Abstract
In recent years, advancements in digital technologies have brought many advantages for consumers and citizens. At the same time, consumers share vast and increasing amounts of personal data in the digital era. As concerns regarding privacy increase, so do the number of businesses whose business model revolves around personal data. Many of these businesses are platforms, which due to the inherent network effects often have considerable market power. The combination of powerful and data-rich platforms has gained the attention of competition authorities. Big Data played a central role in various recent competition law cases, such as the Facebook/Whatsapp merger, the DoubleClick/Google merger and the Bundeskartellamt’s abuse of dominance probe into Facebook. This paper critically assesses to what extent competition law can address the concerns in digital markets. It argues that, while privacy concerns may be particularly pervasive in relation to firms with market power, the solution for privacy concerns is likely to lie in data protection law rather than competition law. In cases where, instead, market power based on data is the reason for concern, competition authorities may be better apt to intervene.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Costa-Cabral and Lynskey (2017), p. 12.
- 3.
OECD (2015), p. 143 ff.
- 4.
Vezzoso (2016), p. 1.
- 5.
- 6.
Google/DoubleClick (Case COMP/M.4731) Commission decision C(2008) 927 [2008] OJ C184/10 (‘Google/DoubleClick’).
- 7.
Facebook/WhatsApp (Case COMP/M.7217) Commission Decision C (2014)7239 [2014] OJ C417/4 (‘Facebook/WhatsApp’).
- 8.
Microsoft/LinkedIn (Case COMP/M.8124) Commission Decision C(2016) 8404 [2016] OJ C388/4 (‘Microsoft/LinkedIn’).
- 9.
Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46, O.J. 2016, L 119/1.
- 10.
- 11.
Stucke and Grunes (2015).
- 12.
Balto and Lane (2016).
- 13.
Pitruzzella (2017), p. 78.
- 14.
Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax, [2006] ECR I-11125 (“Asnef-Equifax”), para 63.
- 15.
Google/DoubleClick, paras 359 and 366.
- 16.
Asnef-Equifax, para 368.
- 17.
Harbour (2007).
- 18.
Facebook/WhatsApp.
- 19.
Facebook/WhatsApp, paras. 70–71 and para 102.
- 20.
Ribeiro (2016).
- 21.
WhatsApp Legal Information, WhatsApp Privacy Policy.
- 22.
European Commission Press release “Commission fines Facebook €110 million for providing misleading information about WhatsApp takeover”.
- 23.
Facebook/WhatsApp, para 164.
- 24.
Miller (2016), p. 7.
- 25.
European Commission Press Release “Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, subject to conditions”.
- 26.
Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 324.
- 27.
Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 350.
- 28.
Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 365.
- 29.
Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 177.
- 30.
Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 178.
- 31.
Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 366.
- 32.
Bundeskartellamt, Press Release, ‘Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of having abused its market power by infringing data protection rules’.
- 33.
Bundeskartellamt, Press Release (March 2016).
- 34.
Davilla (2017), p. 381.
- 35.
CNIL statement (2017).
- 36.
Belgische Privacycommissie v. Facebook Inc, 16 February 2018.
- 37.
Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens statement (2017).
- 38.
Kerber (2017), p. 858.
- 39.
Europe Economics (2016), p. 2.
- 40.
Evans (2013).
- 41.
Senftleben et al. (2016).
- 42.
- 43.
Rubinfeld and Gal (2017), p. 340.
- 44.
See e.g. Sokol and Comerford (2016), referring to Competition Commissioner Vestager and FTC Chairwoman Ramirez.
- 45.
Graef (2016).
- 46.
Balto and Lane (2016), p. 2.
- 47.
Kuneva (2009), Speech of former Consumer Commissioner Kuneva at the Roundtable on Online Data Collection.
- 48.
Schepp and Wambach (2016), p. 121.
- 49.
Miller (2016), p. 5.
- 50.
- 51.
- 52.
Shapiro and Varian (1999).
- 53.
Sokol and Comerford (2016).
- 54.
Miller (2016), p. 5.
