The Nomological Interpretation of the Wave Function
Friends of the so-called nomological interpretation of the wave function claim that the wave function does not represent a physical substance, nor does it represent a property of physical things; rather, it is law-like in nature. In this paper we critically assess this claim, exploring both its motivations and its drawbacks and reviewing some of the recent debates in the literature concerning such an interpretation.
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