Intelligence Prior to the Declaration of Emergency

Arditti, Roger C.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_5

Roger C. Arditti⁴

Part of the book series: Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World ((SCCCW))

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Abstract

Despite the background of organisational and personal infighting among the key actors in Britain’s intelligence apparatus in the Far East, officials still had to consider the implications of Malaya’s deteriorating security prior to the declaration of Emergency. This chapter demonstrates that both military intelligence and Malayan Security Service recognised from the earliest days of Britain’s return to Malaya in 1945 that the communists presented a credible existential threat, both in terms of capability and intent. This was reported to the Malayan government on a regular basis but, largely due to the organisational infighting that was taking place, this was ignored. The declaration of a state of Emergency was not a failure of intelligence. It was a failure to listen.

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Notes

1.
The British Military Administration was in existence from the return of the British to Malaya in August 1945 until the creation of the Malayan Union in April 1946.
2.
MSS Ind. Ocn. S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 1/46.
3.
CO 537/3751, Minute by Mr. Morris, 6 May 1948.
4.
Ibid., minutes by Mr. Williams, 11 May 1948.
5.
See R. Arditti and P. Davies, “Rethinking the Rise and Fall of the Malayan Security Service, 1946–48”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43: 2 (2015), pp. 292–316.
6.
CO 537/3751, minutes by Mr. Williams, 22 June 1948.
7.
A. Short, The Communist Insurrection (London 1975), pp. 82–83.
8.
L. Comber, “The Malayan Security Service (1945–48)”, Intelligence and National Security, 18: 3 (2003), pp. 128–153; L. Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–60—The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency (Singapore 2008).
9.
See Chin and Hack, eds., Dialogues with Chin Peng : New Light on the Malayan Communist Party ; Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng—My Side of History (Singapore 2003), pp. 195–223; K. Hack, “The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40: 3 (2009), pp. 471–496; P. Derry, “Malaya 1948: Britain’s Asian Cold War?”, Journal of Cold War Studies 9: 1 (2007), pp. 29–54; A. Stockwell, “Chin Peng and the Struggle for Malaya”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 16: 3 (2006), pp. 279–297; Short, The Communist Insurrection, pp. 82–83.
10.
Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star over Malaya, Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (Singapore 2012), pp. 59–61.
11.
Ibid., p. 60; F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (Singapore 2009), p. 10.
12.
M. Shennan, Our Man in Malaya (Stroud 2007), p. 127.
13.
B. Hembry, Malaya Spymaster (Singapore 2011), p. 265.
14.
Cheah, Red Star over Malaya, p. 163.
15.
Ibid., p. 99; Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng, pp. 119–121.
16.
Cheah, Red Star over Malaya, p. 99.
17.
Ibid., pp. 97, 149, and 249.
18.
CO 203/4497, 14 Army to ALFSEA, 12 October 1945.
19.
CO 537/1572, BMA Monthly Report, No. 4—December 1945.
20.
Ibid., No. 5—January 1946.
21.
Ibid., 4/47—31 March 1947.
22.
Ibid., 5/47—15 April 1947.
23.
Ibid., 16/47—30 September 1947.
24.
Ibid., 13/47—15 August 1947. See also 02/48—15 January 1948; 05/48—15 March 1948; 06/48—31 March 1948.
25.
Ibid., BMA Monthly Report, No. 6—February 1946.
26.
CO 537/1581, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 17, 23 February 1946.
27.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 3/46, 31 May 1946.
28.
Ibid.
29.
Ibid., 11/46—30 September 1946.
30.
Ibid., 9/47—15 June 1947.
31.
WO 268/550, HQ Malaya Command, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 63, 13 August 1947.
32.
Ibid.
33.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 15/47, 15 September 1947.
34.
Ibid., 19/47—15 November 1947.
35.
CO 537/1581, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 21, 23 March 1946.
36.
Ibid., Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 22, 2 April 1946.
37.
CO 537/1581, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 20, 16 March 1946.
38.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 11/47, 15 July 1947.
39.
Ibid., 12/47—31 July 1947.
40.
Ibid., 19/47—15 November 1947.
