Abstract
The topic of this and the following chapter is deontological ethics (D). This chapter is concerned with characterizing it, and the next with assessing it. More specifically, in this chapter I argue that the different deontological theories take their point of departure from common-sense morality (CSM) and are as many attempts to elaborate, systematize, and justify that morality. As the characteristic features of deontological theories are inherited from CSM, I focus on the nature of the latter: what are its distinguishing features, and how are they to be explained?
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Notes
- 1.
This is partly an empirical, partly a conceptual claim. If people living in a certain area did not have a common set of norms regulating their dealings with each other, there would almost certainly be so much strife and dissension that we would not call this congregation of people a society.
Anthropologists inform us that in certain so-called “primitive” societies there is no distinction between morality, custom (etiquette), and law; hence in such societies there is no concept corresponding to our concept “morality”. Yet, I would contend, they have a norm system that encompasses norms that we count as moral, and in that sense they certainly have a morality.
- 2.
Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 87 f.
- 3.
Ibid., p. 92.
- 4.
According to Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 40), the term was coined by Henry Sidgwick.
- 5.
William Frankena, Ethics, p. 6.
- 6.
Gilbert Harman in Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 9. For a vastly detailed account of the variety in social moralities—an account that amply testifies to Harman’s verdict—see Edward Westermarck, The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1908), passim.
- 7.
Brandt, op. cit., p. 95.
- 8.
The first observation is perhaps only true of societies where these norm systems are clearly distinguished from each other.
- 9.
T. M. Scanlon, “Levels of Moral Thinking”, in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion (eds.), Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 134.
- 10.
John Maynard Keynes, “My Early Beliefs”, in his Two Memoirs (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949), p. 97; quoted from Tom Regan, Bloomsbury’s Prophet: G. E. Moore and the Development of His Moral Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), p. 247.
- 11.
The insight, due to modern historiography, of how different the moralities of past societies have been no doubt, had a similar impact. And so, I think, has the critical attitude to established morality taken by Marxism and psychoanalysis.
- 12.
See the many articles on the CSMs of different societies, both past and contemporary, under the heading of “Ethics and Morality”, in James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 13 vols. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner’s sons, 1908–26).
- 13.
For a vivid illustration of this, see Colin Turnbull, The Mountain People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).
- 14.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. III, Pt. II, Sec. V; ed. David Fate Norton and Mary Fate Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 (2000)), p. 334.
- 15.
Prisoners’ dilemmas—like lawn-crossers’ and consequentialists’ dilemmas, both of which will be introduced in subsequent chapters—are not, of course, dilemmas in the strict sense.
- 16.
For the sake of simplicity, the term “action” here includes omissions.
- 17.
This is obvious in the case of the norms belonging to the first category. It is perhaps a slight exaggeration in the case of the norms belonging to the second and third categories. In the following, I will mostly dwell upon the norms belonging to the first category.
- 18.
Something that bears witness to, at least, a dim awareness of the pertinent facts is the common reaction to moral misdemeanours, “What if everybody did that!”
- 19.
This claim is sometimes intertwined with and not clearly distinguished from (what may be called) social contractualism, the claim that political authority is, and can be justified as, the outcome of an express or tacit contract, viz. the time-honoured social contract.
- 20.
The Republic, 358c; quoted from H. D. P. Lee’s translation of The Republic, p. 45.
- 21.
Ibid., 358e–359a; Lee’s translation, p. 45. Notice that the Greek term dikaiosune, here translated as “justice”, actually “has a less legal and more moral meaning than ‘justice’; it is in fact the most general Greek word for morality, both as a personal quality and as issuing in right action” (Lee in the “Introduction” to his translation, p. 7, n. 1).
- 22.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Ch. XI; quoted from C. B. Macpherson’s ed., p. 161.
- 23.
Quoted from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, tr. G. D. H. Cole (London: Everyman, 1973), p. 177 f. The “law which we prescribe to ourselves” spoken of in the last sentence of the quoted passage is (the outcome of) that much discussed phenomenon which Rousseau calls “the general will” (“la volonté générale”). For a convincing interpretation of this concept that takes it to embody (what I call) a solution to a PD-situation, see W. G. Runciman and Amartya Sen, “Games, Justice and the General Will”, Mind, 74 (1965): 554–62. The connection between the general will and central elements in Kant’s moral philosophy is adumbrated by Cole in the “Introduction” to his translation:
The idea of the General Will is indeed essentially ethical: it is a principle of moral conduct applied to political behaviour. Ethically, it is one and the same as Kant’s conception of moral rationality. Kant, in effect, took it from Rousseau and applied it to the entire realm of conduct. The justification for this extension is to be found in Rousseau’s own attitude; for he protested more than once against attempts to treat moral and political philosophy apart, as distinct studies, and asserted their absolute unity. (Ibid., p. xxxvi)
- 24.
As a matter of fact, Hobbes explicitly denies that the state of nature actually once prevailed “all over the world”. See Leviathan, p. 187.