- 55.
Harbour (2007).
- 56.
Rubinfeld and Gal (2017), p. 351.
- 57.
Ibid.
- 58.
20140457: Google, Inc.; Nest Labs Inc., 2014.
- 59.
Chiou and Tucker (2014).
- 60.
Cecere et al. (2017), p. 2.
- 61.
- 62.
Cecere et al. (2017), p. 1.
- 63.
Westin (1967).
- 64.
Schoeman (1992).
- 65.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 8.
- 66.
Larouche et al. (2016), p. 18.
- 67.
Cecere et al. (2017), p. 2.
- 68.
Kerber (2017), p. 858.
- 69.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 28.
- 70.
- 71.
Anderson and Simester (2010).
- 72.
Larouche et al. (2016), pp. 19–20.
- 73.
Lambrecht and Tucker (2013).
- 74.
Larouche et al. (2016), p. 20.
- 75.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 23.
- 76.
Acquisti et al. (2012).
- 77.
Varian (2010).
- 78.
Larouche et al. (2016), p. 17.
- 79.
Anand and Shachar (2009).
- 80.
Stone (2010).
- 81.
Larouche et al. (2016), p. 21.
- 82.
- 83.
Kerber (2017), p. 857.
- 84.
Farrell (2012), pp. 251–252.
- 85.
Larouche et al. (2016), p. 21.
- 86.
Larouche et al. (2016), p. 18.
- 87.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 23.
- 88.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 7.
- 89.
- 90.
Cecere et al. (2017), p. 3.
- 91.
Kerber (2017), p. 858.
- 92.
Acquisti (2012), p. 229.
- 93.
Cecere et al. (2017), p. 3.
- 94.
- 95.
Varian (1997).
- 96.
- 97.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 6.
- 98.
Berthold and Boehme (2010).
- 99.
Cecere et al. (2017), p. 2.
- 100.
- 101.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 5.
- 102.
Cecere et al. (2017), p. 3.
- 103.
- 104.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 39.
- 105.
See Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 39 ff. for an overview.
- 106.
- 107.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 42.
- 108.
Solove (2002).
- 109.
Rubin and Lenard (2001).
- 110.
Acquisti et al. (2016), p. 42.
- 111.
Larouche et al. (2016), p. 19.
- 112.
E.g. Directive 95/46, Art. 2.
- 113.
GDPR, Preamble paras 9–15.
- 114.
Article 4(1) GDPR.
- 115.
See further Graef (2016), p. 8.
- 116.
Article 15 GDPR.
- 117.
Article 17 GDPR.
- 118.
Article 20 GDPR.
- 119.
Article 83, paragraph 5 GDPR.
- 120.
Article 83, paragraph 4 GDPR.
- 121.
Stucke and Grunes (2015).
- 122.
- 123.
Balto and Lane (2016), p. 7.
- 124.
International Competition Network (2007), pp. 6–21.
- 125.
Bhattacharya and Buiten (2018).
- 126.
US Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission (2010), Horizontal Merger Guidelines, p. 2.
- 127.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
- 128.
OECD (2016).
- 129.
Colangelo and Maggiolino (2017), p. 364.
- 130.
Ohlhausen and Okuliar (2015), p. 32.
- 131.
Costa Cabral and Lynskey (2017), p. 18.
- 132.
Costa Cabral and Lynskey (2017), p. 18.
- 133.
Ohlhausen and Okuliar (2015), p. 32.
- 134.
Sokol and Comerford (2016), p. 10.
- 135.
Ohlhausen and Okuliar (2015), p. 121.
- 136.
Stucke and Grunes (2016).
- 137.
- 138.
Tucker (2015).
- 139.
Kimmel and Kestenbaum (2014), p. 53.
- 140.
Rubinfeld and Gal (2017), p. 360.
- 141.
Ibid., p. 361.
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Funding by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC TR 224 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Buiten, M.C. (2019). Regulating Data Giants: Between Competition Law and Data Protection Law. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) New Developments in Competition Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11611-8_13
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