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Three Levels of Naturalistic Knowledge

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Conceptual Spaces: Elaborations and Applications

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 405))

Abstract

A recent naturalistic epistemological account suggests that there are three nested basic forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge-how, conceptual knowledge-what, and propositional knowledge-that. These three knowledge-forms are grounded in cognitive neuroscience and are mapped to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory respectively. This article investigates and integrates the neuroscientifically grounded account with knowledge-accounts from cognitive ethology and cognitive psychology. It is found that procedural and semantic memory, on a neuroscientific level of analysis, matches an ethological reliabilist account. This formation also matches System 1 from dual process theory on a psychological level, whereas the addition of episodic memory, on the neuroscientific level of analysis, can account for System 2 on the psychological level. It is furthermore argued that semantic memory (conceptual knowledge-what) and the cognitive ability of categorization are linked to each other, and that they can be fruitfully modeled within a conceptual spaces framework.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a critique of Kornblith’s position see for example Bermúdez (2006).

  2. 2.

    Kornblith argues that cognitive ethology ‘gives us the only viable account of what knowledge is.’ (Kornblith 2002, p. 135, my italics). However, he does not motivate this restriction in a convincing way – pointed out by for example Kusch (2005) – and so this aspect of Kornblith’s otherwise fruitful ideas will not be heeded here.

  3. 3.

    Episodic memory (propositional knowledge) governing self-awareness and first-person phenomenology, on the other hand, is more naturally linked to internalism and forms of justification such as rationality and cognitive access (Tulving 2005; Alston 2005).

  4. 4.

    More or less similar domains and quality dimensions can also be found for other animals (see, e.g., Lorenz 1973; for an illuminating classic discussion see also Nagel 1974).

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Acknowledgments

I have had the great pleasure and privilege of investigating and discussing these topics with Peter Gärdenfors, and I am very grateful to Peter for sharing his vast knowledge, his eye for detail, and his positive energy. I would also like to thank Mauri Kaipainen for his generous and insightful remarks. Thanks to Trond Arild Tjøstheim for inspiring discussions. Finally I would like to thank my anonymous reviewers for comments.

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  1. Lund University, Lund, Sweden

    Andreas Stephens

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  1. Perspicamus LTD, Helsinki, Finland

    Mauri Kaipainen

  2. International Center for Formal Ontology, Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland

    Frank Zenker

  3. Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland

    Antti Hautamäki

  4. Cognitive Science, Lund University, Kungshuset, Lundagard, Lund, Sweden

    Peter Gärdenfors

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Stephens, A. (2019). Three Levels of Naturalistic Knowledge. In: Kaipainen, M., Zenker, F., Hautamäki, A., Gärdenfors, P. (eds) Conceptual Spaces: Elaborations and Applications. Synthese Library, vol 405. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12800-5_4

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