- 25.
What Hume terms “justice” is, roughly, the norms that are included in CSM, although Hume stresses the rules concerning property. “‘Justice’ is, in effect, Hume’s term for the virtue of following the rules and institutions that society creates to thwart the elements of the wolf and the serpent in our nature” (Tom Beauchamp in “Editor’s Introduction” to David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 35.)
- 26.
David Hume, op. cit., Sec. 3, Par. 21; p. 89.
- 27.
J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 113.
- 28.
Thomas Hobbes, op. cit., p. 183. There is a similar account in H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 190 f.
- 29.
Mary Midgley, “The Origin of Ethics”, in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993): 3–13.
- 30.
Ibid., p. 4.
- 31.
Ibid., pp. 9 and 5, respectively.
- 32.
David Hume, op. cit., Sec. 9, Par. 4; p. 147.
- 33.
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 106. Perhaps, however, Parfit means by “collective code” something different from what I mean.
- 34.
In the case of some norms, e.g., those concerning lying and promise-keeping, partial conformity to the norm would often be pointless since, without general conformity, people would not trust each other to abstain from lying and promise-breaking. (See my discussion in Sect.Sect. 5.5 and the Appendix.)
- 35.
For a survey of the many kinds of individualism characteristic of contemporary Western society—political, economic, religious, etc.—see Steven Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).
- 36.
Ibid., p. 101.
- 37.
Consider the following parallel: In Sweden, people are taught to drive a car (ride a bike, etc.) on the right-hand side of the road. They are not, of course, told the collective rule: It shall be the case that each person keeps to the right. This would not give the individual much guidance. Nevertheless, this is the fundamental rule, which, together with facts about people’s conformity to the rule, justifies the corresponding individualistic rule: You shall keep to the right. It was the collective rule that was the object of a referendum in Sweden in 1955.
- 38.
David Hume, op. cit., p. 86.
- 39.
In the following, I will sometimes talk as if I thought that other people who have commented on CSM have had CSM* in mind. Actually, what I think is that they have had at least something similar in mind, and I trust that my simplified way of talking will not be misleading.
- 40.
Immanuel Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives”, in Lewis White Beck (ed. and tr.), Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, reprint (New York: Garland, 1976): 346–50.
- 41.
For the sake of brevity I use the term “action” in the present context so as to include also omissions.
- 42.
Unlike CSM*, the norms of consequentialism are agent-neutral.
- 43.
Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, p. 99.
- 44.
Ibid., p. 98 f.
- 45.
Ibid., p. 117.
- 46.
Ibid., p. 98. Both of Williams’s examples are also examples of CSM*’s above mentioned recognition of constraints against harming people. Perhaps they might also be seen as illustrating the acts and omissions doctrine, to be discussed later in this section.
- 47.
For such criticism, see Jonathan Glover, “It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I do It”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 49 (1975): 171–90.
- 48.
Bernard Williams, “Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence”, in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- 49.
C. D. Broad, “Certain Features in G. E. Moore’s Ethical Doctrines”, in Paul Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Chicago and Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1942): 43–67; p. 54 f.
- 50.
Thomas Green, An Examination of the Leading Principle in the New System of Morals, 1798; quoted from D. H. Monro (ed.), A Guide to the British Moralists, p. 199.
- 51.
The, to my knowledge, best treatment of the socio-biological claims concerning CSM* is still the one contained in Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
- 52.
Excellent analyses of the distinction are given in Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
- 53.
In some societies, the probability that you might need help in such cases is higher, and in these societies I may accordingly be required to help you. I take up this issue later in the present subsection.
- 54.
The above explanation of the acts and omissions doctrine also explains the traditional view of positive and negative rights: the existence of negative rights is usually taken for granted, but the existence of positive rights is often called in question and, if acknowledged, not considered equally stringent.
- 55.
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung, Paton’s tr., p. 86.
- 56.
Ibid.
- 57.
An example of this is given in Fridtjof Nansen’s description of the Greenlanders: “A hard life has taught the Eskimo that even if he is a skilful hunter and can, as a rule, manage to hold his own well enough, there may come times when, without the help of his fellows, he would have to succumb. It is better, therefore, for him to help in his turn.” (Fridtjof Nansen, The First Crossing of Greenland, 2 vols. (London: Longman, Green & Co., 1890), Vol. 1, p. 304 f.; quoted from Edward Westermarck, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 560.
- 58.
Cf. my characterization of CSM* at the end of Sect. 2.6.
- 59.
CSM and, more generally, D side with the negative version of the golden rule (see Sect. 4.4), whereas C sides with the positive version.
- 60.
Michael Slote, Common-sense Morality and Consequentialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). The asymmetry had not gone totally unnoticed before Slote put his finger on it. Both Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 431 f.) and W. D. Ross (Foundations of Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 72 ff., 272 ff.) comment on it. Sidgwick thinks that the asymmetry is, all things considered, compatible with utilitarianism, and Ross, who thinks that it is not, finds the asymmetry intuitively acceptable and therefore unproblematic.
