelligible in a formidable way.
- 20.
McDowell (1996, pp. 77–9, 84–6 and passim). McDowell use of the word spontaneity is derived from Kant and in particular from the Kantian idea that what he calls ‘spontaneity’ plays a role in articulating what understanding and knowledge is and how they are distinct from and complementary to mere receptive sensibility that is involved in intuition. Ibid. p. 4 and p. 4n3. The key reference to Kant is to the Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75. McDowell uses the Norman Kemp Smith translation as published by Macmillan, London 1929.
- 21.
- 22.
I draw on material offered in the first remark in the Introduction (McDowell, 1996, p. xi).
- 23.
This kind of ‘recommendation’ is a crucial part of the McDowell’s effort to present his strategic notion of ‘second nature’ as substantive and legitimate.
- 24.
Claims to such weak, liberal achievements abound in the book. See for instance pp. xxiii, xxiii, and 113. The status of weak doctrines in this sense and the notion of truth that they involve would be worth exploring, and could, arguably, be used to defend McDowell against my criticism. I will not embark on the topic here.
- 25.
In much of Mind and World McDowell elaborates the second step.
- 26.
The notion that we might free ourselves from anxiety through choice will not be discussed here. All discussion by Wittgenstein about how will and reason are related is of course pertinent here. See also Kierkegaard and Thulstrup (1962) and Nietzsche (1906). I discuss the topic in chap. 7 in Wallgren (2006).
- 27.
See Plato, Apology, 40e–41c.
- 28.
In the last pages of Mind and World this theme is brought up explicitly and Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode brought in as the key reference. McDowell chooses not to engage with Apel’s and Habermas’s critique of exactly those fundamental aspects of Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy, which are crucial to McDowell. See Apel (1975).
- 29.
Some readers might, as Rupert Read has pointed out to me, object that I am missing the point of McDowell’s ‘therapeutic’ or ‘resolute’ philosophical approach. The point, they would say, is that once we understand exactly what McDowell proposes the grip of the ‘mind—body problem’ will go away. In particular, have I failed to notice how McDowell’s work needs to be reviewed with a keen eye to what exactly is involved in the idea that his kind of philosophical work may help us discover limits of what makes sense. Have I attended with sufficient care to McDowell’s comments on these matters, at McDowell (1996, pp. 159, 178) and elsewhere? My contention is that McDowell remains in several places too close to the perspective of RPPM by presenting matters as if the attractions of RPPM were intellectual or theoretical more than they are practical, moral and concrete. Here is one example: On pages 76f. McDowell offers an explicit articulation of the notion that there are two conceptually ‘tolerable’ (not illusory!) conceptions of naturalism, ‘bald naturalism’ and the alternative which we arrive at if we ‘make room for spontaneity in nature, even though we deny that spontaneity is capturable by the resources of bald naturalism’—Let me once more repeat where the problem lies. The problem is that McDowell accepts (and not only for the sake of argument!) as respectable and familiar the conception that we might have expected that he would wish to unmask, namely bald naturalism. This becomes abundantly clear in how the sentence I just quoted continues: ‘we shall by the same token be rethinking our conception of what it takes for a position to be called ‘naturalism’.’ (McDowell, 1996, p. 77). To make my point fully clear: McDowell is express that he thinks we ‘rethink’ naturalism if we accept his kind of naturalism, which includes second nature and he implies that no rethinking is required to accept bald naturalism as a kind of naturalism. So, McDowell takes for granted that bald naturalism has been thought before we engage in rethinking. But is that so?
- 30.
Wittgenstein’s early philosophical reaction to Frege and Russell and his later reaction to G.E. Moore’s lecture ‘Proof of an External World’ turned, it seems to me, to a significant degree around this question about levels of reflexivity and about where questions come to an end. See the remark on Frege and Russell at p 5. in Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914–1916 (Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Klemke, & von Wright, 1979), remarks 5.43731 and 5.4733 in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1933), and, for the later phase, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, and von Wright (1970).
