Abstract
Until now, economic theories of the firm have treated behaviour as postulated assumptions and described it as exogenously given. Accordingly, the content of firm members’ preferences ultimately determines organizational governance. However, applying Elinor Ostrom’s work to organizational governance allows for interpreting preference patterns endogenously. She provided the underpinnings for the propensity to cooperate based on the development and growth of social norms. Organizational governance can thus make it possible to reinforce conditional cooperation.
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Literature
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137–158.
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Frost, J. (2019). Jetta Frost Recommends “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms” by Elinor Ostrom. In: Frey, B., Schaltegger, C. (eds) 21st Century Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17740-9_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17740-9_19
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