- 61.
Slote, op. cit., p. 10. It should be noted that some deontologists, e.g., Kant, think that, according to CSM, we have moral obligations to ourselves. This may be due to a lingering Christian influence: we are created by God, are his property, and therefore cannot deal with ourselves as we please. Consider how Shakespeare makes Hamlet burst out: “O, […] that the Everlasting had not fix’d/His canon ’gainst self-slaughter!” (Hamlet, Act 5, Scene 2, lines 129–32.
- 62.
But language is not always a reliable indicator; suicide is called “Selbstmord” in German and “självmord” in Swedish, both words meaning self-murder.
- 63.
Ibid., op. cit., p.14.
- 64.
G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1976).
- 65.
Slote, op. cit., p. 20. Slote gives two other examples, but they add nothing essential.
- 66.
Collins Dictionary of the English Language (Glasgow: Collins, 1985); my emphasis.
- 67.
Michael Slote, “Virtue Ethics”, in Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 181.
- 68.
Ibid., p. 182.
- 69.
This explanation is tentatively suggested by Shelly Kagan in Normative Ethics, p. 250 f.
- 70.
It is not, perhaps, strictly true that ethical egoism has its origin in common-sense morality. Though common sense, no doubt, harbours the conviction that one ought (or, at least, is permitted) to fulfil one’s own interest, the conviction is not, perhaps, (properly) regarded as an unmistakably moral one.
- 71.
To verify that this is true with respect to English-speaking philosophy from Hobbes onwards, the reader should consult the following anthologies: L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1897); D. D. Raphael, British Moralists 1650–1800, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969; D. H. Monro, op. cit.
- 72.
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 404; the quotation is from H. J. Paton’s translation, The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson, 1948), p. 69.
- 73.
W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 40 f.
- 74.
In the previous section, I called these features “deontological”. And it might seem to be a trivial task to show that deontological theories manifest deontological features. But it is not trivial that deontological features manifest most of the features characteristic of CSM*, and this is what I will try to show. Notice also that the fact that a theory does not manifest a deontological feature does not, of course, mean that it does not acknowledge it; the feature may just be taken for granted.
- 75.
According to David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, the basic distinguishing features of deontology standardly fall under three rubrics, viz. constraints, options, and duties of special relationships. See their “Deontology” in David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006): 424–58.
- 76.
Ibid., p. 19.
- 77.
Ibid., p. 21; cf. p. 39.
- 78.
Ibid., p. 22. (Here, I take it, “prima facie” means intuitively.)
- 79.
Ibid., p. 21. Ross puts truth-telling and promise-keeping together since he considers the former as resting on an implicit promise.
- 80.
Ibid., p. 24.
- 81.
Alan Donagan, op. cit.
- 82.
Ibid., p. 155. (A perfect duty “is simply a duty not to do, or not to omit, an action of a certain kind: not to murder, [n]ot to lie, not to omit to pay a debt” (ibid., p. 154). This quotation also illustrates Donagan’s adherence to the acts and omissions doctrine.
- 83.
Ibid., p. 86.
- 84.
Ibid., p. 206.
- 85.
Ibid., p. 208.
- 86.
Ibid., p. 66. As I said in Sect. 2.4, such convictions may be due to Christian influence. And, as I mentioned above, Donagan considers his theory to be an exposition of the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition.
- 87.
Ibid., p. 92 ff. and p. 88 ff., respectively.
- 88.
Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978).
- 89.
Ibid., p. 11.
- 90.
Ibid., p. 13.
- 91.
Ibid., p. 67 f.
- 92.
Ibid., p. 36. Among special relationships, kinship and friendship are mentioned (ibid., p. 173).
- 93.
Ibid., p. 17.
- 94.
Ibid., p. 1.
- 95.
Ibid., p. 21.
- 96.
Ibid., p. 21 f. The doctrine (law, principle) of double effect is not, as Fried claims, a specification of the acts and omissions doctrine. If, for example, I intentionally omit an action, I may be acting wrongly according to the former doctrine but not according to the latter. At other places, e.g., at p. 52, Fried implicitly recognizes that the doctrines do not come to the same thing.
- 97.
The doctrine of double effect is often traced back to Aquinas. But, according to Jonathan Bennett, this attribution is not correct: “The history of the principle of double effect, indeed, is clear only back into the nineteenth century.” (Op. cit., p. 200.) Among modern defenders of the doctrine are G. E. M. Anscombe, in “Modern Moral Philosophy”: 26–42, and Thomas Nagel, in The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). The doctrine is scathingly criticized by Bennett (op. cit., p. 196 ff.)
- 98.
More costly benefits are normally considered supererogatory, that is, praiseworthy but not obligatory.
- 99.
In Sect. 2.4, i showed that this set of norms manifest the deontological features described there.
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Österberg, J. (2019). Deontological Ethics: Exposition. In: Towards Reunion in Ethics. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12410-6_2
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