Abstract
Would it be possible to put wisdom-inquiry into practice? The answer is that it would not be politically possible in undemocratic, dictatorial regimes, but it would be possible in liberal democracies—although a struggle against hostile social groups would no doubt be required. How would the transition from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry help humanity resolve major global problems and conflicts? Academia organized along wisdom-inquiry lines would be actively devoted to helping humanity learn how to resolve conflicts and problems of living. Social inquiry and the humanities would be devoted to helping humanity build progress-achieving methods (arrived at by generalizing those of science) into diverse social and institutional endeavours—especially meta-methods designed to improve aims and methods of social endeavours so that that which is genuinely of value is increasingly realized. A basic task would be public education about what our problems are and what we need to do about them, conducted by means of two-way discussion and debate. All these activities could have a major impact on the capacity of people to grapple successfully with the global problems that confront us. None of these vital activities can be conducted properly granted knowledge-inquiry. It is reasonable to hold that implementation of wisdom-inquiry in academia would very substantially enhance the capacity of humanity to resolve our conflicts and global problems.
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- 1.
It is perfectly possible, however, for knowledge-inquiry to exist in such regimes, as long as it does not try to acquire knowledge about politically sensitive matters, or does not try to oppose dogmas dear to the regime. The natural sciences flourished in the Soviet Union, but ran into difficulties in connection with Lysenko’s doctrines favoured by Stalin. Wisdom-inquiry would, however, have been unthinkable. This illustrates the point that wisdom-inquiry is much more difficult to establish, politically, than knowledge-inquiry; the intellectual standards of wisdom-inquiry are much more demanding than those of knowledge-inquiry.
- 2.
Unless the species in question is a harmful virus or bacterium.
- 3.
Are (1)–(12) policies or aims? If we take our basic aim to be world civilization, then they may legitimately be considered to be policies, especially if put forward in contrast to other possibilities (such as world economic growth, conversion of humanity to Christianity or Islam, preservation of independent nation states). If, however, we forget about world civilization, and concentrate on one or other of (1)–(12) as an end in itself, then it becomes an aim rather than a policy; we need much more specific policies to attain the aim. A policy becomes an aim if considered as an end in itself; and, vice versa, an aim becomes a policy if considered as a means to the realization of a more basic aim, especially if it is one among a number of rival possible such means.
- 4.
- 5.
This feature of wisdom-education amounts to a straightforward application of rules (iii) and (iv) of rational problem solving (see Chap. 3, Sec. 3).
- 6.
Wisdom-inquiry would require there to be a version of this seminar at all levels of education, right up to the level of postgraduates and professors.
- 7.
The primary substitute is representational government. But in addition to deliberations associated more or less directly with the execution of political power, we need sustained deliberations carried on openly in public, concerning matters not always on the immediate political agenda, deliberations removed from political power, and thus free of the distortions brought about by power. Once upon a time the priesthood might have fulfilled this role. Today, neither the civil service nor the press can fulfil the role. Knowledge-inquiry cannot do it either, but wisdom-inquiry is designed specifically to take it up.
- 8.
I say ‘quasi-altruistic’ because what is involved is not acting for the benefit of others per se, but rather, acting for the benefit of oneself and others in the expectation that others will do likewise.
- 9.
I say “new quasi-altruistic actions” because all of social life, in a sense, relies on already established quasi-altruistic actions. What is more questionable is that new quasi-altruistic actions will become established in a society once the need for such actions has become generally recognized. Contemporary life exhibits many counter-instances. Everyone agrees in Britain, at the time of writing, that there are too many cars on the road; everyone expects everyone else to cut down on their use of the car. Few unilaterally make less use of their car in the expectation that others will follow.
- 10.
In recent times in the UK there has been a tendency for work for industry and government to increase; this makes it all the more important that philosophy of wisdom standards operate within universities, guiding involvement of universities with the rest of society for the good of humanity, and not just for the good of universities, the wealthy and powerful.
- 11.
This point was made in Sect. 3 of Chap. 4.
Reference
Maxwell N (2005) Philosophy seminars for five-year-olds. Learn Democracy 1(2):71–77
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Maxwell, N. (2019). How Would Wisdom-Inquiry Help?. In: Science and Enlightenment. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13420-4_7
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