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Theory and Research Design

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Anti-Corruption Evidence

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 34))

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Abstract

The theories that guided the research are drawn from the literature on corruption, accountability, and parliamentary oversight from the institutionalist school of thought, especially the rational choice, historical, and sociological sub-schools. The research design utilized a mixed methodology, involving both quantitative and qualitative elements, and a mixed fixed/flexible research design; this approach follows Lieberman (Am Political Sci Rev 99(3):435–52, 2005). Data was collected through literature review and document search complemented by key informant interviews which included closed and open-ended questions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This approach was previously used by Stapenhurst (2011) and partially presented in Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012).

  2. 2.

    Parliamentary oversight comprises the oversight tools that a legislature adopts (e.g., specialized committees and supreme audit institutions (SAIs)) and the governance context (e.g., form of government and type of electoral system). Process is the glue binds these two concepts—oversight tools and governance context.

  3. 3.

    However, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the exact meaning of neo-institutionalism. According to Scott (2001, p. 33), there are “…two quite distinct groups: the historical and the rational choice theorists.” In this regard, Scott is implicitly supported by North (1990), Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Sanders (2006). However, Hall and Taylor (1996) add a third school, that of sociological institutionalism. We drew on all three institutionalist schools.

  4. 4.

    However, as Mulgan (1997) stresses, people of equal status may be accountable to one another as part of a mutual authority relationship as long as each accepts the authority of the other.

  5. 5.

    These theories and approaches are explained more fully in Stapenhurst (2011), pp. 40–52 and summarized in Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) pp. 18–23.

  6. 6.

    Other scholars, such as Uzzi and Dunlap (2005), emphasize the benefit to individuals from a web of social relationships and ties to individual actors.

  7. 7.

    (1) simple correlations, using Ordinal (Spearman’s rank) rather than Pearson correlations, because it is difficult to quantify corruption precisely—the CPI is not a precise measure of corruption but rather an interval measure of perceived corruption; (2) a maximum likelihood Ordered Probit specification; and (3) a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification. The latter two, used when running the regression models, are commonly applied in studies of the determinants of corruption (e.g., Lederman et al. 2001, 2005).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Rick Stapenhurst

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  1. Rick Stapenhurst
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Correspondence to Rick Stapenhurst .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Rick Stapenhurst

  2. African Centre for Parliamentary Affairs, Accra, Ghana

    Rasheed Draman

  3. Culver City, CA, USA

    Brooke Larson

  4. University of Westminster, London, UK

    Anthony Staddon

Appendix

Appendix

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Stapenhurst, R. (2020). Theory and Research Design. In: Stapenhurst, R., Draman, R., Larson, B., Staddon, A. (eds) Anti-Corruption Evidence. Studies in Public Choice, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_1

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