Abstract
A vexing puzzle about vagueness, rationality, and evolution runs, in crude abbreviation, as follows: vague language use is demonstrably suboptimal if the goal is efficient, precise and cooperative information transmission; hence rational deliberation or evolutionary selection should, under this assumed goal, eradicate vagueness from language use. Since vagueness is pervasive and entrenched in all human languages, something has to give. In this paper, we focus on this problem in the context of signaling games. We provide an overview of a number of proposed ways in which vagueness may come into the picture in formal models of rational and evolutionary signaling. Most argue that vague signal use is simply the best we can get, given certain factors. Despite the plausibility of the proposals, we argue that a deeper understanding of the benefits of vagueness needs a more ecological perspective, namely one that goes beyond the local optimization of signaling strategies in a homogeneous population. As an example of one possible way to expand upon our current models, we propose two variants of a novel multi-population dynamic of imprecise imitation where, under certain conditions, populations with vague language use dominate over populations with precise language use.
J. P. Correia—Holder of a Ph.D. studentship by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (SFRH/BD/100437/2014).
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In fact, it has been argued (Vanderschraaf 1998) that Hume’s whole account of convention is very closely in line with modern game theory.
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Simon uses the term substantive instead of instrumental rationality, but the characterization is basically the same (Simon 1986, pp. 210–212).
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These terms will be used interchangeably.
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Correia, J.P., Franke, M. (2019). Towards an Ecology of Vagueness. In: Dietz, R. (eds) Vagueness and Rationality in Language Use and Cognition. Language, Cognition, and Mind, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15931-3_6
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