- 31.
Incisive on this: G.H. von Wright, In the Shadow of Descartes, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1998. See also Wittgenstein’s reflections on fate and freedom in Culture and Value, pp 69f. and von Wright’s reflections in his editorial preface to Culture and Value (Wittgenstein et al., 1980) and in his essay von Wright (1988).
- 32.
Paraphrased with only slight alteration from McDowell (1998, p. viii).
- 33.
The original is: ’[Wir sollten] nicht die ausser Frage stehenden historischen Fortschritte [vergessen lassen], die es in allen Dimensionen gibt, in denen Menschen lernen können’?
- 34.
Habermas’s does leave some room for a non-evading attitude to our evasion issues. See esp. Habermas (2012, p. 51).
- 35.
For my diagnosis of how a residue of dogmatic commitment to Kantian and Weberian notions of ‘differentiation’ between spheres of reason as progress deforms Habermas’s philosophy of modernity, see chap. 6 in Wallgren (2006).
- 36.
For instance in discussion of the so called locked-in syndrome these issues can become pertinent. I am grateful to Kai Kaila for pointing this out to me.
- 37.
Gaita , Raimond, Romulus, My Father, London: Review, 2000, pp. 194f.
- 38.
I think Rorty is more acute and more honest than most of his fellow naturalists in seeing through the paradoxes analytical philosophers tend to get involved in when they claim that naturalism is, or can be understood and defended as, a morally neutral truth. Rorty also places, I think quite correctly, the question of the moral truth of naturalism in a broad diagnostic and political context. I have tried to explain some of this, and also my differences with Rorty , in Wallgren (2006).
- 39.
Philosophical Investigations, remark 281. Quoted in Bennett (2007) by Bennett and Hacker at page 19, by Dennett at 78, by Searle at 101.
- 40.
We may say, with reference to McDowell, that Bennett and Hacker claim that they unmask as illusory the notion that we say something that makes sense when we say that pain is in the brain.
- 41.
A classic reference in the debate is Philosophical Investigations 500. ‘When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from language, withdrawn from circulation.’ Cora Diamond’s essay ‘Throwing Away the Ladder: How to read the Tractatus’ (Diamond, 1991a) may be the most important contribution to a line of thinking inspired by Wittgenstein which is often referred to as ‘therapeutic’ or ‘resolute’ ‘readings’ of Wittgenstein. See also e. g . Baker and Morris (2004), Crary and Read (2000) and Conant and Diamond (2004). For some discussion inspired by Anscombe of the Fregean background to this theme in Wittgenstein, see the essay ‘Frege and Nonsense’ (Diamond, 1991b). In her ‘Introduction II’ (Diamond, 1991c) Diamond traces Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s and Anscombe’s nonsense-theme back to Kant’s conception in his Logic of ‘understanding that is in agreement with itself.’ See esp. p. 29.
- 42.
For a relevant comparison of Derrida with Wittgenstein see Stone (2000).
- 43.
The most interesting difference between, say, Peter Hacker’s ‘grammatical’ interpretation and Gordon Baker’s ‘therapeutic’ interpretation is, it seems to me, indicated well by Katherine Morris in her Introduction to Baker’s Neglected Aspects, when she writes that ‘the middle Baker’, who worked closely together with Hacker, wanted to ‘police the borders of sense and nonsense’ while (later) Baker does not have such policing ambitions. The difference may be theorised as turning around normativity and agreement. The idea of ‘police’ is the idea of an external authority whose norms have validity independently of any acknowledgement by the participants in philosophical work. ‘Therapists’ emphasise the intrinsic links between normativity and consent or acknowledgement, a theme the importance of which was highlighted by Stanley Cavell in his (Cavell, 1979). But Baker, too, like James Conant and many other ‘therapeutic Wittgensteinians’ relies on the possibility of leading others to realise that what they thought makes sense does not do so.
