Abstract
In the classical social choice problem a society has to select an alternative from a given set. Once the alternative has been chosen all agents will remain members of the society. There are many situations where some agents decide to leave the society (the Brexit is a good example). We review some papers that study how to adapt some well known models of social choice for including the possibility of voluntary exit. Finally we give some list of open questions regarding this issue.
I want to thank D. Berga J. Massó and A. Neme the discussions we had during several years in which we have written several papers in this topic. The author is partially supported by research grants ECO2014-52616-R and ECO2015-70119-REDT from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Competitiveness, GRC 2015/014 from “Xunta de Galicia”, and 19320/PI/14 from “Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia”.
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Bergantiños, G. (2019). Exit in Social Choice. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_24
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