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Private Anonymous Data Access

  • Ariel Hamlin
  • Rafail Ostrovsky
  • Mor WeissEmail author
  • Daniel Wichs
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11477)

Abstract

We consider a scenario where a server holds a huge database that it wants to make accessible to a large group of clients. After an initial setup phase, clients should be able to read arbitrary locations in the database while maintaining privacy (the server does not learn which locations are being read) and anonymity (the server does not learn which client is performing each read). This should hold even if the server colludes with a subset of the clients. Moreover, the run-time of both the server and the client during each read operation should be low, ideally only poly-logarithmic in the size of the database and the number of clients. We call this notion Private Anonymous Data Access (PANDA). PANDA simultaneously combines aspects of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) and Oblivious RAM (ORAM). PIR has no initial setup, and allows anybody to privately and anonymously access a public database, but the server’s run-time is linear in the data size. On the other hand, ORAM achieves poly-logarithmic server run-time, but requires an initial setup after which only a single client with a secret key can access the database. The goal of PANDA is to get the best of both worlds: allow many clients to privately and anonymously access the database as in PIR, while having an efficient server as in ORAM.

In this work, we construct bounded-collusion PANDA schemes, where the efficiency scales linearly with a bound on the number of corrupted clients that can collude with the server, but is otherwise poly-logarithmic in the data size and the total number of clients. Our solution relies on standard assumptions, namely the existence of fully homomorphic encryption, and combines techniques from both PIR and ORAM. We also extend PANDA to settings where clients can write to the database.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Rafail Ostrovsky is supported in part by NSF-BSF grant 1619348, DARPA SafeWare subcontract to Galois Inc., DARPA SPAWAR contract N66001-15-1C-4065, US-Israel BSF grant 2012366, OKAWA Foundation Research Award, IBM Faculty Research Award, Xerox Faculty Research Award, B. John Garrick Foundation Award, Teradata Research Award, and Lockheed-Martin Corporation Research Award. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. Mor Weiss is supported in part by ISF grants 1861/16 and 1399/17, and AFOSR Award FA9550-17-1-0069. Daniel Wichs and Ariel Hamlin are supported by NSF grants CNS-1314722, CNS-1413964, CNS-1750795 and the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ariel Hamlin
    • 1
  • Rafail Ostrovsky
    • 2
  • Mor Weiss
    • 1
    • 3
    Email author
  • Daniel Wichs
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceNortheastern UniversityBostonUSA
  2. 2.UCLALos AngelesUSA
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceIDC HerzliyaHerzliyaIsrael

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