- 44.
Some Wittgenstein scholars think we can draw from the later Wittgenstein the lesson that factual and conceptual questions are clearly, perhaps even fundamentally, different from each other. But that idea is easily mystified.
- 45.
For similar reflections by Wittgenstein as provided in the report by Bouwsma see also for instance p. 178 in Wittgenstein (1958).
- 46.
In their chapters in this volume Hannes Nykänen, Joel Backström and Niklas Toivakainen discuss the concepts of openness and love suggesting, if I understand them well, that in an open or loving relation between people we do not see each other as robots. But when Jesus says what he says on the cross, does he not see the Romans as robots? (Gospel of Luke, 23, 34 in The Holy Bible, 1869). And is what he says not an expression of his love for them? (The logic of sin and forgiveness.)
- 47.
See the chapters by Cerbone and Dain in this volume.
- 48.
One might also say that the very concept of ‘intellectual decidability’ is destabilised by our discussion. Let us say that we want to save the notion of intellectual decidability and that in order to do so we introduce the following stipulative definition: A matter is intellectually decidable if there are arguments such that rational agents will in the light of the arguments agree upon the truth of the matter. But it is an open question whether the definition clarifies anything. For a case-study, see Wallgren (2015). For a pertinent general discussion, see the essay ‘Anything but Argument?’ (Diamond, 1991d).
- 49.
In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein emphasises the interconnected nature of the topics he discusses, a feature of the book highlighted by Norman Malcolm (in Malcolm, 1954) and later by many more authors. For discussion of polyphony in Wittgenstein, see Pichler (2004) and Stern (2004) and references to earlier sources given there.
- 50.
- 51.
Similarly, Wittgenstein’s remark in Wittgenstein et al. (1980, pp. 69f), does not make much sense if we see it as rejecting or fighting against the naturalist constellation. Wittgenstein’s concern is with what he there calls ‘overestimation of science’, not with falsity or irrationality of science.
- 52.
For a reading of the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations which is congenial to my discussion here see again Stern (2004).
- 53.
Max Weber’s oeuvre is perhaps the most formidable, but also a deeply ambivalent, defence of the modern division of labour.
- 54.
- 55.
Obviously I am not suggesting that it is bad if a philosopher contributes to neuroscientific research. The point is that the ambition so defined is above all obscure. It offers no bridge or inroad into reflection on how philosophical discourse of mind meets daily practices, which are closely intertwined with scientific development. We may think here, to take just one controversial issue, of the nexus between mental health, psychopharmaceutical drugs and neuroscientific research. For a critical perspective see Gøtzsche, Peter C. Deadly Medicines and Organized Crime: How big pharma has corrupted healthcare, Taylor & Francis, 2013.
- 56.
See Wittgenstein (1958), Philosophical Investigations remarks 1 and 694.
- 57.
Among the authors I have cited Habermas more than others links his discussion of mind with his discussion of religion and the question of meaning of life within the context of a philosophical, diagnostic engagement with modernity. See references to Habermas given above. See also Taylor (1989).
- 58.
- 59.
Theunissen’s essay (Theunissen, 1991b) has influenced my understanding of the contribution of Parmenides to contemporary philosophy of mind.
- 60.
I am grateful to many students and colleagues including John Atkins, Joel Backström, David R. Cerbone, Mladen Dolar, Andreas Fjellstad, Kai Kaila, Hannes Nykänen, José Pereira da Silva, Alois Pichler, Rupert Read, David Stern, Tuomas Tahko, Pii Telakivi, Niklas Toivakainen, Tuomas Vesterinen and Bernt Österman for comments and criticism.
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Wallgren, T. (2019). Mind and Moral Matter. In: Backström, J., Nykänen, H., Toivakainen, N., Wallgren, T. (eds) Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18492-6_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18492-6_2
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