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On the Transcendence and Reality of Husserlian Objects

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Book cover New Phenomenological Studies in Japan

Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 101))

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Abstract

We often expect Husserl’s concept of intentionality to be the key to opening our minds to the world. The phenomenological sphere of consciousness is not a closed encapsulated sphere, but open to the world. The phenomenological method, however, forbids appealing to naïve realism exclusively as it concentrates on immanently accessible conscious experiences. How can these two features be compatible with one another? This paper examines this question while seeking to justify Husserl’s claim that an intentional object is the real and actual object itself, and transcendent in the sense that it is beyond our grasp of meanings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This means “we cannot experience it within our actual concrete experiences,” and not in the sense that it is an inaccessible possible world with respect to an accessible relation in the framework of possible world semantics.

  2. 2.

    A decidable procedure is a well-defined inscription which ensures the answer can be determined as yes or no within finite steps in all cases, and a semi-decidable procedure ensure the answer yes within finite steps in positive cases. See, for example, Enderton 2001, pp. 61–65.

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Tomiyama, Y. (2019). On the Transcendence and Reality of Husserlian Objects. In: de Warren, N., Taguchi, S. (eds) New Phenomenological Studies in Japan. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 101. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11893-8_4

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