Abstract
Our language encloses us in certain conceptual horizons. As regards the range of our cognition, we can say with confidence that there is a terrain beyond our horizons but we cannot say what it is. With regard to languages, we can say that they will shift the horizon boundary but, of course, not say how. And considerations of general principles indicate that there will be some fact whose specification is beyond the capacity of any and all language whatsoever. Given that we cannot possibly tell what lies in this terra incognita, its existence has little practical importance for us but its theoretical importance is immense.
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Rescher, N. (2019). The Limits of Language. In: Philosophical Clarifications. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15269-7_7
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