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Volatile Voters and a Volatile Party System: The Results

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The Italian General Election of 2018

Abstract

The outcome of the Italian General Election of 2018 was largely unexpected. None of the competitors secured majorities of seats in both chambers, but, most importantly, populist parties such as the Five-star Movement and the League increased their shares of the vote to a much greater extent than predicted by most polls, while the mainstream parties, mainly the Democratic Party and Forza Italia, suffered significant losses of votes. As a result, a brand new government consisting of the Five-star Movement and the League was formed. In this chapter, we give an account of what happened in the ballot, analysing the new electoral system; the results in terms of the votes won by coalitions and party lists; the social bases of the various party electorates, and finally the effects of the election outcome on the party system as a whole and on its continuous transformation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Under this ruling (no. 1/2014), the Court annulled a number of the Calderoli Law’s provisions, most significantly, those concerning the majority premium and the ‘closed’ lists. Specifically, the Court struck down the majority premium on the grounds that it was awarded to the party or coalition with a plurality of votes regardless of the actual share of votes the party or coalition had won. Meanwhile, it ruled that the closed lists were unconstitutional as they were too long and thus deprived voters of a real choice in the (s)election of representatives.

  2. 2.

    The Italicum—conceived and approved in connection with the Renzi-Boschi constitutional reform (which would later be rejected by a referendum)—was similar to the previous electoral system used up until 2013. The main differences were in the way the majority premium was awarded, and in the length of the party lists. The premium (55% of the total seats), was awarded to the largest party list with at least 40% of the vote at the first round of voting or, if no list achieved that share, to the list with the most votes in a run-off ballot. Party lists were still ‘closed’, but they were now shorter, ranging from 3 to 6 candidates so as to meet the Court’s requirements.

  3. 3.

    Constitutional Court judgement no. 35/2017 ruled out the run-off method provided for by the Italicum, as a consequence of which the majority bonus was not awarded if no party list reached the 40% vote threshold established for the first round of voting.

  4. 4.

    In analysing the geography of the 2018 results, we have divided Italy into the three classic zones: the North, the Red belt, the South. The Red belt is made up of four regions: Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Marche, and Umbria. The North consists of all seven regions north of this ‘red belt’: Aosta Valley, Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Trentino-South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria. The South is composed of the nine regions to the South of the Red belt: Latium, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Apulia, Calabria, Sardinia, and Sicily.

  5. 5.

    It should also be mentioned that the electoral systems used before the Rosato Law was approved included relevant differences in the way they translated votes into seats, which constituted a second potential source of difference in the results between the Chamber and the Senate (see, among others, D’Alimonte 2013).

  6. 6.

    The fact that the homogeneity between the results is present not just at the national level, but is also replicated at the district level, can be considered as an indication that the role of SMD candidates in orienting vote choice was very limited.

  7. 7.

    Actually, the heavy vote losses of the centre left, coupled with the major electoral gains of both the centre right and the M5s have made the party system appear a little less tri-polar and a little more bipolar than it was five years ago. Indeed, with a combined vote share of 70.0%, the two main aggregations of 2018—the centre right and the M5s—are stronger than were the two main aggregations–the centre left and the centre right—of 2013, with a combined vote share of 58.7%. Meanwhile, the third largest aggregation in 2018 (the centre left with 22.9% of the vote) is smaller than the third largest in 2013 (the M5s with 25.6% of the vote).

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Chiaramonte, A., Paparo, A. (2019). Volatile Voters and a Volatile Party System: The Results. In: Ceccarini, L., Newell, J. (eds) The Italian General Election of 2018. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13617-8_11

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