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The Revolutionary Rupture and the Political Field in Kurdistan: A Brief Survey

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The Forgotten Years of Kurdish Nationalism in Iran

Part of the book series: Minorities in West Asia and North Africa ((MWANA))

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Abstract

This chapter investigates the discursive representation of political and ideological positions and the constituencies of support of political forces operating within the ethnic boundaries of the Kurdish political field in the revolutionary conjuncture of 1978–1979. The analysis is further concerned with the discourse and practice of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komalay Shoreshgeri Zahmatkeshani Kurdistani Iran (KSZKI) on the means and conditions of the realisation of their stated strategies and objectives in the face of the political and military opposition by the revolutionary government in Tehran in the crucial period of 1979–1983. The chapter also focuses on the position of the non-Kurdish political forces, primarily the Tudeh Party and the Organization of Iranian People’s Fedaiyan, and their strategies to circumvent the ethnic boundaries of the political field and undermine the influence of the Kurdish political organisations. The chapter closes with a consideration of the processes and practices ensuring the consolidation of the Islamic regime and the subsequent marginalisation and expulsion of the KDPI and the KSZKI from the political and military fields in Rojhelat, marking the onset of a new and ongoing phase in the process of exilic nationalism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kianouri, the chairman of the Tudeh Party: ‘we have decided to create the independent organization of the Tudeh party in Kurdistan’ in Porsesh va Pasokh (Questions and Answers) 1358/1980.

  2. 2.

    The Fourth Congress of the KDPI was held in February 1980 in the critical political and ideological juncture defined by the takeover of the US Embassy by the Islamist students known as the followers of the Imam’s line, the adherents to Khomeini’s revolutionary stance, on 4 November 1979. The bulk of the information about the developments in the KDPI leading to the Fourth Congress and the subsequent conflict and tensions resulting in the split is derived from extensive discussions with Ghassemlou, Seraji, Hussami and Hassan Ghazi and two more participants, both former members of the central committee of the KDPI on various occasions.

  3. 3.

    The Tudeh opposition in the central committee of the KDPI was actively backed up by the Tudeh leadership in the political and discursive fields. The growing tension reached its climax in late May when seven members of the central committee, namely, Ghani Blurian, Mohamad Amin Seraji, Rahim Sayfi Ghazi, Fawziya Ghazi, Navid Moeini, Farouq Kaykhusrow and Ahmad Azizi, signed a letter criticising Ghassemlou’s leadership. The language of the letter was unmistakably Tudeh, focusing on issues already raised in the Tudeh’s numerous attacks on the leadership of the KDPI. The signatories criticised Ghassemlou for his grave strategic miscalculation, giving primacy to the struggle for Kurdish autonomy over the anti-imperialist struggle and waging armed action against the popular democratic regime in Iran. They further accused him of treason for collaboration with the Iraqi aggressors and helping their war effort against Iran in order to advance his own cause. Ghassemlou and his followers in the party reacted by branding the signatories as collaborators (ja’sh) and expelling them from the party. Ghassemlou denied the authenticity of the documents released by the breakaway group of seven and attributed it to a Tudeh plot to remove him from the leadership and take over the party. Hussami, a prominent member of the central committee at the time, also disputed the authenticity of the documents implicating Ghassemlou in treason. Seraji too criticised Blurian for publishing the letters, although he did not go as far as rejecting their authenticity. Hussami, disagreeing with their reason to oppose the leadership of the party and forming a Kurdish opposition to Ghassemlou in the Tudeh Party, was at the same time critical of the latter and his close circle of followers and devotees in the central committee for expelling the signatories, accusing them of collaborating with the Islamic regime and branding them as ja’sh. See also McDowall (1996, pp. 272–274).

  4. 4.

    Kar No. 62, 21 Khordad 1359/11 April 1980.

  5. 5.

    This issue was extensively discussed with Ghassemlou, Hussami and Seraji in various interviews when the perennial issue of the relationship with the Tudeh Party and the significance of the Soviet support kept coming up, especially in relation to the internal conflict and power struggle in the party leading to and after the Fourth Congress. My extensive discussions with Hassan Ghazi have also been illuminating in this respect given his in-depth knowledge of the working of the KDPI and his extensive contacts with various personalities in the higher echelons of party leadership. He was at the time an active member of the KDPI and participating in the party meetings.

  6. 6.

    See Note 2.

  7. 7.

    Although Ghassemlou insisted that he was in command and the main apparatuses of the party, especially the crucial Peshmarga force, were under his direct control, and that he was not much worried about the remaining pro-Tudeh elements in the central committee, he could not conceal his fear of the political schemes and machinations of the Tudeh leadership, especially Kianouri, its secretary general, to wrest the leadership of the party from him. On a number of occasions he referred to Kianouri’s speech, asking him to give up the leadership for six months and help to reduce conflict and tension in the KDPI (Porsesh va Pasokh March 1981), as a clear sign that his leadership was the only obstacle to the planned Tudeh takeover of the party. The Tudeh’s plan, and more generally its influence on the KDPI, Ghassemlou suggested implicitly, depended on the Soviet support. The Tudeh’s relationship with the Soviet Union loomed large in his thoughts about the conduct of the Tudeh Party after the Fourth Congress. Interview with Ghassemlou in London, November–December 1983 and December 1984.

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Vali, A. (2020). The Revolutionary Rupture and the Political Field in Kurdistan: A Brief Survey. In: The Forgotten Years of Kurdish Nationalism in Iran. Minorities in West Asia and North Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16069-2_8

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