41.
Ibid., 10/47—30 June 1947.
42.
CO 537/1581, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 24, 16 April 1946.
43.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 6/46, 15 July 1946.
44.
CO 537/1582, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 38, 23 August 1946.
45.
Ibid., Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 39, 7 September 1946.
46.
CO 537/2140, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 49, 27 January 1947.
47.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 02/47, 28 February 1947.
48.
WO 268/550, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 66, 26 September 1947.
49.
Ibid.
50.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 17/47, 15 October 1947.
51.
Ibid.
52.
CO 537/3751, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 02/48, 15 January 1948.
53.
CO 537/1581, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 22, 2 April 1946.
54.
Ibid.
55.
CO 537/1582, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 39, 7 September 1946.
56.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 11/46, 30 September 1946.
57.
CO 537/1572, BMA Monthly Report, No. 4—December 1945.
58.
S. 251, MSS Political Intelligence Journal-No. 8/46, 15 August 1946.
59.
Ibid., 13/46—31 October 1946.
60.
Ibid., 12/46—15 October 1946.
61.
CO 537/1581, Weekly Intelligence Review-No. 29, 24 May 1946.
62.
WO 106/5448, General Sir N. Ritchie, Report on Operations in Malaya, June 1948–July 1949.
63.
CO 537/3751, 08/48—30 April 1948.
64.
Ibid., 09/48—15 May 1948.
65.
CO 537/3752, 10/48—31 May 1948.
66.
Ibid.
67.
Ibid.
68.
Ibid.
69.
Ibid.
70.
Ibid.
71.
Ibid., 11/48—15 June 1948.
72.
Ibid.
73.
Ibid.
74.
WO 268/584, Quarterly Historical Report of North Malaya Sub District, Quarter 1 April–30 June 1948, Appendix C, Report on Op Haystack, 23 April–25 May 1948.
75.
Ibid., HQ Malaya District, Report on Operation “Pathan”, 28 May 1948.
76.
WO 268/584, Note by British Adviser, Perak—Movement of Military to SUNGEI SIPUT at the request of Police in general support of law and order, 2 June 1948.
77.
Hembry, Malaya Spymaster, pp. 308–322.
78.
In the first half of June there were 19 murders and attempted murders, 3 arsons, and armed attacks on isolated police stations in Pahang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Johore, as well as Perak. See Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police, p. 36.
79.
The modern spelling of First Minister in Jawi is ‘Menteri’. However, the documents consistently use the spelling ‘Mentri’. The contemporary spelling will be adopted for this discussion. Similarly, the modern spelling of the location where emergency powers were declared is ‘Sungai Siput’. However, the documents consistently use the spelling ‘Sungei Siput. Again, the latter, older, spelling will be used.
80.
WO 268/584, Note by British Adviser, Perak—Movement of Military to SUNGEI SIPUT at the request of Police in general support of law and order, 2 June 1948.
81.
C. Bayly and T. Harper, Forgotten Wars—The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (London 2008), p. 426.
82.
CO 537/2638, Fortnightly Review of Communism in the Colonies, 18 June 1948.
83.
A contrary view is that murders were the logical outcome of the May 1948 Central Executive Committee to intimidate and kill ‘scabs’. However, there appears a dislocation of a quantum nature between an order of this kind, effectively aimed against native labour, and the murder of the ex-patriot British planters.
84.
CO 537/2647, Minutes of the Governor General’s Conference, 13 July 1948. Sir Alec Newboult was Chief Secretary in the Federation of Malaya’s administration. He was Officer Administrating the Government (OAG) in the interregnum between High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent’s death on 4 July 1948 and the arrival of Sir Henry Gurney on 13 September 1948.

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Independent Scholar, Wraysbury, UK
Roger C. Arditti

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Arditti, R.C. (2019). Intelligence Prior to the Declaration of Emergency. In: Counterinsurgency Intelligence and the Emergency in Malaya. Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_5

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16695-3_5
Published: 01 May 2019
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16694-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-16695-3
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